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ABSTRACT
The problem undertaken. In this dissertation is
to discover the importance of the role played by Eugene
Beauharnais as viceroy of the Kingdom of Italy during
the existence of the Napoleonic Empire.

The dominant

figure of Napoleon overshadows all other persons, and
appreciation of the importance of the men about him has
been lost in many instances.
Beauharnais.

Such is the case of Eugene

Some historians dismiss him as simply one

of Napoleon*s lackeys who supinely served the whims of
the French Emperor.

It is the belief of this writer

that such an interpretation of Beauharnais is in error.
Indeed, it is unjust.
The evidence contained in the personal letters
of Eugene written to members of the Italian government
during his viceroyalty indicates that the Prince Viceroy
did take action on his own initiative as occasion de
manded.

More importantly, a number of the letters indi

cate that from time to time he took action diametrically
opposed to orders he received from Napoleon.
I have arrived at the conclusion that Beauharnais
became a first-class administrator.

The conclusion was

reached after reading the letters of Napoleon to Eugene
reproduced in the official Correspondance of the Em
peror, the letters of Eugene to Napoleon reproduced in
his Memoires, and Eugene*s Letterbook, which is con
tained in manuscript in the Beauharnais Archive at
Princeton University.

In addition to these letters,

selected Napoleonic authorities have been consulted for
material on the Emperor himself,

disappointingly lit

tle material on the Yiceroy is available, and most of
that is of doubtful worth.
In studying the development of the Kingdom of
Italy under the direction of Eugene, his role as ad
ministrator loomed ever larger.

As important, at least,

as his actions were his personality and ability.

With

out men of ability to aid him, Napoleon would have been
an impossibility.

It is hoped that this dissertation

will help to bring into clearer light Eugene Beauharnais,
a person of integrity and ability who suffers undeserved
historical obscurity.
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CHAPTER I
PROLOGUE TO PAME
Eugene-Rose de Beauliamais, the only son of the
vi comte Alexandre de Beauharnais and Josephine Tascher
de la Pagerie, was bora in Paris, 3 September 1781

A, Du Casse (ed.). Memoires et correspondence
politique et militaire du Prince BugSne flO vols.s Paris:

Miahel Levy FrSres, 1858-60), I, 2 7 - 2 8 . (Hereafter cited
as Eugene, Memoires). The dictated portion of Eugene
Beauharnais* Memoires consists of only some one hundred
pages of the first of ten volumes* There is doubt con
cerning the worth of these hundred-odd pages as a valid
historical source, for the editor states that they were
dictated by Prince Eugene to his secretary in 1822, some
seventeen to twenty-five years after the events narrated
occurred. Eugene suffered a stroke in late March 1823,
and never fully recovered* As a result, the narrative
stops with Eugene’s report of becoming viceroy in 1805.
Regardless of the reasons for approaching Eugene’s dic
tated memoirs with caution, the letters reproduced in
Du Casse's edition are invaluable as source material.
The commentary interspersed between sections devoted to
letters is worthless as a source. Du Casse loved his
subject too much; in his eyes Eugene was nothing short
of a genius in every field, and the commentary is de
signed to bring the reader to the same conclusion. See
also Mine. P. E. Planat de la Faye (ed. and arranger),#
Vie de Planat de la Faye, souvenirs, lettres. et dietees
(.Paris; Paul Ollendorff, 1895)* 449. (Hereafter cited
as ffime. Planat, Tie de Planat).

1

2

His parents separated in 1784, due to Josephine*s in2

discretions, and were not reconciled until just before
the outbreak of the French Revolution.

Sometime during

the period of his parents* estrangement Eugene entered
•Z

the college at Harcourt and remained there until 1790.
From this time until the arrest of his father in 1794
he was at home with his parents and served as a page
during the sessions of the National Constituent Assembly.
He recalled that his father, having embraced the princi
ples of the revolution, sat on the left, while his uncle,
Frangois de Beauharnais, sat on the right.

Because of

their political differences the brothers did not speak
to each other.

Instead they depended upon notes which

Eugene often carried.

p

Eugene, Memoires, I, 28; William Milligan Sloane,
The Life of Napoleon Bonaparte (4 vols.; New York: The
deniury do.', 1916;, il, 5l4. (Hereafter cited as Sloane,
Napoleon); Jean Hanoteau (ed.), The Memoirs of Queen
Hortense. trans. by Arthur K. Griggs (2 vols.; New York:
Cosmopolitan Book Corporation, MCMXXVIII), I, 3. (Here
after cited as Hortense, Memoirs); F. M. Kircheisen,
Napoleon, trans. by Henry-St. Lawrence (New York: Har
court, Brace and Companv, 1932), 69. (Hereafter cited
as Kircheisen, Napoleon]. According to Sloane the reason
for the estrangement of Josephine and Alexandre is un
known. Hortense, however, reports that the separation
was due to Josephine*s jealousy of Alexandre*s popularity.
Kircheisen maintains that the charge of infidelity brought
by Alexandre after the birth of Hortense in 1783 was only
an excuse to get rid of an unwanted, uncouth wife.
The college in the French system of education
was a secondary sehool. The College d* Harcourt, closed
during the revolution, is now the-lyeee of Saint Louis.

3
For a time his father served as the presiding
officer of the Assembly and held that office at the moment
of the attempted flight of Louis XVI.

According to his

Memoires. Eugene could remember his father swinging him
up to his saddle on the streets of Fontainebleau and ex
claiming,

"Here is the new Dauphin."^

When w a r broke out between Revolutionary France
and those nations determined to prevent the revolutionary
virus from infecting all Europe, the elder Beauharnais
loaned his sword to the Revolutionary cause, and young
Eugene went to live with his paternal grandfather at
Fontainebleau*

There an attempt was made to rectify the

damage done by neglect of his education, but the effort
was hampered by his bad eyes*

However, w hen his father

became commander of the Army of the Rhine, Eugene went to
be with him and entered the college at Strasbourg*

It

was here, if we can trust his M emoires. that he first be
came infected with the love of nation and glory w h i c h was
to remain with him for the rest of his life*
Before long Eugene returned home, for Alexandre
quit the army with the beginning of the Terror.
arrest of Alexandre and Josephine soon followed*

The
Tried

and condemned to death at Paris for treason, the elder
Beauharnais lost his life on the guillotine; only the

^Eugene, M emoires. I, 28-29; See also Kircheisen,
Hapoleon* 69*

4
efforts of highly placed friends enabled Josephine to
escape the same fate.

5

Following the execution of his father, Eugene be
came an apprentice to a cabinetmaker, with whom he re
mained for some months.

But Josephine found new friends

who relieved the financial distress of the family, and as
a result Eugene was taken from the cabinetmaker's shop.
He then began his military career as aide-de-camp to
General Lazare Hoche, who was engaged in suppressing the
counter-revolution in the Vendee.

In the words of his

Memoires. "The master was severe and the school was none
7

the less good for being hard.”1
Q
Prior to the Quiberon Bay Affair, Eugene was sent
back to his mother in Paris and witnessed the events of
13 Vendemiaire, Year IV (5 October 1795)*

Following that

attempt to overthrow the Convention a decree was issued
requiring that all arms of the nobility be surrendered,

3
*
•'Eugene, Memoires, I, 29-33; Sloane, Napoleon,
I, 314-315*
^Madame 0. Desplaces et M. Michaud (eds.),
Biographie universelle ancienne et moderne (45 vols.;
taris: Henri PIon, 1854), III, 373* (Hereafter cited
as Biographie universelle).
n

'Eugene, Memoires. I, 31.
8
The Quiberon Bay Affair was an unsuccessful
attempt by the British and emigres to invade Brittany
in June 1795*

5
and General de Beauharnais1 sword was taken.

Eugene went

to plead for the return of the sword Before General Na
poleon Bonaparte himself, who returned it in person the
next day.

Touched by this show of filial devotion, Bona

parte asked to be introduced to the rest of the family,
and Eugene had the opportunity of presenting his mother
q
and his sister Hortense to the general.
A rather swift

Eugene, Memoires, I, 31-32; Barry E. 0*Meara,
Napoleon in Exile (2 vols.; New York: Peter Eckler,
n.d. K I, 111.
("Hereafter cited as O ’Meara, Napoleon in
Exile); Emmanuel, Comte de Las Cases, Memorial de SainteHfel&ne (3 vols.; Paris: Ernest Bourdin. n.d.), I, 318.
(Hereafter cited as Las Cases, Memorial); Sloane, Na
poleon. I, 316; J. M. Thompson, Napoleon Bonaparte~TNew
York:
Oxford University Press, 1952), £>3. (Hereafter
cited as Thompson, Napoleon); John Holland Rose, The Life
of Napoleon I (2 vols.; New York: Harcourt, Brace and
Company, 1924), I, 67.
(Hereafter cited as Rose, Na
poleon I ); Hortense, Memoirs, I, 25, 329 n. 4; Kircheisen,
Napoleon. 72. Napoleon*s version states that Josephine
came to thank him for his kindness a few days later, but
it is possible that Las Cases is the source of the tale
of the sword and Napoleon’s meeting with Josephine.
Sloane discounts entirely the story of the sword and con
tends there was no disarmament of any group of people as
a result of the events of 13 Vendemiaire.
The editor of
Hortense*s Memoirs, however, places the date of the order
to give up arms on 22 Vendemiaire, Year IV (14 October
1795).
Concerning Napoleon’s meeting with Josephine,
Rose reports that -Napoleon met Josephine at Barras’ house;
however, Kircheisen maintains that this is only a proba
bility.
According to Hortense she attended a dinner
party at Barras’ house with Josephine where Hortense
first met Bonaparte and sat between the general and Jo
sephine at dinner.
She states, however, that this inci
dent was after the alleged return of Alexandre’s sword
to Eugene*
Hortense could have been mistaken about the
time of the meeting, for she was writing from memory
several years later.
Thompson finds there is no reason
to assume Eugene’s story is false.

6
courtship ensued, and General Bonaparte soon had the run
of the Beauharnais house.

Both Eugene and Hortense op

posed the courtship, feeling it was an insult to their
father’s memory.

Bonaparte and Josephine realized the

hostile attitude of the children and sent them to school
at Saint-Germain.^
Soon after their arrival at Saint-Germain, Eugene
and Hortense learned of Josephine’s marriage to Bonaparte
and of Bonaparte’s appointment as commander of the Army
of Italy.

Eugene hoped that he might go with his new

stepfather, hut he was disappointed.

Instead, Bonaparte

informed him that if he studied hard and mastered his
work, he would he called later.

As a result, for fifteen

months Eugene applied himself particularly to the study
of history, mathematics and the English language.

His

reward was a brevet 2nd lieutenancy in the 1st regiment
of Hussars and the coveted call to report to Bonaparte's
camp
Eugene arrived in Italy too late to take part in
the campaign of 1796-97, and while the general negotiated
the peace, Eugene was entrusted with a mission of re
connaissance of the mountainous territory separating the

Eugene, Memoires. I, 32; Hortense, Memoirs„ I,
23-25. Hortense says ikey were sent to school at SaintGermain before the courtship began.
^Eugene, Memoires. I, 33-34.

7
Drave and Tagliamento rivers and of the Isonzo Biver
i
12

basin.

Following the negotiation of the Treaty of

Campo-Formio Hapoleon appointed Beauharnais to oversee
the transfer of the Ionian Islands from Austria to
France.15
Inactive during the winter of 1797—98, Bonaparte
convinced the Directory that an expedition to Egypt
would produce good results and obtained the command for
himself.

As a member of Bonaparte's staff, Eugene was

ordered to the port of embarkation, Toulon, 1 April
1798,"^and went aboard the flagship, the Orient. on 17
May.

The expedition set sail three days later*

Ac

cording to Eugene only a few officers knew the destination
of the expedition.

The rumor that they were going to

Malta was verified on 10 June, when they arrived at that
island.15

12Biograph!e universelle. Ill, 375*
15Eugene, Memoires. I, 34-35.
14~Ibid.. 35-36.
15Ibid.. 38; Sloane, Napoleon. II, 55; Deo Gershoy,
The French devolution and Hapoleon IHew Yorks Appleton
Gentury-6roits, Inc• , 1933)»
(Hereafter cited as
Gershoy, French Revolution); August Fournier, Hapoleon I ,
trans. by Annie E l i z a b e t h A d a m s (2 vols.; Hew Yorks Henry
Holt and Company, 1911), I, 150.
(Hereafter cited as
Fournier, Hapoleon). Both Sloane and Gershoy place the
date the expedition set sail as 19 May 1798.

8
On 11 June Eugene was assigned as a courier to
General Louis Besaix in the morning, and to Colonel
Auguste Marmont in the afternoon.

While under Marmont's

orders he was in a party under counterattack hy the garri
son of Malta.

The attack was repulsed, and Eugene per

sonally took one of the five flags captured hy Marmont*s
group.

He was given the honor of delivering the flags

to Bonaparte.
There is no indication of the impact that this
engagement made on young Beauharnais; he does not tell
us whether the sight of men meeting violent death, or
his part in bringing their death, affected him at all.
Eager to prove himself worthy of the military profession,
he probably enjoyed the afternoon's work thoroughly.

17

The expedition left Malta 15 June, and the troops
learned their ultimate destination only when they ar
rived off the African coast 2 July 1798.

The debarkation

was accomplished that night in a quite heavy sea, and it

^Eugene, Memoires. I, 38-39.
IV

It is quite plain throughout Eugene's Memoires
that he thoroughly loved war and the glory that one
might gain as a result. There is abundant evidence that
Eugene gave no thought to personal danger, and there is
little evidence that he was moved at all by the suffering
of men under his command or the prodigious losses some
times suffered. In most matters he was quite stolid and
busine sslike •

9
fell to Eugene*s lot to "be the messenger sent from ship
to ship in a light boat where, he tells us, he was in
constant danger of death by drowning or being crushed.

18

The day after debarkation Beauharnais partici
pated in the seizure of Alexandria and had an opportunity
to demonstrate his bravery to his general.

Eugene, ac

cording to his story, was a member of Bonaparte*s escort
and as the party made its way into the city and rounded
the corner of a street, it was met by such a fusillade
from a house ahead and on the other side of the street
that the whole group, including Bonaparte himself, thought
the house must be defended by at least a platoon of rifle
men.

Eugene, detailed to lead the party charged with re

ducing the attack, discovered an old man on the second
floor with about a dozen muskets which his wife and ten
or twelve offspring were loading as rapidly as they could.
19
Eugene personally made the capture* ^
On the march from Alexandria to Cairo, Beauhar
nais was introduced to the difficulties of a desert

18

Eugene, Memoires. I, 38-39; Rose, Napoleon I .
I, 171; Fournier, Napoleon. X, 152.
Rose sets the day
of debarkation as 2 JulyT” Fournier sets the day of de
barkation as 1 July, and the seizure of Alexandria on
2 July.
19

*

Eugene, Memoires, I, 40. This story is im
possible to substantiate. The only source is Eugene*s
Memoires.

10
campaign.

The troops suffered from the heat, intensified

"by reflection from the sand; thirst and hunger were con
stant companions, and Eugene speaks wryly of the soldiers
20
sleeping on sacks of grain hut having no bread or flour.
Eugene participated in the battle of the Pyramids and
the occupation of Cairo.

He longed for action and volun

teered for every detail which seemed to promise some
excitement until the general told him, "Young man, in
our profession it is not necessary to seek danger; it is
only necessary to do your duty, do it well, and hope to
God that it pleases."

21

Thus Eugene learned there is

more to soldiering than being rash.
When the French moved against Suea from Cairo,
it was Beauharnais who led the advance guard.

The move

ment required five days, during which time the terrible
heat took its toll of the men*s strength.

Eugene com

plained that an inadequate amount of water had been pro
vided, his detachment having only two water bags per man,
and that this was no more sufficient for their needs than
two glasses in Prance on a normal summer day.

20

Under these

Ibid., 40-41; Sloane, Hapoleon. II, 59; Gershoy,
French Revolution. 337; Hose, Hapoleon I . I, 173; Thompson. Hapoleon. 125: Fournier, Hapoleon. I, 154.
O']
Eugene, Memoires. I, 42.

11
circumstances Eugene rationed water and put the water
bags under guard.

On the fourth night out from Cairo the

soldiers, driven to desperation by thirst, overpowered
the guard and slit the waterskins.

In an attempt to save

the water Eugene laid about him with a will using the
flat of his sword, but none of the water was saved.

In

the telling he remarked that he was later somewhat ap
palled at the figure he must have cut as an unshaven lad
belaboring the ferociously moustached veterans of the
22
Italian campaign.
At this point the army was evidently
still well disciplined.
At Suez Eugene reconnoitered the country and sub
mitted a sketch to Bonaparte.

This assignment, coupled

with the fact that the previous year he had been entrusted
with the duty of performing a similar job in northern
Italy, indicates that even at the age of seventeen he was
a keen observer, that he had the ability to reproduce ac
curately what he had seen and to make some evaluation
concerning the military significance of the terrain.
After Bonaparte's arrival at Suez, it became Eugene's

22

Ibid., 46-47; Kircheisen. Napoleon, 177* A c 
cording to Kircheisen, Napoleon made the trip from Cairo
to Suez in three days, traveling with 100 mounted guides
and 200 infantry.
p7
Eugene, Memoires. I, 47.

12
duty to lead the general*s staff to Mt. Sinai.

He re

ported that the Eed Sea could easily he crossed at that
point on horseback at low tide, due to the ridges formed
hy the action of water on the sand.

The ridges were

easily seen in the daytime, hut at night became quite
difficult to see.

In spite of the remonstrances of his

general staff, Bonaparte stayed longer at Sinai than was
wise, and consequently the recrossing had to he made at
night.

The water was more than horsebelly deep, and to

prevent riding off the ridges in the sand, it was neces
sary to dismount and lead the horses#2^
As a reward for his handling of the advance
guard on the movement to Suez, the scouting he had done,
and the sketches he had made, Eugene received his lieu
tenant* s commission, and a letter from General Alexandre
Berthier, Bonaparte*s chief of staff, commending him for
his work.

He was hardly more than two months beyond his

seventeenth birthday.2^
On the march to Kan-Tounes, a way-point on the
route to Gaza, the whole army became lost.

It approached

a village and found entry blocked by a troop of enemy
cavalry; unprepared to fight, the army retreated.

24

Eugene’s

Ibid., 47; Thompson, Hapoleon. 133; Kircheisen.
-- ;
—
Hapoleon. l7§7
25

*

jBugene, Memoires. I, 49*

13
horse, overcome with the heat and fatigued hy ru n n i n g in
the sand, dropped from exhaustion, and Eugene was left
alone and afoot in the desert.

Had it not been for the

Moslem dislike of night fighting, Beauharnais* career
would have ended in the desert as he struggled through
the night.

After walking three leagues he came up with

the main body, which Bonaparte*s scouts found the next
day.

After this fiasco the army moved to G-aza, and though

Turkish cavalry was

present, the French army camped on

the heights above the city where Samson is supposed to
26
have deposited the gates of Gaza.
The tone of his
Memoires indicates that Eugene was rather deeply affected
by visiting this religious landmark.
Following the battle at Gaza, Bonaparte detailed
Eugene to carry orders to General Jean-Baptiste ELeber
to begin an advance early the next day.

Worn out from

the exertions of the d a y ’s work, Eugene overslept.

Find

ing Eugene asleep, the officer of the day, General Geraud
Duroc, awakened him, and Beauharnais arrived at Eleber’s
headquarters with the orders at the hour ELeber was to
27
begin his movement.
There is no evidence to indicate

26Ibid.. 50-51
27Ibid.« 51-52

14
that Eugene ever again allowed fatigue to threaten his
career.
In the Syrian campaign the young lieutenant was
again entrusted with several difficult assignments.

At

El-Arisch he was ordered to take one of the houses built
into the wall; on a bright moonlight night he lost seven
men before reaching his objective, and after having ac
complished the mission, dashed back to report it cap
tured.

While under heavy musket fire, he tripped and

fell.

He arrived at Bonaparte*s camp just as observers
28
were reporting to the general that he had been killed.
At 'Ramieh a torrential rain fell, and the troops
were soon wet to the skin.

-To dry clothing and equipment

they set fire to the olive grove in which they were
camped.

The fire burned long and hot, and Eugene reported

that there was wild, magic beauty in the sight.

He gave

not one indication that he was concerned about the destruction and loss the burning of the grove might cause.
When the army approached Jaffa, Beauharnais led
the attack on the town and accepted the surrender of the
garrison.

It was his first time to see a town taken by

assault, and he observed the wanton cruelty of the

28

Ibid., 49

Kircheisen, Hapoleon. 180.

29
' *
^Eugene, Memoires. I, 53.

29

15
conquerors with revulsion.

30

This is the only indication

in his dictated Memoires that war and death seemed had
to him.
At Jaffa Eugene first saw the dark streak of
cruelty in Bonaparte*s nature when he learned that the
general intended to have the 800 defenders of the gar
rison shot.

At a staff meeting, Eugene and several others

protested the proposal, hut the will of the general over
rode all opposition.

After the event, out of devotion

to Bonaparte, Eugene defended the act as justified hy
the facts that there was a shortage of food and water and
many of those paroled at El-Arisch were in the garrison
defending Jaffa.^"*"

30
Ibid., 53-54; Biographie universelle. Ill,
375— 376; Sloane, Hapoleon^ II,
•
T*!

Eugene, Memoires. I, 53-54; Biographie univer
selle , III, 375-376; Sloane, Mapoleon. II, 69-76; 6'Meara,
Hapoleon in E x i l e . I, 202-204; Kircheisen, H a p o l e o n . 181182; Bose. Hapoleon I . I, 186; Thompson, Hapoleon. 142;
Fournier, Hapoleon. t. 166-167.
There is a great dis
crepancy in numbers between Sloane*s version of this en
counter and E u g e n e ’s. Sloane reports the number of the
El-Arisch garrison taken at Jaffa as 800, and the total
number shot as 3,000 to 4,000. Hapoleon places the num
ber of those shot at Jaffa at 1,000 to 1,200.
He makes
no mention of a shortage of food and water, simply as
serting it was due to the El-Arisch garrison having
broken its parole.
Kircheisen defends the massacre of
prisoners at Jaffa mainly on the grounds of military
necessity.
Rose reports that Hapoleon was reluctant to
order the execution of troops at Jaffa and states that
he did so only on the demand of the soldiers and generals.

16
Prom Jaffa the road led to St. Jean d'Aore.

At

Caiffa, en route, Beauharnais led a cavalry patrol on a
scouting expedition to determine if the place was de
fended.

It was a small place hy the sea, and as Eugene

and his party approached they saw a large crowd of men on
the walls, hut could not determine whether the men were
armed.

A closer approach drew no fire and Eugene ordered

the gate opened; this was done.

Beauharnais and his men

dashed in and discovered a British longboat just pulling
away from the town.

They fired upon it with pistols and

muskets with no effect, and the return fire likewise did
no harm.

Tears later Beauharnais discovered that one of

the occupants of the boat was none other than Sir Sidney
2.0

•

Smith, British commander in that area.
At St. Jean d'Acre, a practically impregnable
city, Bonaparte's staff advised that the city be bypassed,
but the great conqueror persisted in his plans for a
siege and for sixty-four days attempted the impossible.
. Here Beauharnais learned that a city which cannot be cut
off from its source of supply can seldom be besieged
.successfully. Assault followed assault, all doomed to
failure.
Hear the beginning of the siege Eugene was rather

7p
Eugene, Memoires. I, 55-56.
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seriously wounded in the head, the only "battle wound he
was ever to suffer.
teen days.

He was out of the fight for nine

Upon his return to active duty he was among

those who penetrated the last defenses of the city for
the only time; "but the attackers could not hold and were
forced back.

He participated in the cavalry battle of
33

Nazareth as well. ^

Finally, out of provisions, his men

ill and wounded, Bonaparte accepted the fact that he had
been defeated and ordered the retreat to begin.

As the

general*s troops retreated they abandoned their guns,
caissons, and other equipment, though one of Bonaparte’s
dicta was never to leave guns.

Then as now, men were

expendable, but guns were hard to obtain*
The charge of inhumanity so often hurled at Bona
parte is supported by at least one historian*

Sloane

asserts that as the general ordered the retreat, he sug
gested that the soldiers in the hospital at Tentoura who
were so badly wounded they could not be moved should be
killed with an overdose of opium.

In his Memoires*

Beauharnais holds that this claim is completely unfounded.

^ I b i d .. 56; Biographie universelle. Ill, 375376 •
34.

Sloane, Napoleon* II, 75* For conflicting
opinions see O ’Meara* Napoleon in E x ile* I, 204-205; Hose,
Napoleon I . I, 193; Thompson* Napoleon. 142; Kircheisen,
Napoleon. 184-185; Fournier, Napoleon. I, 172. Napoleon,
ai St. Helena, contended it was a medical officer, Larrey,
who suggested an overdose of opium, and Napoleon approved.
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He reports that the artillery horses, the officers'
horses, the wagons of the artillery service corps, and
in truth all means of transport were commandeered hy
Bonaparte to move the ill and wounded.

According to

Eugene, the retreat was as ghastly as the retreat from
Moscow in 1812, the only difference being in the numbers
involved.

When they arrived bach at Cairo, the army
35
Bonaparte led was only a skeleton.
From Cairo the route led to Alexandria, and from
Alexandria to Aboukir Bay, where Bonaparte's tarnished
glory was somewhat brightened.

Eugene relates that the

defeat of the Turks came as the result of the destruction
of a French unit attempting a flanking attack.

The Turks

swarmed out of their entrenched positions to take the

However, smother medical officer, Desgenettes, opposed
the suggestion and the opium was not given. Both Sloane
and Napoleon report the hospital located at Jaffa instead
of Tentoura. Napoleon says hospitalized soldiers were
ill of the plague. Hose reports that Napoleon ordered
all horses commandeered for transport of sick and wounded.
Rose supports Eugene's statement that Napoleon did not
order the ill poisoned and that Sir Sideny Smith found
seven of the few left in the hospital alive when the
English took Jaffa, while Thompson reports that Napoleon
ordered opium to be given to prevent troops falling into
the hands of the Turks. Kircheisen says that 1,200
wounded were evacuated from Jaffa by sea and 800 by land
to Egypt. He affirms Napoleon's contention that a worse
death awaited them at the hands of the enemy. According
to him Napoleon suggested the opium poisoning; however,
he attributes the atrocity claim to Sir Sidney Smith.
According to this authority, no one knows whether the
troops actually were poisoned. Fournier is inclined to
accept Napoleon's story.
"^Eugene, Memoires. I, 63-64.
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heads of the French, for which they were paid "bonuses.
Taking quick advantage of the Turkish error, Bonaparte
sent his own infantry into the abandoned trenches and
had Joachim Murat lead his cavalry in behind the Turks.
The Turks, caught between the infantry and the cavalry,
attempted first to stand, and then to swim to the ships
from which they had disembarked.

The cavalry followed

the hapless swimmers into the water as far as possible,
and the infantry and the artillery harassed those who es
caped the flashing sabres of the French horsemen.

In

this action, though a cavalry man, B e a u h a m a i s commanded
■zg

a battery of artillery.
Following the triumph at Aboukir Bay, Bonaparte
is supposed to have negotiated with the British for the
delivery of French newspapers from which he learned the
true condition of affairs in France.

”57

*

In his Memoires

Eugene tells us that he and Bonaparte sat up all night

^ Ibid., 64-70; Herbert Fisher, Hanoleon (New
York: Henry bolt and Company, 1913), 69* (hereafter
cited as Fisher, Napoleon): Sloane, Napoleon. II, 78;
Thompson, Napoleon. 144: Kircheisen. Napoleon. 188;
Fournier, Napoleon. I, 174. Kircheisen makes no mention
of this maneuver m his brief discussion of the battle
of Aboukir.
^^Eugene, Memoires. I, 70-71. For conflicting
accounts of newspaper delivery to Napoleon see Sloane,
Napoleon. II, 79; Fisher. Napoleon. 69; Kircheisen, Na
poleon .""191: Hose, Napoleon I . I, 195; Thompson, Na
poleon. 1*44; Fournier, Napoleon. I, 175*
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reading the news, and that the general became so agitated
he often dashed the papers to the ground in his tent and
strode forcefully back and forth while cursing the Di
rectory and the defeats of French arms.

Beauharnais

leaves the impression that it was at this juncture that
Bonaparte began to lay his plans to return to France, but
that it was a well-kept secret, and the ones who were to
return with him were notified of the decision to abandon
70

the army only a few hours before they set sail.
The return to France accomplished, Eugene continued
to share in the adventures of the Corsican and was a part
of the cavalry contingent present when Bonaparte attempted
to coerce the Council of Five Hundred.

He reported that

while he was in position to observe the general and the
crowd pressing around him during the reported attempt to
stab Bonaparte, he did not see the attempt, though he
would not deny that it happened.

He also stated that while

he supported the general in his seizure of power, he did
not know what was actually taking place and indicated
that he for one did not particularly care if it succeeded

^^Eusene. Memoires. I. 70-71: Sloane. Napoleon. II
80; Fisher, Napoleon, 69; Thompson, Napoleon. 144;
Fournier, Napoleon. I. 169, 176. SIoane indicates that
the decision to return to France was made after the re
ceipt of newspapers at Aboukir Bay; according to Fisher,
Napoleon made the decision to leave Egypt while at St.
Jean d*Acre. Fournier agrees with Fisher.
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or net »

T/?hen the success of the coup was assured, Eugene

carried the word to Josephine that all was well.

Re

gardless of his lack of interest in the coup d*etat,
Eugene soon profited from Bonaparte's success.

Realizing

that the position of aide to Bonaparte would be one of
inactivity for some time to come, Eugene requested and
received appointment to a company of the newly-created
Consular Guard.

He received promotion to the rank of

captain on 22 December 1799> and was given command of his
company.

He epent the remainder of the winter of 1799-

1800 studying the profession of arms and perfecting his
knowledge of the operation of cavalry, on parade and in
the field .4 0
9?he second Italian campaign in 1800 gave young
B e a u h a m a i s the action for which he longed and for which
he had prepared himself through study of the art of war.
He served under Murat at Buffalore and Milan.

From Milan

he was sent to Pavia, where he met General Desaix, just
returned from Egypt.

He reports that he was slightly up

set by Desaix*s telling him, "Austrian balls have known
me earlier, and I fear they will know me better now.*

^ E u g e n e , Memoires. I, 76 ff.
4 0 I b i d .. 79?
Fnovost et Roman d'Amat (eds.),
Dictionnaire ‘aTe bio graph! e franoai.se (Paris: Bibrairie
Letouzey ei Ane, 1951), V, 1096-1691.
(Hereafter cited
as D . B . F .). Only six volumes of this work have appeared
to date.

4-1

.

Eugene, Memoires. I, 80.
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A few days later Desaix was killed at Marengo, where
Eugene distinguished himself by his action and cool
headedness.

Prom 4:00 p.m. until the last shot was

fired, he and his company were in the thick of the action.
That it had been a brutal experience is indicated by the
losses his company suffered.

Eugene entered the battle

with 115 men and emerged with 45-

For his bravery and

ability in action he received promotion on the field of
45
Marengo to the rank of squadron commander.
Following the armistice after Marengo, Eugene
and his men received orders to escort Bonaparte to Milan.
The general set such a pace that upon arrival Beauharnais
had only seven men other than himself in the saddle.

AA

Ordered to take the captured flags to Paris,
Beauharnais and his company stopped to have their horses
reshod at Geneva, where Madame Anne de Stael flted them.
The delay caused them to arrive at Paris on the morning of
14 July, the fete day, about 10 o ’clock in the morning.
They rode directly to the Invalides to deposit the flags,
and then to the Champ de Mars to a hero’s welcome.

The

42
Kircheisen, Napoleon. 195; Thompson, Napoleon.
178.
45
•
Eugene, Memoires. I, 80.
4 4 Ibid.,

80 ff.
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cheers of the crowd were heady wine for the dusty, travelweary youth.4^
From this point on, Eugene accompanied the First
Consul on his trips of inspection, and as in Egypt, Bona
parte lost no opportunity to school him in the military
art.

At every opportunity Eugene commanded the cavalry

as it maneuvered under the eagle eye of his general, and
never was found wanting.
From 1800 until 1802, Eugene led a quiet life,
and continued to study the military art.

In this year he

received promotion to the rank of colonel, and Bonaparte
told him he would never rise higher than this rank, "for
4-6
you do not have the stuff of which a general is made."
In spite of this evaluation, Eugene received promotion to
the rank of Colonel General of Chasseurs in 1804*
On 1 February 1805* he became the viceroy of Italy,
and in December of that year he became commander-in-chief
of the Army of Italy.4^

4 5 Ibid.,
4 6 P . B . F ..

In statecraft Beauharnais had

85.

Y, 1090-1091.

4 ^Ibid.; J. Dumain and Henri Plon (eds.), Corre
spondence de Han ole on Ier (52 vols*; Paris* Henri !Pion,
18$8—1870), XI*
(Hereafter cited as tfapoleon,
Correspondence J * Beauharnais Archive, Alexandre Berthier
to Eugene, 18 December 1805. The Beauharnais Archive is
a collection of approximately 3 0 , 0 0 0 letters written to
Eugene Beauharnais by various imperial officers.
It also
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little experience to guide him when he became the lieu
tenant of Napoleon in Italy.

His only experience in this

field had come as envoy to the Ionian Isles in 1797.

He

was far more at home with his soldiers and horses than he
was in a drawing room or presiding over a meeting of the
Council of State.

But there was in him a spark of the

politician which if properly nourished could become a
real flame.

Whether Napoleon realized that his stepson

had the makings of an able statesman is beside the point.
Eugene probably was placed in Italy as viceroy because
Napoleon thought he would be a willing tool, for there is
no question that Eugene revered his stepfather and that
Napoleon knew it.

Whether or not he was that willing

tool in the master*s hand is the task with which we must
%

now engage ourselves.

contains Eugene*s letterbook which has in it some of his
correspondence with members of his cabinet. It was de
posited in the Princeton University Library in the De
partment of Rare Books and Manuscripts by Mr. Andre de
Coppet, who purchased the letters in 1934.

CHAPTER II
THE ESTABLISHMENT AND INITIAL ORGANIZATION
OP THE KINGDOM
French, domination of* Lombardy had been secured by
the campaign led by Bonaparte in 1800, and he had been
responsible for organizing Lombardy under the name of the
Italian Republic.

The constitution of the new state,

written at Lyons, became the fundamental law of the
Italian Republic.

Under this constitution Bonaparte

filled the office of president and Francesco Melzi d*Eril
filled the office of vice-president.
As long as Prance remained a republic such an
organization was acceptable; but the destruction of the
Prench Republic by the elevation of Bonaparte to the
status of emperor in 1804 made it necessary that the
Italian Republic be reorganized.
That Italian officials realized the probability

It is impossible to determine exactly w hen Ha'
poleon reached the decision that Italy should become a
kingdom, but it is quite probable that he had it in
mind some time before the establishment of the Prench
E m pire•
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of a change to come is revealed in the report of the
Italian Secretary of State to the Vice-President on 21
May 1804, just three days after a senatus consultum
named Napoleon the Emperor of the Prench.

2

As a result

of the report Vice-President Melzi, on 29 May 1804,
wrote Napoleon:
The homage that I render at the foot of
the throne of Your Majesty contains all
the sentiment which ought to be inspired
by the admirable results of unparalleled
recognition by the nation, and the marve
lous genius which commanded such recog
nition. I do not have words to express
the sentiment I feel. May Your Majesty
deign to find this sentiment in the pro
jects of decrees of the Council of State,
which I have the honor to submit to him.
The first decree suggested the erection of an
equestrian statue of Napoleon and the second, dated 28
May 1804, recommended that Napoleon become King of Italy.4
It is by no means certain that Italian officials desired
to have the republic transformed into a Kingdom simply
because the suggestion came from them, for Bonaparte

p
J. E« Driault, Napoleon en Italie (Paris:
Librairies Fe3.ix Alcan et Guillaumin B&uniea. 1908),
295-296. (Hereafter cited as Driault, Napoleon en
Italie). The senatus consultum was legislation by the
Senate which had the force of law without needing the
approval of the Corps legislatif.
3 Ibid.. 2 9 6 .

4Ibid., 296.
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often had his seconds carefully arrange such, matters
well in advance*
Napoleon was gratified when the Italians indi
cated a desire to make him their king, and he asked the
Council of State to put its proposals in concrete form*
These were presented in July 1804 by the Italian Secre
te
tary of State*
The Council proposed that the title of
the sovereign be "the Constitutional King of the Italian
Republic," and called for a national viceroy who should
reside in the republic during the k i n g fs absence; it
indicated that the present Vice-President, Melzi d fEril,
should be the one to receive this honor*

In addition,

it proposed that the Italian diplomatic corps be located
in Milan rather than Paris*

The Council further desired

that the Corps legislatif* which was patterned after that
of Prance, be modified and made into two chambers*

One

of the chambers should be composed of thirty members
having property valued in excess of 4,000 crowns *^

This

chamber should have legislative initiative and the right
of petition*

The Council did not stipulate the property

requirements for the second chamber; it only established

K

*

Ibid,, 300*
The Italian Consulte d*etat became
the Council of State*

^Ibid, The crown was a silver coin equivalent
in value to three pounds sterling*
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its membership at forty-five persons and requested that
its duties should be to examine and accept or reject
the laws proposed.

7

It is clear that the Italians in

tended to make the legislative body an active force in
government.
In addition, the Council called for the creation
of a new organ in the Italian government to be called
the ^supreme conservative magistrate," to be made up of
eight councillors-of-state appointed for life.

This

organ should be independent of all other organs of
government, even the king, and be the most important
body in the government.

The first supreme magistrate

should be formed from the present Council.

According

to the plan of the Council, the supreme magistrate
would have the power to rule on all things and all
events not foreseen and provided for in the constitution
of the state; it would have the power to dissolve the
electoral colleges, dissolve the Corps legislatif.
choose the king from among the princes eligible for the
kingship, name the king in case of the extinction of
the royal line, and even propose a new dynasty if the
present one died out.

Upon the death of a member of

the supreme magistrate, the other members should have
the authority to name his replacement from a list

7 Ibid.
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presented by the provincial electoral colleges with.Q
out the advice of the king.
The Council of State deemed it necessary that
Napoleon recognize the independence of Italy.

Sometime

during the year 1804, Melzi wrote Fernando Maresealehi,
the Italian Secretary of State:
The execution of the project is always
subordinate to two essential conditions
which are those of the guarantee /of
independence/, and of a treaty with
France.
These two items ought to pre
cede any attempts on the part of the
electoral colleges.
It is necessary
that the Emperor of the French remit to
the Italian Republic a solemn act of
guarantee of the Treaty of luneville
which has never been communicated to it.
It is to the advantage of His Imperial
Majesty that this solemn guarantee pre
cede his nomination to the throne of
Italy and the establishment of the dy
nasty in his family, to the end that
all of Europe see and recognize in this
memorable act a free and spontaneous
recognition of a people which unites
its destiny to that of its august bene
factor and that of his descendents.
The treaty of alliance is no less
necessary to put the two states morally
on a level of equality .9
Napoleon did not find the presentations of the
Council acceptable, for he was determined that none of
his states should be independent.

Realizing the

8Ibid., 300-301.
The^electoral colleges nomi
nated persons for the Corps legislatif.
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impossibility of a victory for the Council and himself,
Melzi requested that he be allowed to resign, but the
request was refused.^

After a long struggle the Council

accepted defeat and presented the crown of Italy to
Napoleon on his own terms.

The Italian deputation to Na

poleon's coronation formally offered the Iron Crown of
the Lombards to the Emperor in the course of an audience
a few days before the deputation left the French capital.
Napoleon graciously accepted.^
It was in this situation that the kingship of
Napoleon was accepted by the Council of State on 15 March
and decreed on 17 March.

12

The acceptance of Napoleon as King of Italy by
Melzi and a deputation of the Council of State was an
nounced to France and Europe in the official French news
paper on 18 March 1805•

The announcement was in the form

of a resolution and was divided into articles, some of
which were to be incorporated into the First Constitutional

1 0 Ibid.

^ T b i d . ; Baron C. F. de Meneval, Memoirs of Na
poleon Bonaparte (3 vols.; New Yorks P. F. Collier & %
Son, 1910), I, 320. (Hereafter cited as Meneval, Memoirs)*
12

1
Beauharnais Archive, Report of the Minister of
War. 1 January 1805 - 1 July 1807: Kircheisen. Napoleon.
312. ihe only place I have found a statement concerning
the date when the Council of State accepted and decreed
Napoleon as king is in this report. Kircheisen mentions
the two dates, but does not clearly state that the 1 7 th
was the date the Italian government issued the decree.
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Statute of Italy.

Article 4 carried the provision that

the crown of Italy and the crown of Prance should not

be

united on the same head except that of Napoleon, and
Articles 5 and 6 provided that Napoleon should wear both
crowns until Naples, Malta, Corfu, and the Ionian Islands
were free of foreign troops.

Article 9 required*

a

guarantee of religious freedom; the assurance of the in
tegrity of Italian territory; equal rights for all sub
jects; and governmental protection of political and civil
liberty.

The same article further stated that imposts

would be established only by law, only Italian subjects
would be qualified for governmental offices, and the sale
1^5
of land from the public domain would be irrevocable.
The next day the First Constitutional Statute ap
peared.

The provisions of the Statute were as follows*
Article 1.

Napoleon I, Emperor of the
Prench, is the King of Italy.

Article 2.

The Italian crown is heredi
tary in his direct descendance,
whether natural or adoptive,
from male to male to the per
petual exclusion of women and
their descendance, except that

13
^Gazette nationale ou le Moniteur universel
(Paris), 27 Ven*&se',"T e a T m T (16 ka'rch 1505).— There
after cited as Mon i t e u r ). The Constitutional Statutes
were to be only temporary, but they became the permanent
constitution of the Kingdom of Italy. Napoleon toyed
with the idea of an Italian constitution in 1806, but
put off establishing one until the crown should be passed
to another person.
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his right of adoption shall
not extend to any other per
son than to a citizen of the
French Empire or the Kingdom
of Italy.
Article 3.

At the moment when foreign
armies have evacuated the state
of Naples, the Ionian Isles and
the island of Malta, the Emper
or Napoleon will transmit the
hereditary crown of Italy to
one of his legitimate male
children, whether natural or
adoptive•

Article 4.

From the date of that epoch, the
crown of Italy ought not to be
reunited to the crown of France
on the same head, and the suc
cessors of Napoleon I in the
Kingdom of Italy ought constantly
to rpside on the soil of the
Italian Republic.

Article 5.

During the course of the present
year, the Emperor Napoleon, with
the advice of the Council of
State and of the deputations of
the electoral colleges, will
give to the Italian Monarchy a
constitution founded on the same
bases as that of the French
Empire, and on the same princi
ples as the laws which he has
already given Italy.14

On 27 December 1804, in his speech opening the’
session of the French Senate, Napoleon explained the need
for reorganization of the Italian state.^

The acceptance

I 4 Ibid., 28 Ventftse, Year Kill (19 March 1805)
^Sloane, Napoleon. II, 347.
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of the Italian crown by Napoleon and his speech to the
Prench senate regarding the need for reorganization of
the Italian government caused international disturbance.
Austria particularly was concerned and immediately began
stationing troops in the areas where her borders touched
those of the new Italian kingdom.

On 1 January 1805

Napoleon wrote Emperor Francis II of Austria that he need
not become alarmed because Italy had become a kingdom with
Napoleon as king, for the Emperor had ceded his rights
to the crown to his brother Joseph whc* had been proclaimed
hereditary king of the country.

The cession, Napoleon

said, carried the renunciation of Joseph's rights to the
crown of France.

There was, therefore, no need of troops

in the countries controlled by Austria which bordered upon
Italy.

He told Francis II that if he persisted in keeping

troops in the regions bordering Italy, France would have
no alternative but to strengthen her forces in Italy and
along the Bhine.

Perfectly aware of the machinations of

the British at this time, Napoleon warned the Austrian
Emperor against giving ear to their b l a n d i s hments.^
Napoleon hoped that the appointment of Joseph as
king of Italy would cause Austrian fears to be dispelled,
for if any of the Bonapartes could be considered a man
of peace, Joseph was the one.

But the Austrians knew

1g

Dri a u l t , Napoleon en Italie. 307*
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Napoleon himself too well and rightly feared that if
Joseph took the throne, Italy would he only an appendage
of France itself.

Therefore, the Austrian government

asked what guarantee it would have that the separation
of France and Italy would exist in fact as well as in
form.

Austria further requested a statement from Na-

poleon concerning his intentions toward the other Italian
republics, and proceeded to establish a "cordon sani17
taire."
The situation was considered serious enough
that Count Fran5 ois La Rochefoucauld was sent to Vienna
with the rank of ambassador to replace the charge d faf"I Q

faires, Dodun.
On 27 January 1805, Joseph refused the

crown of

Italy, pleading that he wanted to keep his rights to the
IQ

Imperial crown intact. J
Continuing his search for a king, Napoleon next
suggested that he adopt the infant son of Louis Bonaparte,
make the child king of Italy, and retain the regency for

1 7 Ibid.,

308.

1 8 Ibid..

305.

iq

Louis Madelin, The Consulate and the Empire,
trans. by E. F. Buckley (*Dhe National History of France
Series" /jL vols.; New York: G. H. Putnam's Sons, 1934/),
I, 248. (Hereafter cited as Madelin, Consulate and
Empire); Briault, Napoleon en Italie. 310: Rose. Nanoleon
I, II, 9.
'
■ ,•
»

>t

*
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himself*.

Louis rather violently refused to allow this

procedure .^
Rehuffed hy his own brothers, the Emperor turned
to the Beauharnais family, and on 30 January 1805 named
his stepson, Eugene, as viceroy.

Two days later Beau—

harnais became the Archchancellor of State*

21

To quiet

international fears Napoleon insisted that as soon as
foreign influence was eradicated from Naples, the Ionian
Islands, and Malta, he would give the crown Of Italy to
either an adoptive or natural son.

The protestation of

such intent did not calm Austria, and she continued the
negotiations with Russia which had been initiated in
December 1804.

A further indication of Austria’s lack

of confidence in Napoleon was voiced by Baron Moll, the
Austrian representative at Milan, who made the state
ment that Joseph’s refusal of the Italian crown could
only end in war.

22

Though the Moniteur would have us believe that
Italy was overjoyed at the prospect of becoming a member

20
Madelin, Consulate and Empire. I, 248;
Driault, Napoleon en Italie. 3l0; Rose. Napoleon I*
II, 9.
^^Driault, Napoleon en Italie. 313; R o s e , Napoleon I . II, 9; Kircheisen. Napoleon. 312. KireheTsen
states that in appointing Eugene viceroy, Napoleon in
tended to show his brothers he could get along without
them •
2 2 Driault,

Napoleon en Italie. 313.
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of Napoleon*s new empire, the reports of the Council of
State do not hear out this assumption.

Driault writes

that the Council reported the country filled with apathy
instead of joy, for the people knew that the location of
Italy would make her once more a battlefield in any
23
future war between Napoleon and Francis II.
Thus the Kingdom of Italy came into being, and
the Constitutional Statutes became the governing instru
ments of the state.

In all, seven Constitutional Statutes

were issued during the life of the kingdom.

As soon as

the news of the erection of the kingdom reached Italy,
the cities, towns, villages, departments, and the various
branches of the Italian army and navy sent congratulations
to their new king.

Considering the statement of Driault,

noted above, perhaps it is not amiss to suggest that the
spontaneity and happiness expressed in the Moniteur were
24
more of less foreed.
It was decided that the coronation of the new

23
Adolphe Thiers, The History of the Consulate
and the Empire of France. trans. by D. Forbes Campbell
and H. W. Herbert C5 vols.; Philadelphia: J. B. Lippincott & Co., 1865), I. 665. (Hereafter cited as Thiers,
Consulate and Empire): Driault, Hapoleon en Italie. 319;
Kircheisen, Hapoleon. 312. Kircheisen also states that
the Italians had little enthusiasm over becoming Na
poleon^ subjects.

1805).

^ Moniteur. 23 Germinal, Year Kill (13 April
“
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king would take place in May 1805* and Napoleon, Jose
phine, and the general staff of the empire began the
journey to Italy early in April.
16

They entered Pavia on

Ploreal, Tear XIII ( 6 May 1805), and were met by Vice-

President Melzi, the Council of State, the 1st Italian
Chasseurs, and the artillery of the army.

25

Two days

later, with Marshal Jean Jourdan and his staff added to
the retinue, the Emperor's train entered Milan.

Na

poleon was honored with a sixty gun salute, and the
cheers of the crowd filled the air as the hero of Marengo
passed through the streets.

26

Prom the time of his ar

rival until 26 May, Napoleon combined work, pleasure, and
preparation for the coronation.

On 26 May 1805, amid

great pomp and display, the coronation took place.

In

order that the crowd might be properly inspired to cheer
the new sovereign, the police selected the recipients of
invitations and tickets to the coronation and even as
signed the spots where certain ones would sit.

The ladies

attending were particularly mortified to learn that the
police had chosen, among others, many of the "public

2 5 Ibid., 25 Ploreal, Tear XIII (15 May 1805);
Kircheisen, Napoleon. 312.

26Moniteur. 25 Ploreal, Tear XIII (15 May 1805).
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women* of Milan, and had seated them among the nobility.

27

Having placed the Imperial Crown upon his head
with his own hands at his coronation as Emperor, Napoleon
likewise placed the Iron Crown of the Lombards

28

upon his

head himself and pronounced the traditional words of the
Italian coronation, "God has given it to me, let him be
ware who touches it."

He was proclaimed King of Italy

and the crowd gave him a thunderous ovation.

Following

the coronation, Milan celebrated for days with the court
joining in the merrymaking.

The new king entered into

the spirit of the occasion, but following his usual
pattern he did not allow it to interfere with the business
of state.
The Corps legislatif was called to meet on 7

^Lriault, Napoleon en Italie. 321 ff. The coro
nation originally had been planned for 24 May, but a
torrential rain and massive thunderstorm prevented it.
Why the police seated prostitutes among the nobility re
mains a mystery. There is no evidence that Napoleon
punished the police for this insult.
28
The Iron Crown of the Lombards was so named
because, according to legend, one of the nails with which
Christ was nailed to the Cross at Calvary was in it. It
was the crown used at the coronation of the Holy Homan
Emperors when they took possession of their Lombard fiefs
and received fealty from their Lombard subjects. It had
not been used since the late 15th century. During the
intervening three centuries it had been kept at Monza
and was brought to Milan from Monza for the coronation
of Napoleon.
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June 1805, and at the opening session Napoleon ad
dressed the legislators*

The government promulgated

the Third Constitutional Statute, which established the
vice—royalty and named Eugene Beauharnais as viceroy*
He was to exercise "all civil and military authority"
29
in the state* * This proved to be a rather empty decla
ration, for Napoleon reserved for himself the final
authority on all decisions*

Eugene*s authority as

viceroy could he exercised only during the absence of
the Icing, but even then the viceroy was to be nothing
more than a "grand prefect*"

As long as Napoleon wore

the crown, Eugene could be no more than a small cog in
a large machine*

It is the contention of some historians

of the Empire that Beauharnais thus became only the
lackey of Hapoleon, and that in his role of lieutenant
to the great captain he was consistently subservient to
•an
the Emperor*s wishes and directives*
There is evidence,

29
*
^Driault, Napoleon en Italie, 337; Napoleon,
Correspondence. X, 487; Moniteur. 25 Prairial* Year XIII
C12 June 1805 7$ Beauharnais Archive, Report of the M3.n1 ster of Var* 1 January 1805 - 1 July 1 867*
"
"50
#
Briault, Napoleon en Italie* 583; Thiers, Con
sulate and Empire. I, 6 6 ^*
■^Driault, Napoleon_en Italie* 583; Madelin,
t £ 2 9 * Moniteur* 24 Prairial,
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which will he presented in later chapters, that in
dicates this interpretation is to some degree in error.
At this point
the

the concern is

with the organization of

state and the manner in which Napoleon intended it

to he directed.
During the period 1800-1805 Italy had failed to
32
achieve a stable governmental organization.
The
election of officials was attended with a considerable
degree of corruption, and most officials looked upon
public office as a means of enriching themselves.
A part of the difficulties faced by Italy during
this period undoubtedly stemmed from the fact that during
the

centuries of Spanish and

Austrian ruleItalians, with

the

exception of the rule of

Maria Theresa(1740-1780),

had not directed local affairs themselves.

They had no

experience with the intricacies of national finance,
national defense, or any attendant problems.
At the beginning of the nineteenth century, Italy
also suffered from that age-old European malady, a
stratified social system which allowed great extremes in
wealth and poverty, and the upper classes enjoyed the
privileges that went with rank in all European society
at that time.

32

This brief discussion of the condition of Italy
in 1805 depends upon A. J. Whyte, The Evolution of Modern
Italy (Oxford: Basil Blackwell & Mott Ltd., 1959), 1-19.
(Hereafter cited as Whyte, Modern Italy).
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Having been for centuries an area divided bylocal loyalties, Italy enjoyed no sense of unity.
Mutual distrust existed between Milanese, Venetians,
Parmesans, Luccans, and Homans.

All the Italian re

publics had the character of city states rather than
the character of nations.
This was the sort of state Napoleon appointed
Eugene Beauharnais to administer on 7 June 1805*
Though untrained in politics and government Eugene had
several qualities which made him a perfect choice to
fill the role of an imperial administrator.

Pirst of

all, he possessed a good nature which drew people to
him and could serve as a buffer to the irritant of
foreign control in Italy.

Secondly, Eugene was rigidly

honest— a rare quality indeed.

Thirdly, as pointed out

above, Eugene was devoted to the Emperor and found his
satisfaction in serving Napoleonrs cause. 33

33
G-ershoy, Prench Revolution. 472; Sloane, Na
poleon. Ill, 211; Mine. IPlanat. Vie de Planat. 416-417•
Sloane calls Eugene "that excellent youth."

CHAPTER III

STATE ADMINISTRATION
Following the opening of the Corps legislatif
on 7 June 1805* Napoleon began the business of organ
izing his new kingdom.

On 8 June the King appointed

two secretaries of state by decree, one to remain near
him to counter-sign decrees and to perform duties of
like kind, while the other remained near the Viceroy
i
to perform the same function for him.
Keenly aware of Eugene*s inexperience in govern
ment, Napoleon gave him advice in statecraft in a per
sonal letter dated 7 June.

The King told the Viceroy

he did not have enough experience in the field of govern
ment to handle affairs personally and that at first he
should depend upon his councillors.

The King advised

Eugene to cultivate Italian ways and customs, observe
Italian fftte days, and visit all places of military
interest in order that he might be able to defend the
state if that should become necessary.

The Viceroy

should meet with ministers twice weekly, once with each

^Moniteur. 26 Prairial, Year XIII (15 June 1805)•
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of them alone and once in council, and ttLe King warned
him against taking the advice of only one person on any
given problem.

Napoleon ordered Eugene to keep all

correspondence between them secret; their letters were
2
to be shown to no one, not even a councillor.
The King also gave B e a u h a m a i s guidance in the
direction of ministers.

Napoleon wrote Eugene on 19

June 1805, upon receiving for approval a four-page di
rective to the Minister of Interior, that in giving in
structions to his ministers he should only outline the
laws he wanted them to present to the Council of State,
tell them what he wanted to accomplish by the laws, and
allow them to draw up the bill.

In this instance he

suggested the following to replace Eugene's long di
rective s
M. Felici, Minister of the Interiors The
intention of His Majesty is that the
magistracy of revision be suppressed, and
that no censorship of the press ought to
be undertaken; in case of anonymous author
ship, the publisher should be held re
sponsible if the writing contains anything
contrary to the public good. His Majesty
intends also that seven days before a publi
cation goes on sale, a copy be sent to the
Minister of Interior so that if it contains
anything contrary to the public good or the
government, it can be suppressed.3

2
Napoleon, Correspondence. I, 488 ff.
^Ibid., 536, Napoleon to Eugene, 19 June 1805*
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Hapoleon, two days after the beginning of the
first session of the Corps legislatif. began appointing
ministers.
of Justice.

Giuseppe Luosi, on 9 June, became Minister
Giuseppe Prina, on the same day, received

the portfolio of finances, Luigi Lambertenghi the customs,
Pietro Moscati the Department of Public Instruction, and .
Gian Paradisi the Department of Bridges and Roads.

The

Department of Finances, directed by Prina, became a
branch of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs.

The Depart

ment of Public Instruction and the Department of Bridges
and Roads were to be branches of the Ministry of the
I n t e r i o r A l s o , on 9 June Napoleon decreed that two
bureaus in the Department of Finances should administer
direct and indirect taxes.

Napoleon, at the same time,

issued a decree establishing the Council of State.

Ap

parently Eugene had no voice in the appointments.
Luosi began his duties as minister of justice
by appointing a commission to translate the Code Na
poleon into Latin and Italian.^
For administrative purposes Napoleon divided the
kingdom into fourteen departments, adding two to the

4 Moniteur.

26 Prairial, Year XIII (15 June 1805);
28 Prairial, Year XIII (17 June 1805).
5Ibid., 1 Messidor, Year XIII (20 June 1805).
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twelve which, had made up the Italian Republic.

The

departments were divided into districts, cantons, and
communes.

The administration of each department was to

be directed by a prefect, who was to be assisted by a
prefectoral council of forty members.

The districts

were to be administered by a sub-prefect and a district
council.

Each sub-prefect was responsible for the ad

ministration of the communes in his district.

Each

canton was to have a justice of the peace and a scribe.
There were three classes of communes; a first-class
commune was to be a city of 10,000 population or more,
a second-class commune was to have a population of 3,000
to 10,000, and a third-class commune was to be one with
less than 3,000 population.

Each commune was to be

served by a communal council and a municipalite.*^

The

councils of the first-class communes were to consist of
forty members, those of the second-class of thirty
members, and those of the third-class of fifteen members.
The decree stipulated that at least three members of
each council should be chosen from the propertied class.
The municipalites of the first-class communes were to be

6I b i d .. 14 Messidor, Year XIII (3 July 1805);
23 Messidor, Year XIII (12 July 1805); Eugene. Memoires.
I,9 26.
\.
kA municipalite was simply the combined members
of the governing bodies of a city.
J
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composed of a mayor and six elected representatives,
the second-class municipalites were to he composed of
a mayor and four elected representatives, and the thirdclass municipalites were to he composed of a syndic and
two old men.

Only the King had the power to appoint the

prefects, sub-prefects, secretaries-general of the pre
fectures, prefectoral councils, and councils of firstand second-class districts and communes.

He would

appoint the scribes of the tax collectors and the mayors
from a list of three candidates for each position to he
presented by the communal councils.

The syndics^ and the

communal councils of the third-class communes were to he
Q
appointed by the prefects.
Pellowing the issuance of the organizational
decree, Napoleon made a grand tour of his kingdom, and
according to the reports carried in the Moniteur the
tour was a triumphal march.^
Napoleon's progress brought him to Piacenza on
28 June 1805, and Eugene met him there to work with him
on the issuance of a number of decrees which were designed

Moniteur. 14 Messidor, Year XIII (3 July 1805).
The syndic was a governmental trustee.
Q

^Thiers, Consulate and Empire. I, 665; Moniteur.
1 Messidor, Year Xtll (26 June 1805); 7 Messidor, Year
XIII (26 June 1805).
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to organize further the functions of the government.
The decrees issued were concerned with financial
affairs and established the administration of the contri
bution placed upon Italy.

One dealt with the adminis

tration of the national lottery; another established two
mints, one at Milan and another at Bologna, and es
tablished the rules for administering them; a third was
concerned with the administration of the national domain
and the indirect taxes; still another organized the oper
ation of the postal service; customs were organized and
their administration regulated; finally, still another
decree regulated the tax on salt, tobacco, powder, and
consumer g o o d s . ^
Soon after the meeting of the King and Viceroy
at Piacenza, Napoleon returned to Paris and issued an
other financial decree, which ordered that the liqui
dation of the public debt, not yet provided for, should
be administered through the Ministry of Pinance.

The

decree provided for the establishment of a commission
to work through a particular bureau of the Ministry of
Finance.

The bureau should be under the direction of

a director-general and four private persons.

Decisions

reached by the commission on the liquidation of the
public debt were to be referred to the Minister of

1Q

1805).

Moniteur. 22 Messidor, Year 2ZII (11 July
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Finance, who in turn would report the decisions to the
Council of State for action.

The reports of the com

mission and Minister of Finance were to be made
monthly.'^

While Napoleon remained in Italy, the role of
the Viceroy was simply that of an overseer, a foreman
as it were, to see that the orders and decrees of the
King were carried out.

In this role he was simply the

administrator, pure and simple, of decisions made on a
higher level.
A part of the duty of the Viceroy in his role
of overseer was to report to Napoleon concerning the
progress of the reorganizjation of the state as ordered
by the decrees of the King issued 9 June 1805.

In his

first letter to the Emperor, Beauharnais reported that
he had called a meeting of the ministers of the various
departments and had chided them for their slowness in
presenting departmental budgets, for the inactivity of
their bureaus, and the condescension with which they
treated bureau subordinates.

He reported further that

Ibid., 26 Thermidor, Year XIII (14 August
1805); Duane Koenig, “The Napoleonic Regime in Tuscany,
1807-1814“ (Doctoral dissertation, University of Wis
consin, 1942), 107» 111. (Hereafter cited as Koenig,
"Tuscany"). According to Koenig, confiscated Church
lands were utilized to. pay. the public debt wherever
the French established themselves in Italy. Eater in
the same chapter, however, Koenig indicates that the
public debt was paid from the revenues of the Imperial
Domain, which included confiscated Church property.
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he had been working with Secretary of State Antonio
Aldini on the formation of the various sections of the
legislative council.

Eugene included a report to

Napoleon concerning the make-up of the legislative
council and asked Napoleon to approve the membership of
the council.

12

It is evident that in the role of viceroy Eugene
had a hand in the selection of the Council of State, for
on 11 June 1805 he reported that at least one of the ap
pointees to the council of auditors was a bad subject
15
and should be removed. J Six days later the Viceroy
nominated twelve persons to be auditors
In an effort to find a suitable president for
the Council of State, Eugene began the practice of having
each minister exercise the chairmanship.

Shis met with

Napoleon’s approval, but the King warned the Viceroy
that he should not take too long to decide whom he
wanted, for too great a delay would make the maintenance
>

of control difficult.3'^

-i p

Eugene, Memoires. I, 123, Eugene "to Napoleon,
11 June 1805* The report Eugene mentioned is not con
tained in his Memoires or in the correspondence of the
Prince in the Beauharnais Archive.
•^Ibid.. 124, Eugene to Napoleon, 11 June 1805*
•^Ibid.. 126, Eugene to Napoleon, 17 June 1805*
15
^Napoleon, Correspondence. X, 512, Napoleon to
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On 10 August Eugene reported four vacancies on
the Council of State and nominated several persons*

He

called particular attention to one of his nominees,
Luigi Lambertenghi, whom he recommended for the post of
Minister of the Interior.

Lambertenghi, according to

Beauharnais, had travelled widely in Prance and had
most carefully and acutely observed the operation of
the institutions of Prance*

The Viceroy assured Na

poleon that the nomination did not stem from any person
al difficulties with the present Minister of the
Interior, but that he thought for the interests of the
state and the Empire that Lambertenghi would be a better
man for the post*

"L 6

This recommendation was not acted

upon.
On the day of his first attendance at sessions
of the Corps legislatif as viceroy, Eugene sat to the
right of the throne with the insignia of Italy on a
table to the left of the throne.

After the presidential

speech, Eugene, speaking in Italian, made the following
address:

Eugene, 12 June 1805; Eugene, Memoires. I, 125, Eugene
to Napoleon, 17 June 1805*
16
Eugene, Memoires* I, 242-243, Eugene to Na
poleon, 10 August I&6 5 .
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Though very young, I have heen called by
the hero who presides over the destiny
of Prance and Italy to be the organ of
his will among you. Today I am only able
to offer you hope.
Gentlemen, the thought
which animates me is that this hope will
not be forlorn#
Prom this moment, I belong entirely to the
people over whom government has been en
trusted to me. Aided and assisted by all
authorities, and particularly by the zeal
of the savants of the Corps legislatif.
always directed bv the vast ana powerful
spirit of our august sovereign, remember
ing the great lessons and examples I have
received from him, I will have only one
end and one desire, the glory and well
being of the Kingdom of Italy#17
With a touch of pride the Viceroy wrote Napoleon
that the Corps legislatif had received his address very
well and, though he had not written it himself, the
ideas it contained were his#

There is no indication of

the Emperor's approval or disapproval in Napoleon's
Correspondence. Eugene's Memoires. or the Beauharnais
Archive•
On the same day, Eugene reported that the decree
concerning departmental organization was not yet ready
for signature due to the fact that a number of errors
had been made in translation, but that he had a battery
of clerks working on the necessary corrections#

18

^ I b i d . . I. 115. Address to the Corps legis
latif, 13 Jhne 1805.
18

Ibid#. 141, Eugene to Napoleon, 13 June 1805*
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On 24 June Eugene sent Napoleon a list of the
employees in the various departments of government.

He

further reported that the requested list of the great
proprietors would not he completed for some time due to
difficulties in communication with the various parts of
the kingdom.

However, the list of departmental employees

did include the names of a significant number of the
iq

great proprietors. J
In organizing the government in Italy, Napoleon
followed closely the structure of government in Prance,
and Eugene made the error of tampering with Napoleon* s
handiwork.

Some time in 1806 it came to the Emperor’s

attention that Eugene had introduced a new system of
departmental direction by substituting "civil magis
trates" for the prefects.

On 28 April 1806 Napoleon

wrote his stepson that he could not allow the substi
tution and ordered Eugene to return the prefects to
office 1 July 1806.

He instructed Eugene to use Ve

netians as prefects in Italy and Italians as prefects
in Venetia.

10

20

Apparently he felt that the jealousy

Ibid.. 176-177. Bueene to Napoleon. 24 June

1805.
20
Napoleon, Correspondence. H I , 337.
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which existed 'between Venetians and Italians would in
sure a closer adherence to directives issued*
Napoleon, on 31 March 1806, created hereditary
duchies in Venetia#

The creation of the dukedoms

caused immediate concern in Italy.

Eugene reported on

7 April that the consensus of the Council of State was
that only the royal family should enjoy hereditary
rights*, The Council objected to the creation of dukes
on the ground that probably Napoleon would not confer
a dukedom upon an Italian, and. therefore the holders of
the duchies would not have the welfare of Italy at
heart*

Eugene told the Emperor that Italians feared

Napoleon would give all the national domain of Venice
to the dukes*

The Italians speculated that the emolu

ments given to the dukes would take from Italy nearly
40,000,000 francs yearly, or approximately one-third of
her income*

The Council of State was of the opinion

that the creation of the duchies was harmful to the
Viceroy and his political future and attempted to deter
mine his attitude toward the creation of hereditary
dukes.

Beauharnais told Napoleon he had promised to

give the Council of State his reply in its meeting of
8 April*

Eugene pledged his support to every Napoleonic

program and promised to attempt to make public opinion

54
more favorable toward the idea of duchies.

21

Apparently Napoleon considered the above
mentioned letter an indication of Italian criticism
of his political wisdom, for he wrote the Viceroy on
14 April that he could not understand a people who pre
sumed to criticize his political wisdom when they knew
he had more sense in his little finger than they had in
their collective heads; even the Parisians ^who by
inference were not quite bright/ knew better than that.
Following the creation of the duchies in Venetia in 1806, Napoleon told Eugene that he should
utilize the talents of the new dukes in administration,
but that the Viceroy should say nothing of this in the
proclamation of annexation of Venetia to Italy which
Eugene should make public on 25 April 1806.

Napoleon

made this suggestion in spite of the fact that he had
previously instructed Eugene to tell the Council of
State that the creation of the duchies was a political

P i

Eugene, Memoires. II, 218-220, Eugene to Na
poleon, 7 April 1806.
22

Napoleon, Correspondence. XII, 283-284, Na
poleon to Eugene, 14 April 1806.
2^Eugene, Memoires. II, 228-229, Napoleon to
Eugene, 14 April 1806.
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necessity and that the newly created dukes would have
24
no voice in Italian administration or affairs.
Certain administrative procedures not provided
for at the time of the establishment of the kingdom
demanded the Viceroy's attention from time to time.
For instance, Eugene complained that without his
knowledge the Italian ministers executed private orders
of the Emperor.

Eugene did not believe this practice

would please the Emperor, for he did not think Napoleon
intended Italian ministers to by—pass the authority of
the Viceroy.

The most serious instance of this sort

occurred, Eugene reported, when Antonio Aldini mentioned
during a meeting of the ministers that Napoleon had
ordered him to release a prisoner of Bomagnan extraction.
Even the suggestion that this person might gain his
freedom appalled the ministers, for they all swore that
the Bomagnan was a bad subject and should not be set
free.

Eugene investigated and. discovered that the one

in question was indeed a criminal, having been convicted
of embezzlement, extortion, and other major crimes.
Thereupon, the Viceroy suspended the execution of the
order and wrote Prince Charles-Maurice de TalleyrandPerigord, Minister of Foreign Affairs of the Empire,

24

Napoleon, Correspondence. XII, 287, Napoleon
to Eugene, 15 April 1806; Eugene."Memoires. II, 60-62,
Eugene to Napoleon, 6 February 1806.
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soliciting his support in the storm he expected to
25

follow such a breach of duty. "

There is nothing in

Eugene’s and Napoleon’s correspondence to indicate that
the storm erupted.
The procedure to be followed in appointing
representatives from Italy to foreign courts also pre
sented problems.

In 1806 Eugene and Marescalchi ex

changed a number of rather fiery letters about the
appointment of a representative to the court of Holland.
Marescalchi wanted* to appoint a person named Matteo
Galdi (a name which in Eugene’s Letterbook is spelled
Goldi), whom Eugene did not know personally.

The

Viceroy did not wish to be represented by a stranger
and instructed Marescalchi to nominate another person.
The Foreign Minister felt that the objection voiced by
Beauharnais exposed his determination to force the ap
pointment of a Frenchman.

Eugene protested that Mares

calchi interpreted his objections incorrectly, but the
Italian insisted.

Thereupon, Eugene wrote that it

really made no difference whether he wanted Galdi or
not, for the Bnperor would make the final decision
about the appointment, what rank the appointee would
hold, and whether a residence would be opened at The

25
"Beauharnais Archive, Eugene to Talleyrand,
12 October 1805#
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Hague.

26

Ho other letters or disagreements of this

nature appear in Eugene’s correspondence.

Therefore,

it is safe to assume that Italian representatives to
foreign courts received their appointments from the
King.
During the existence of the Kingdom of Italy
the Italian Foreign Minister had his residence in Paris.
The location of the foreign ministry at Paris caused
a considerable degree of inconvenience to Italians who
wished to travel, for it was necessary that passports
he obtained from the Foreign Minister.

In April 1806

Eugene apparently received a letter or had a conver
sation with Councillor-of— State Testi about the issu
ance of passports, for the Viceroy wrote Testi that he
agreed that the issuance of passports should fall with
in the province of the minister of interior rather than
the minister of foreign relations.

Beauharnais promised

Testi to make a complete study of the problem after the
annexation of Venetia on 1 May and after determining
the thinking of the judges and Venetians on the problem.
He ended by remarking that the government would still
require consuls and foreign agents to register with the

26

I bid.. Eugene to Marescalchi, 29 July 1806;
Eugene to Marescalchi, 17 August 1806.
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police*.

27

Since Eugene and his ministers later at

tempted to get the headquarters of the Italian diplo
matic corps returned from Paris, to Milan in order that
the government could expedite the issuance of pass
ports, it appears that Eugene and his ministers did not
succeed in transferring the authority to issue pass
ports from the minister of foreign relations to the
minister of the interior.28
It appears that during the first year and a
half of the existence of the kingdom Eugene did not es
tablish firmly a method of communication with foreign
governments, for Marescalchi, on 4 February 1807, com
plained in a letter to the Viceroy that directorsgeneral corresponded directly with foreign governments.
He told the Prince that he thought such action should
fall exclusively within the duties of the ministry of
foreign affairs.

In answer, Eugene wrote that he

agreed with the views of the Foreign Minister and that
he had ordered the directors-general and ministers not
to continue the practice, with the exception of the

27

Ibid., Eugene to Councillor-of-State Testi,
11 April 1806; Eugene to Talleyrand, 13 November 1806.
28

Ibid., Eugene to Marescalchi, 2 January 1807.
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pq
director-general of police. ^

In connection with, corre

spondence between governments it may be mentioned that
in 1807 the government of the kingdom considered the
possibility of establishing a consistorial advocate at
Home, but both Eugene and Marescalchi opposed the move,
"50
and the proposition never became a reality.
In 1807 Eugene began a program of forcing
Italians employed by foreign governments or living
abroad to give up such employment or residence and re
turn to the kingdom or gain the government’s consent to
remain where they were.

A decree of August 1807 es

tablished the policy and provided seisure of property
and its division among heirs living in Italy as punish
ment for failure to comply with the decree.

This de

cree caused a considerable stir among members of the
Italian government, and the Foreign Minister wrote the
Viceroy a letter of protest in which he requested the

Ibid.. Eugene to Marescalchi, 26 February
1807* Directors-general were directors of bureaus
within departments. Marescalchivs letter does not ap
pear in the Beauharnais Archive, but Eugene’s answer
makes the content of the letter quite clear.
^ Ibid.. Eugene to Marescalchi, 22 August 1807*
According to Father W. E. O ’Donnell, S.J., Creighton
University, Omaha, Nebraska, a consistorial advocate
was an advocate, either lay or ecclesiastical, who pled
cases before the curia at Borne.
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abrogation of the decree.

Eugene informed the Foreign

Minister by letter that the decree could not be re
called, for it had the approval of the Emperor.

Though

the letter written by Marescalchi is not available for
examination, Eugene’s reply indicates the Foreign Minis
ter based his opposition on the assertion that the de
cree denied the right of Italians to live abroad.

She

Viceroy defended his order by stating that the govern
ment had no intention of denying the right of Italians
to live abroad; it only required that the persons af
fected by the decree gain the government’s consent to
do so.

■551

There can be little doubt that the decree in
question represented an attempt on the part of the
government to prevent the development of an emigre
problem and an effort to control the entry of news from
the outside, for all communication with relatives and
friends was denied persons to whom the decree applied.
Probably the decree represents an attempt on the part
of Eugene to prevent wealth from leaving Italy and to
make it impossible for political undesirables to return
to Italy once they had left.

Political undesirables

returning to comply with the decree and others returning

31
Ibid., Eugene to Marescalchi, 7 November 1807.
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after the deadline would be arrested, imprisoned, per
haps even shot*
By mid-1807 the structure and practice of state
administration was for all practical purposes complete,
and only a few innovations were introduced after that
date.

The most important changes made came about in

autumn and early winter of that

year wh e n Napoleon paid

his second visit to Italy.
Napoleon was delayed by a storm and he arrived
at Milan when no one expected him.

Therefore, his re

ception in 1807 differed markedly from that given him
at his coronation in 1805.

Eugene had

struction of an arch of triumph

at the

ordered the con
point where the

road from the Simplon Pass entered Milan, and had made
plans for a triumphal entry.

But communications failed

for some reason, and Napoleon was only a short distance
away when Eugene learned of his presence.

The Viceroy

hastily leaped on his horse and dashed to meet the Sling,
reaching his party only a half-league from Milan.

Eugene, Memoires. Ill, 364— 366.
The Moniteur
announced Napoleon*s arrival as having occurred on
21 November 1807, but Eugene's Memoires places the ar
rival on 16 November 1807*
There were changes made in
various branches of government after 1807, such as the
courts.
Such changes will be discussed in the chapter
on reforms.
However, the broad outlines of administration
remained the same after 1807.
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After the Emperor*s arrival fltes were held to
honor him, and the court was at its glittering "best.
Among those who greeted the conqueror were the King and
Queen of Bavaria and the King and Queen of Etruria.
One personage missing at the court was none other than
the Vice-Queen, Augusta Amelia, who had recently
suffered a miscarriage and was recuperating at Monza.
Curiously, she did not return to Milan until the day
following Napoleon’s departure for other parts of the
33

realm."
During the first few days of his visit Napoleon
entered into the festive mood, hut then he gave his at
tention to the affairs of state.

He met with the

Council of State, called the ministers into conference,
examined carefully all phases of administration, and
then congratulated Eugene on the good condition of the
state.

34

On 26 November 1807 Napoleon issued a call to

the electoral, colleges to meet in extraordinary session
on 10 December.

33

'^Ibid.. 365; Moniteur, 7 December 1807.
34

.

'Eugene, Memoires. Ill, 365.
33

'Moniteur. 7 December 1807.

63
Napoleon left Milan 28 November and went di
rectly to Venice where be engoyed additional fetes and
merrymaking, met with, the Venetian naval officials, and
issued decrees designed to improve the public health,
beautify the city, and provide a public walk on the
banks of the St.-Joseph Canal.

Prom Venice Napoleon

visited Trevino, Palmanova, Udine, Osoppo, and Mantua
-2g

before returning to Milan on 15 December.
The electoral colleges convoked for 10 December
held a royal session on 20 December.

Napoleon, at that

time, promulgated the Fourth Constitutional Statute.
This statute provided for Napoleon's adoption of Eugene
and provided that the Viceroy would be heir to the
Italian crown when Napoleon relinquished it to another
person.

The Fourth Constitutional Statute established

the crown as hereditary in Eugene's direct male de
scendants.

Female descendants were denied the right to

succeed to the crown.

37

Apparently collateral line^

were also excluded.
Immediately after the promulgation of the
Fourth Constitutional Statute, Napoleon issued the
Fifth Constitutional Statue, which transformed the

■^Eugene, Memoires. Ill, 366-367•
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Council of State into a consulting senate and provided
that each department would he represented in that body
by at least one member.

Prom this time forward the

Consulting Senate served as the legislative body of the
Kingdom of Italy.

At the same time, Napoleon de

clared that the title ttPrince of Venice” should desig
nate the heir-apparent to the Italian throne.

By

decree Napoleon set the membership of the legislative
section of the Council of State at eighteen persons and
the membership of the council of auditors at twenty,
plus twelve assistants.

■50

In addition, Napoleon con

ferred several honorific titles with hereditary quality.
Those Italians who had embraced the tenets of liber
alism did not receive the creation of Italian nobility
at all well, for it seemed to them that Napoleon in
tended to reintroduce inequality of men, and they
feared social distinction might replace merit as a de
terminant in relationships between sovereign and sub
ject.^
Eugene, in January 1808, proposed that Italy be

38Ibid.
39Ibid.
40Ibid., IV, 12.
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divided into seven military districts as Prance was,
but Napoleon refused to accept the suggestion for all
of Italy,

Eugene received instructions to establish

two military districts, one at Venice and one at Ra
venna,

The duty of the district of Ravenna would be to

provide protection for the coasts, and that of the
district at Venice to provide protection for Friuli and
Udine,

The remainder of the departments each had a

military commander and commissar who reported to the
Minister of War, and there was no reason to transform
them into military districts.^-1

In fact, if not in

name, they already had that quality.
It is in the tact and ability with which the
Viceroy met problems affecting the popularity of Prance
in Italy during the first eighteen months of his ad
ministration that his political capabilities are ex
posed most fully.

Eugene was required to please Napoleoi

without alienating the Italians.

This was a difficult

assignment because of the programs the Viceroy had to
initiate, such as the imposition of a land tax.

Yet

Eugene accomplished his task with consummate skill.
Proof of this statement is to be found in the fact that
the Italians formed no serious opposition outside the

1808.

41
^ Ibid.. 53-54. Napoleon to Eugene. 30 January
■
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Council of State and the Corns legislatif*

Eugene

seldom had to have recourse to reminders of Napoleonic
power in his dealings with subordinates, his letter to
Marescalchi in the incident over the appointment of a
minister to Holland being the strongest such statement
on record.

If he used such persuasion, it is not re

corded in letters as being a common occurrence.
Eugene*s attempts to alter the structure of
administration with the appointment of civil magistrates
in the place of prefects and his suggestion for the es
tablishment of military districts in Italy indicate
that his interests went beyond following instructions
given from Paris.
During the period 1805-1806, Eugene overcame
his initial handicap of political inexperience, and
emerged as a first-rate administrator.

Napoleon had no

reason to complain of the choice he had made to hold
his sceptre in Italy.

CHAPTER IT
LEGAL REFORM
Italy Had Hardly become a kingdom when Eugene
began a policy of reforming civil institutions to bring
tHem into Harmony with tHe institutions of France.
The courts and schools particularly experienced a re
juvenation under Napoleonic domination.

THe Italian

courts and judicial system Had remained largely feudal
under tHe Italian Republic, and tHe new government
determined to eradicate such an archaic method.

It

intended to replace the old courts with the shiny new
Imperial design.
THe first available indication of an imminent
change in the Italian judicial system is a letter from
Napoleon instructing Andre-Joseph Abrial to go to
Milan, meet with Eugene, and direct the reorganization
of the judiciary in Italy.

THe letter also contained

instructions that Abrial should make a study of crimi
nal and civil procedures in order to determine the
applicability of French laws to Italian procedures.1

N a p o l e o n , Correspondance. X, 155* Napoleon to
Abrial, 12 June 1805. Abrial was the French legalist
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It appears, therefore, that at least in the first
instance the government intended to retain Italian
legal procedure, hut had the intention of rewriting the
statutes of the realm.
The order to reform statutes came quite soon,
and on 21 June.1805 the grand judge created two com
missions, one charged with the task of drawing up a
code of criminal procedure and the other with drawing
up a penal code.

The penal code commission contained

some of Italyfs leading legalists, including Di Lorenzi,
judge of the Tribunal of Cassation; Giuseppe Luini,
judge of the court of appeal of Olona; Antonio Canova,
judge of the court of appeal of Mincio; Silva, judge
suppliant of the court of appeal of Olona; Tommaso
Nani, professor of criminal jurisprudence at the Uni
versity of Pavia; and Giuseppe Raffaelli, professor of
criminal jurisprudence at the law school at Bresa,
This commission began its deliberations at Milan, 1
July 1805* and was to finish its work by 15 August of
the same year.2

who headed up the Napoleonic commission charged with
codifying French law. The commission produced the
Code Napoleon.
2Moniteur, 22 Miessidor, Year XIII (11 July
Bresa probably was Brescia.
I have been un
able to locate Bresa on any map.

1805).
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The commission appointed
civil

to establish a code of

procedure also represented Italy*s best legal

thinking-

This commission consisted of Fidele Sopransi,

president of the tribunal of revision at Milan; Borsotti, a member of the same court as Sopransi; Qnuzzarelli, president of the court of appeal of Panaro;
Tacconi, substitute for the commissioner to the tribunal
of revision,of Bologna; and Carlos Prancesco Caselli,
commissioner to the courts of Crostolo*
held its sessions at Milan*

This commission

The commission began its

work on 1 July 1805, and had instructions to present
3
its proposals to the grand judge by 15 August 1805*
It is evident that the suggestions of the com
missions on a penal code and code of civil procedure
did not receive acceptance, for the Code Napoleon was
translated into Italian and Latin, and Eugene, in No
vember 1805, sent it to Antonio Aldini at Paris with
instructions to lay,it before Napoleon at the earliest
v-

opportunity.

At the same time the Viceroy wrote Na

poleon that he had sent the translation of the Code to
Aldini and that if Napoleon delayed approval, the Code
would not be put into execution in Italy on 1 January

5Ibid.
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1806 as planned.

4

It is apparent that reading and ap

proval of the translation of the Code did not proceed
rapidly enough; it was not applied in Italy until 1
April 1806.

IT

As the various Napoleonic codes were com

pleted, they were applied in Italy.

Thus, after the

adoption of the Napoleonic Code of Commerce in France
in 1807 it became the Italian commercial law.

In the

same year the Italian government adopted the Penal Code
then in force in France and all French codes of pro
cedure.^
Though no record of Eugene*s suggesting a ju
dicial code is available, it is evident he offered one
for Napoleon*s consideration, for on 13 May 1806 Na
poleon refused to accept Eugene's suggestion for an
Italian judicial code and ordered that the one followed
in France be applied to Italy.^

In the following month

4
Beauharnais Archive, Eugene to Aldini, 4 No
vember 1805; Eugene, Memoires. I, 439-440, Eugene to
Napoleon, 9 November 1865^Moniteur. 10 April 1806.
6
Eugene, Memoires. Ill, 360; Moniteur. 6 October
1807; Gershoy, French Beyolution. 4571 Dudasse gives
the date of the application of the Napoleonic Code of
Commerce as 1810. Beo Gershoy gives the date as being
1807.
7

*Napoleon, Correspondence. XII, 364-370, Na
poleon to Eugene, 13 May 1806.
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the Moniteur carried the announcement that the section
of the Code Napoleon dealing with the judicial code
O
would not be put into operation until 1807*
Between 7 June and 25 June Eugene sent proposals
to Napoleon for the organization and location of courts
of the first instance*

Napoleon approved the locations,

but reduced the number of courts to be established in
several areas*

Eor example, he ordered that only one

court of first instance should be established at Adda
instead of the four suggested, for, he wrote, sufficient
justices of the peace existed there to make four courts
of first instance at that place unnecessary*

In all,

Napoleon reduced the number of such courts to be es
tablished in the kingdom from the proposed thirty— seven
q
to twenty-seven*
The establishment of courts of first
instance represents the extent of court reform in 1805•
On 17 June 1806, by a decree issued from St.Cloud, Napoleon established the courts, tribunals, and
justices of the peace for the kingdom and set the sala
ries of the presidents, vice-presidents, members, and

8
Moniteur, 27 June 1806*
q
^Napoleon, Correspondance * X, 561, Napoleon
to Eugene, 25 June 1805.
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clerks.

By the same decree he provided for royal procu

rators and their substitutes.^
Hard on the heels of the application of the
Code Napoleon came the establishment of four courts of
appeal at Milan, Venice, Bologna, and Brescia.

The

court at Milan served the departments of Adda, Lagogna,
Upper-Po, lario, and Olona; the one at Venice the de
partments of Adriatico, Bacchiglione, Brenta, Istria,
Passeriano, Piave, and Tagliamento; the one at Bologna
the departments of Lower-Po, Crostolo, Tanaro, Eeno,
and Eubicon; and the court at Brescia the departments
of Adige, Mella, Mincio, and Serio.11
The court system in Italy during the existence
of the kingdom was identical to that of Prance.

12

The

absence of documentary material concerning the Italian
courts forces one to depend upon the French system to
•yz

determine function and organization of Italian courts.

^

^Moniteur. 25 July 1806«

^ Biographie universelle. Ill, 377; Eugene,
Memoires. Ill, 359-360.
'
12Driault, Napoleon en Italie. 590.
13

Jacques Godechot, Les institutions de la
Prance sous la revolution et 1*empire (.Paris: Presses
universitaires de Prance, 1951). 522-555.
(Hereafter
cited as Godechot, Institutionsj. Unless otherwise in
dicated, all material concerning the functions, powers,
and composition of the courts is derived from Godechot *s
work.
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The application of the French judicial system in Italy
progressed rather slowly.

Eugene, on 22 August 1807,

wrote the Minister of Justice that the courts should be
ready to enter into the new system by September of that
year.

The courts of appeal should be prepared to begin

operation under the French codes by 10 September, and
the courts of c-ivil and criminal justice and the counts
of the first instance should begin their operation under
14
the new codes by 15 September at the latest.
The judicial institutions in Napoleonic France
had their origin in the Constitution of the Year VIII
and the law of 27 Ventose, Year VIII (18 March 1800),
and remained unchanged until 1810.

After that date a

few modifications in court structure were effected which
will be indicated in the proper chronological order.
The judicial hierarchy was reinstated by the organic
senatus consultum which established the life consulate.
Under the Constitution of the Year VIII jus
tices of the peace held their positions as the result of
an absolute majority gained in cantonal elections.
After the end of Year X the cantonal assemblies nomi
nated two men for the position; the names of the two men
were then presented to the First Consul, who in turn

14
Beauharnais Archive, Eugene to the Minister
of Justice of the kingdom, 22 August 1807*
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chose one of the two nominees to fill the vacancy.

The

one thus chosen served for ten years and, as all other
justices, had the privilege of wearing the judicial
robe.

The age requirement for a justice of the peace

was set at thirty years, and he had the function of
arbitrating disputes among citizens of the canton.
The Constitution further provided that courts
of first instance should he composed of a presiding
judge and two. deputy judges.

In villages of less than

5,000 the president of the court functioned also as a
director of an accusative jury,

In villages of more

than 5*000 the court had one additional judge whose
special function was to direct the accusative jury, and
an extra deputy.

In towns of more than 30,000 the

courts of first instance were divided into two sections
with seven justices and four deputies each; in "sig
nificantly” larger cities additional sections were es
tablished as they became necessary due to the demands
of the population.

The president of the court of first

instance, chosen by the head of state, held his position
for three years.
Oases were prosecuted by a public prosecutor,
analogous to the American Attorney-General.

The public

prosecutor*s office consisted of a government com
missioner and a deputy for each section of the court
beyond the first section.

After 1804 the commissioners
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carried the title of imperial procurators.

The im

perial procurators were appointed by the Emperor and
could he discharged only hy him.
The courts of first instance had their recesses
between 1 September and 1 November, and during the
period of recess they held a session every ten days.
In March 1808 a recess section was created for each
court and section.
In civil cases the courts of first instance
judged all affairs appealed from the courts of justices
of the peace and also judged commercial affairs if a
commercial court did not exist in the locality.

They

applied the civil code until the issuance of the Code
of Civil Procedure in 1806, which did away with some of
the more progressive features of the Bevolution's legal
reforms.

Under Napoleon, civil procedure utilized the

process established by an ordinance of 1668.

This ordi

nance made provision for prosecutors and attorneys, as
representatives of interested parties, to argue cases
before judges.

After hearing the cases, the judges

rendered their decisions, which were based upon the
arguments presented.

The ordinance made no provision

for jury trial.
There were four courts of appeal in Italy.

They

heard appeals from decisions rendered in civil cases by
the courts of first instance and from the decisions of
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the commercial courts.

In Italy a bill was introduced

on 12 April 1810 to rename the courts of appeal and
provide that the judge auditors who had moved up to the
position of councillor to the court of appeal should
retain their function, but the title "judge auditor”
should be suspended.^

By a law of 20 April 1810 the

courts of appeal were renamed Imperial Courts.
Both the courts of first instance and appellate
courts were divided into two sections if the population
of their jurisdictional areas exceeded one million in
habitants.

A one-section court consisted of twelve or

fourteen justices; a two-section court consisted of
twenty or twenty-two justices.

If the pressure of

business made more justices necessary, they were added
as needed.

The president of the court of appeal enjoyed

a lifetime appointment.

If the court had more than one

section, he carried the title of "first president” and
each additional section had a president as well.
The public prosecutor’s office for each court
of appeal consisted of a government commissioner and
his aides.

16

Under the Empire the public prosecutors

^Moniteur. 16 April 1810. Apparently the
Italian bill was introduced in anticipation of the re
naming of the courts of appeal by the imperial govern
ment. It may be that Eugene hoped to avoid the
appearance of "toadying" to Uapoleon.
^ A government commissioner with his aides was
the equivalent of the American Attorney-General’s office.
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were entitled imperial procurators—general and justices
were entitled "His Majesty*s counsellors in the Imperial
Courts."

After 16 March. 1808 judge auditors, who after

1810 had the title "associate justices," were added to
the courts of appeal.

They filled one-third of the

positions on the courts of appeal and obtained their
posts by appointment of the Emperor.

To be eligible

they must have had two years of legal experience gained
in a court of first instance and an annual income of
3,000 francs or a pension of a like amount.
There was a court of criminal justice in each
department.

The court consisted of a president, ap

pointed by the Emperor for life, two other justices who
held a permanent appointment, and two deputies.

Crimi

nal public prosecutors were imperial procurators who,
in the larger towns, were often assisted by one or more
deputies.
Apparently the only juries used in the criminal
courts were accusative juries.

At first the justice of

the peace drew the jury lists.

He proposed three jurors

per 1,000 inhabitants of the district.

The sub-prefect

reduced by one-third the list proposed by the justice of
the peace, and the prefect reduced by two-thirds the
list drawn by the sub-prefect.

The prefecture council

selected juries from the list presented by the prefect.
After 1811 the prefect prepared jury lists without
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reference to the justices of the peace or sub-prefects.
An accusative jury did not hear defendant or
plaintiff, but made its decision from depositions placed
before the jury.

After the jury read the depositions,

the jury president reported to the court on the determi
nation of the jury.

The police advocate also made a

report to the court on his investigation of the case.
After considering both reports the court determined
whether the accused should be bound over for trial.

If

the accused was to be held for trial, he must be charged
immediately, and if he was to be released, he must be
released immediately.

The reports of the president of

the accusative jury and of the police advocate must be
made within three days after hearing all depositions.
In actual practice the criminal courts had very
little to do, for their functions were exercised largely
by special courts.

Each special court was composed of

a president, two justices from the criminal court, three
military men with at least the rank of captain, and two
civilians.

Special courts heard cases in secret.

They

were courts of first and last resort for such crimes as
burglary, brigandage, armed robbery, murder in the first
degree, counterfeiting, vagabondage, beggary, arson, and
seditious assembly.

There was no appeal from the special

courts.
The court of Cassation, the supreme court of
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appeal, consisted of forty-eight judges who were nomi
nated "by the Emperor and elected for life "by the Senate.
This position required a law degree.

The Court of Cas

sation was divided into three sections; criminal, re
quests, and civil.

A decision could not he rendered

unless at least eleven members were present.

The Court

of Cassation had authority to try cases in all cate
gories covered hy its three sections.

An imperial

procurator-general and six advocates-general, two to
the section, represented the public prosecutor*s office.
If the decision rendered hy the Court of Cassation was
attacked on the same basis as the first decision ren
dered in the case, it was reheard hy all three sections
of the court.

If the decision of the whole court was

attacked, it became the duty of the Corps legislatif to
explain the law.
Until 1807 justices were appointed for life.
In 1807 a senatus consultum decreed that a life ap
pointment could he enjoyed only after five years of
service, giving the government an opportunity to purge
undesirable and refractory justices.

It effectively

destroyed the independence of the courts.
Napoleonic justice brought the workhouse, an
institution unknown to Italy before this time.

Eugene

defended the institution as a necessary item to guard
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against "lazy and dangerous men." '

Since beggary was

a crime punishable by trial before a special court, and
punishment often meant the workhouse, beggary almost
disappeared from the kingdom.

18

True justice did not come automatically to Italy
with the introduction of the French system.

This is

evidenced by a letter from Eugene to the Minister of
Justice written in September 1808, in which Beauharnais
told the Minister that there were a number of prisoners
being held at Udine for long periods of time without the
benefit of having had a hearing.

Eugene ordered such

abuses halted and a full investigation of the prisons
of the kingdom in order to bring such injustice to an

iq

end. 3

Only with the application of the full series of

Napoleonic codes in Italy could the Moniteur report
that the codes had brought the first real measure of
justice to Italy, and the people were happier under the
20
codes than they had ever been under any other system.
There can be little doubt that reforms in areas

17

Moniteur, 1 March 1808.

1 ft
Eugene, Memoires. IV, 14.
iq

Beauharnais Archive, Eugene to the Minister of
Justice of the kingdom, 30 September 1808.
20

Moniteur. 11 November 1811.

81
of local administration and law enjoyed great popu
larity *

Though judicial and legal reforms made in

Italy did not spring from Italian experience, the re
forms did significantly better the administration of
21

justice•

21

Carlo Chisalberti, "Sulle Amminisrazioni
locali in Italia nel periodo Napoleonico." Rassenga
Storica del Risorgimento, January-March (I960), 33—
54.

CHAPTER V
FINANCES
The Italian budget -was the first order of
business for the Council of State and the Corns legislatif in the summer of 1805.

Eugene called the Council

of State into extraordinary session for Tuesday, 18
June 1805, and ordered the Minister of Finance to pre
sent a tentative budget to the Council at that time
under the title of the law of Finances.

If the Council

accepted the budget, the Minister should have it printed
and sent to the Viceroy.1
The Council did not approve the proposed budget,
and when Napoleon learned of the opposition to the law,
he wrote Eugene to call a meeting of the president of
the Corps legislatif and the commission on finances to
explain the position of the government, and to stress
that the meeting had been called at the express request
of the King.

He ended by telling Eugene to send him
p
the finished decree for signature.
Napoleon apparently

^Beauharnais Archive, Eugene to the Minister of
Finance of the kingdom, 13 June 1805.
2

Napoleon, Correspondence. I, 512, Napoleon to
Eugene, 12 June 1805.
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thought that a statement of his displeasure would "bring
the desired result.

If that was his thought, he was in

error, for the Council of State continued in its op
position, and it was some time "before the passage of
the law could be effected.
In the interim, to meet the needs of the state,
governmental spending was determined by estimates of
needs based upon expenditures of the previous y e a r /
Eugene ordered the Minister of Finances to render a
monthly accounting of the cost of all services that had
been established as the responsibility of the state.
Local expense accounts were to be rendered to the Minis
ter of Finance by the prefects, and all other state
departments were to render the Minister of Finance a
report on the cost of operation of their departments in
order that an overall estimate of expenses might be
made .
In addition to the regular budgetary items,
the finance law as presented to the Corps legislatif

^Eugene, Memoires. I, 198-200, Eugene to Na
poleon, 1 4 July 1805*
4.

Napoleon, Correspondance. X, 490, Napoleon
to Eugene, 7 June 1805•
e
^Beauharnais Archive, Eugene to the Minister
of Finance of the kingdom, 13 June 1805.
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provided the following:

(l) payment of priests* sala

ries every six months, (2) governmental power to es
tablish and apply customs regulations, (3) a new custom
on grain, (4) a law of registration.

The addition of

these provisions caused the development of opposition
to the finance law.
Finding that the Italians were determined to
continue resistance to the Law of Finances, Eugene re
ported on 14 July 1805 that he would no longer argue
with the Council of State and that he would allow it
to delete what it would from the law.1

Three days

later he announced the passage of the law and reported
the Minister of Finance hard at work on the draft of a
law of registration which would meet the approval of
the Council of State and which would not be opposed to
the governmento

The law, as it was being drafted,

would exempt from registration those whose estates
amounted to less than 300 livres.

8

At the same time Eugene wrote that the customs

^Eugene, Memoires. I, 231-232, Eugene to Na
poleon, 1 August 1805•
^Ibid.. 198-200, Eugene to Napoleon, 14 July
1805.
8Ibid., 201-202, Eugene to Napoleon, 17 July
1805.
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law had not yet been enacted because Italians feared
q
that Napoleon would allow export to France only*
In reporting this delay, Eugene reflected that the
Italians never occupied themselves with great problems,
only the little ones.

They did not worry themselves

much about the annual contributions of 30,000,000
francs to be paid to France for the upkeep of the army,
but feared a customs which would cost them much less*
To be sure, he noted, the Italians were petitioning
Napoleon for a reduction in the contribution, but they
did not expect that it would be considered, and Eugene
told his master that he should not give the petition
serious t h o u g h t . ^
The deletion of the proposed customs law and
the law of registration from the general budget law
represented a departure from the role Napoleon in
tended the Viceroy to play, and Napoleon complained
bitterly about it.

Eugene defended the move by the

fact that he had to have a budget if government was to
be carried on, and that the customs law and the regis
tration law could be established by a simple decree
if necessary.

Eugene also reported that the success

^Ibid.

^ I b i d *, 201, Eugene to Napoleon, 17 July 1805*
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of the Council of State and the Corps legislatif in
opposing the laws and holding up their passage had
affected adversely Italian public opinion.

He felt

it better to lose a small battle over the passage of
these two items than to have the whole budget refused,
thus giving the legislators the status of defenders of
the public welfare when a budget was decreed.

11

Eugene

wrote later that the Corps legislatif and the Council
of State had the idea that they were to rule rather
12
than to serve.
In answer to a query put by Napoleon
whether the opposition had come from Melzi*s clique,
Eugene wrote that no one particular group had opposed
the law, but that the opposition had come from the
feeling that the finance minister had done nothing but
increase taxes.

13

Ihe result of the opposition to Napoleonic legis
lation was the dissolution of the Corps legislatif.

In

a letter of 26 July 1805, Napoleon wrote the Viceroy
that he was sending a budget for two years and that he
would not need a Corps legislatif during that period;

1805.

11Ibid.. 203-205, Eugene to Napoleon, 21 July
---12Ibid.. 233-234, Eugene to Napoleon, 2 August

1803.
225-22?, Eugene to Napoleon, 30 July
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in another letter written the same day he announced
his displeasure w i t h the chamber and stated that as
long as he remained k ing of Italy, he would not call
it again#

By the same letter Marescalchi was appointed

interim Secretary of State.

14-

A few days later Eugene wrote the King that he
had seen the president of the Corps legislatif and a
few members of that body#

He had been asked to send

a letter from them to Napoleon, which he had done, and
remarked that probably the letter contained nothing
but excuses; to hear them tell it, he said, none of
them had a thing to do w i t h the refusal of the Law of
Finances as it was first presented.
In answer to the letter, Napoleon, master of
w r y w i t , wrote the president of the Corps legislatif
that he was gratified to learn that the faithfulness
of this body was greater than its actions indicated#
He went on to say that he could brook no interference

with his directives, and gave no indication that he
intended to recall the Corns legislatif.

He made it

crystal clear that the various governing bodies in
Italy were only 1atermedlaries between himself and his

14Uapoleon, Correspondence. X I f 43*44# Ba~>
poison to Bugene, 26 M f i W ^ e j i d Sapolese to
geresealehi# 26 July 180$.
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of the Council of State and the Corps legislatif in
opposing the laws and holding up their passage had
affected adversely Italian public opinion.

He felt

it better to lose a small battle over the passage of
these two items than to have the whole budget refused,
thus giving the legislators the status of defenders of
the public welfare when a budget was decreed.

11

Eugene

wrote later that the Corps legislatif and the Council
of State had the idea that they were to rule rather
than to serve.

12

In answer to a query put by Napoleon

whether the opposition had come from Melzi*s clique,
Eugene wrote that no one particular group had opposed
the law, but that the opposition had come from the
feeling that the finance minister had done nothing but
increase taxes.

13

The result of the opposition to Napoleonic legis
lation was the dissolution of the Corps legislatif.

In

a letter of 26 July 1805, Napoleon wrote the Viceroy
that he was sending a budget for two years and that he
would not need a Corps legislatif during that period;

^ I b i d . , 203-205, Eugene to Napoleon, 21 July
1805.
12Ibid., 233-234, Eugene to Napoleon, 2 August
1805.

1805.

^ Ibid.. 225-227, Eugene to Napoleon, 30 July
“

87
in another letter written the same day he announced
his displeasure with the chamber and stated that as
long as he remained king of Italy, he would not call
it again.

By the same letter Marescalchi was appointed

interim Secretary of State.

14-

A few days later Eugene wrote the King that he
had seen the president of the Corps legislatif and a
few members of that body.

He had been asked to send

a letter from them to Napoleon, which he had done, and
remarked that probably the letter contained nothing
but excuses; to hear them tell it, he said, none of
them had a thing to do with the refusal of the Law of
Finances as it was first presented.
In answer to the letter, Napoleon, master of
wry w i t , wrote the president of the Corps legislatif
that he was gratified to learn that the faithfulness
of this body was greater than its actions indicated.
He went on to say that he could brook no interference
with his directives, and gave no indication that he
intended to recall the Corps legislatif.

He made it

crystal clear that the various governing bodies in
Italy were only intermediaries between himself and his

14

^Napoleon, Correspondence. XI, 43-44, Na
poleon to Eugene, 26 July 1805* and Napoleon to
Marescalchi, 26 July 1805*
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subjects.

They were tools of the King. He would rule
it:
as well as reign. J Hot until 1810 did Italians again
vote on a finance measure, and then the consulting
senate, which had replaced the Corps legislatif in
1807, voted.^

The result of the vote cannot be de

termined from available sources.

There is no reason,

however, to believe the senate voted against the
measure.
Even though Napoleon had sent a budget for two
years in July 1805, it was very general and useful only
as a guide to the approximate amounts to be spent.

For

itemized spending Eugene had to depend upon budgets
which were prepared in Paris every two months.

The

return of budgets was chronically slow during the first
two years of the existence of the kingdom.

The sections

of Eugene's Memoires devoted to correspondence with Na
poleon are replete with requests for the return of
monthly budgets, and many letters in his correspondence
with his finance minister are announcements of requests
for the return of the budgets.

17

^Eugene, Memoires. I, 237-239» Eugene to Na
poleon, 5 August 1805; Napoleon, Correspondance. XI,
77-78, Napoleon to Tavema, President ox the frorps
legislatif at Milan, 11 August 1805*
16

Moniteur. 21 March 1810 and 28 December 1807.

^Eugene, Memoires. I, 370-371, Eugene to Na
poleon, 16 September 1865» Beauharnais Archive, Eugene
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It appears that during the first few weeks of
the existence of the new kingdom the treasurer paid in
bonds for services rendered the state, for Eugene re
ceived a letter from the Emperor telling him that the
treasurer should be made aware of the difference between
bonds and money.

Napoleon felt that when bonds were

sold money came into the treasury, but when they were
given in payment for services rendered, money was taken
out.

Napoleon sarcastically reflected that if all

nations paid their obligations with bonds the result
would be disastrous.

18

Napoleon's reasoning on this

point seems to be somewhat muddled, for regardless of
whether bonds were sold or used as payment for services
rendered, at the time of redemption money would be
taken out of the treasury.

Perhaps the King was re

luctant to increase the bonded indebtedness of the
state before provision had been made to fund the debt.
Though Napoleon made provision for paying the
public debt, funds were lacking for even the most

to the Minister of the Public Treasury, 13 September
1805* and Eugene to the Minister of Foreign Relations
of the kingdom, 21 April 1810. No effort is made here
to cite every instance in which Eugene made such re
quests.
The letters cited are representative of the
Viceroy's requests for the return of monthly budgets.
“|Q
Eugene, Memoires. I, 154-155, Napoleon to
Eugene, 18 June 1865.

90

pressing financial needs.

As long as the Council of

State held up the law of Finances, the Italian govern
ment could meet its expenses only by advances from the
imperial treasury,

Eugene expected the imperial

government to mark off these sums, but in September
Napoleon informed the Viceroy that the Italian govern
ment must repay all advances from the imperial treasury
and advised Eugene to economize.

19

There is nothing

in the published Mfemoires of Beauhamais, Napoleon*s
Correspondence, or Eugene*s correspondence with his
finance minister indicating how Eugene could reduce the
cost of governing in Italy except by reducing his
personal expenses.

TWien the Viceroy presented the

budget for the Royal Household to Napoleon in 1806, it
amounted to 10,000,000 francs.

Napoleon reduced the

amount to 3,000,000 and added that by exercising a
little economy Eugene should have 500,000 francs left
of this sum at the end of the year.

20

Napoleon was anxious to know what he might
expect in the way of revenue from his newly acquired

19
'Napoleon, Correspondence. X£, 210, Napoleon
to Eugene, 16 September 1805.
20

Ibid.. XEI, 14, 33, Napoleon to Eugene, 5
February 1&66 and Napoleon to Eugene, 11 February 1806.
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kingdom*

In order to supply this information, Eugene,

in October, demanded a report on the amounts realized
from the imposition of the direct tax and the cost of
collection*

In the letter demanding the report the

Viceroy told the finance minister the report should be
exact since the Emperor had ordered it.

21

Having entered the campaign of 1805 by the time
Eugene asked for the report, the Emperor could not give
his personal attention to the study of details for
which he is justly famous*

However, upon his return

to Paris in January 1806, Napoleon complained that he
could make nothing of the report and said that he had
written Aldini, who. served as treasurer, for a report
on all subjects relative to Italian finances and the
Italian budget for 1806 in order that he might fully
inform himself of the financial condition of the
state.22
Apparently, Eug e n e ’s report contained mention
of expenditures on canals and roads, for four days
later the Emperor informed the Viceroy that he was
spending on ill-advised projects; canals and roads

21 B e a u h a m a i s Archive, Eugene to the Minister
of Finance of the kingdom, 2 October 1805*
22

Napoleon, Correspondence * XII, 33, Napoleon
to Eugene, 11 February 1806; 52, Napoleon to Eugene,
15 February 1806•
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could wait until a later date.

Napoleon 1;old Eugene

that a councillor-of-state, accompanied by a receiver,
was coming from Prance to untangle and administer
23
Italian finances.
By the terms of the Treaty of Pressburg,
Venetia became a Prench possession, and the Emperor
wrote that he hoped the increase of wealth derived
from the addition of Venetia to the Kingdom of Italy
would make it possible for governmental revenues to
meet the needs of the state, for he needed the war
contributions of the Italian states for expenses in
Prance.

At the same time Napoleon desired a report

which would show exactly the condition, composition,
and cost of the Italian army, squad by squad.^
Two weeks later Napoleon complained that he had
not received the reports requested on the condition of
the Italian army, the national wealth of Italy, or the
wealth of Venice.

In his letter he told the Viceroy

that sucli reports were not really work- if he just ap
plied himself.

The Emperor went on to tell Eugene

that he was spending too much money in Italy and that

23
Ibid.. 51-52, Napoleon to Eugene, 15 Febru
ary 1806.
Ai

Ibid., XI, 566, Napoleon to Eugene, 31
January 1805.
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he must economize; Napolepn had increased the armies
of the French Empire and needed all the money he could
get for French forces.

The armed force in Italy, sup

ported until this time by France, became the responsi2*5
bility of the Italian treasury. J
In another letter of the same day Napoleon
wrote the Viceroy that contributions for the Grand
Army from the Venetian territories were as follows:
Verona 400,000 francs; Vicenza 1,000,000; Trevino
1,500,000; Padua 1,500,000; Udine 1,000,000; and
Trieste 2,000,000, totaling 7,40G,000 francs.

Napoleon

ordered 10,000,000 to be collected, but in this letter
made no mention of the manner in which the remaining
2,600,000 francs were to be assigned.

A portion of

the contributions had been collected during the cam
paign of 1805, and the Emperor demanded to know what
portion remained outstanding and ordered Eugene to
26
collect the unpaid portion immediately.
Siphoning
off such sums did not aid the Italian economy.
Eugene misinterpreted Napoleon's request for
a report on the cost of the Italian army and reported

2^Ibid., XII, 54-55, Napoleon to Eugene, 16
February 1866.
26

1806.

Ibid., 54. Napoleon to Eugene. 16 February
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only the cost of troops in Venetia.
to 1,790,320 Milanese francs.^

This cost amounted

At the same time the

Viceroy reported that estimated overall revenue from
Venetia would amount to 24,000,000 or 25,000,000 francs.
He estimated that administrative costs in Venetia would
he ahout 15,000,000 francs, and the cost of the army
would be some 8,000,000 to 9*000,000 French francs.^®
According to these estimates there would be a surplus
of about 1,000,000 francs in revenue from Venetia.
Napoleon did not consider this to be enough profit and
ordered a re-examination of Venetian revenues.^
Eugene had only estimated expenses, and when careful
investigation was made the finance minister discovered
that his estimates were too optimistic.

The finance

ministers investigation revealed that revenues from
Venetia would be 22,400,000 francs and administrative
costs would be 14,500,000 Milanese francs.

Adminis

trative costs and the cost of the army in Venetia

27

'One Milanese franc equalled .768 French

franc •
28

Eugene, Memoires. II, 106-112, Eugene to
Napoleon, 3 March 1865.
29

^Napoleon, Correspondence. XII. 106-108,
Napoleon to Eugene, 27 February 1806.
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destroyed Napoleon*s hope that Venetia would profit
50
him.
Though Napoleon continued to complain, the
finance m i n i s t e r ’s report remained correct.
In answer to Napoleon's complaints about
Venetian revenues, Eugene reported that a significant
portion of the revenue collected in Venetia came from
a land tax collected quarterly.

Since the territory

became legally subject to Italian laws on 1 January
1806, Eugene explained he had decreed that the govern
ment would begin collection of the land tax in March
and the collection of unpaid contributions in April.

51

At the same time, Eugene reported that he had a deficit
in army funds for February 1806 totaling 2,560,729
52
livres.
Finally convinced of the V i c e r o y ’s financial
difficulties, the Emperor came to his rescue w ith a
gift of 5»000,000 francs for the Italian treasury*

Na

poleon told Eugene to take the 3,700,000 francs Marshal
Andr& Mass&na repaid, the 360,000 assessed against
General Jean-Baptiste Solignac,333G0,000 from the

•^Eugene, Memo i r e s . II, 88—90, 106-112, Eugene
to Napoleon, 24 February 1806 and 3 March 1806*
51

Ibid., 106-112, Eugene to Napoleon, 3 March

1806.
52

1806.

Ibid., 149 1 Eugene to Napoleon, 11 March

35Infra, 146-148.
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paymaster-general, and 450,000 from the sale of se
questered quicksilver.

This totaled only 4,800,000

francs, but Napoleon told Eugene that General Solignac
would make up the difference.^
In addition to the armed forces, the repair
and construction of fortifications constituted a heavy
drain upon the Italian treasury in 1806.

General

Frangois Chasseloup proposed to spend 800,000 livres
at Palmanova; 200,000 at Osoppo; 300,000 at Venice and
in the lagoons; 300,000 at Peschiera; 100,000 at Rocca
d'Anfo; 700,000 at Legnago; 500,000 at Mantua; 40,000
at Pizjaighettone; and 10,000 at Verona.

Coupled with

administrative costs of 50,000 livres, Chasseloup
planned to expend some 3,300,000 livres in 1806 on
engineering works alone at the fortifications.^

In

this area Napoleon ordered that spending be reduced.
He would allow no construction at Venice, and would
permit an expenditure of only 500,000 francs at Pal
manova and Osoppo combined.

Chasseloup should spend

nothing at Pizzighettone or Rocca d'Anfo and only
200,000 at Mantua.

34

In addition to the Italian funds

.

y Eugene, Memoires. II, 247, Napoleon to
Eugene, 22 April 1806.
35

Ibid., 94-96, Eugene to Napoleon, 25 Febru
ary 1806. In Napoleon's and Eugene's letters francs
and livres are used interchangeably.
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to be expended at Palmanova, the French treasury al
located 2,000,000 francs, for it was of the utmost
necessity that these places be brought into a condition
of defensive capability.
The Italian treasury suffered from the n e 
cessity of supplying the administrators of the Illyrian
provinces with money and paying the upkeep of Italian
units on detached duty at Naples.

An example of this

expense is that on 10 April 1806 Eugene sent 400,000
francs to Dalmatia, 200,000 to Istria, and 100,000 to
57
Marshal Auguste Marmont in Friuli, 'and when Eugene*s
financial condition was most critical, Napoleon forced
the Viceroy to send 500,000 gold francs to Naples to
satisfy a claim of the paymaster of the Neapolitan
38
army.
The Viceroy repaired the depleted Italian
treasury in 1806 by rigid economy, subsidies from

Napoleon, Correspondance. XII, 118-119* Na
poleon to Eugene, 2 March 16G6; 1^3, Napoleon to Jean
Dejean, 28 February 1806; 307-308, Napoleon to Eugene,
25 April 1806. Dejean was Minister of the Adminis
tration of War in France.
•^Eugene, Memoires, II, 221— 223, Eugene to Na
poleon, 10 April 1806.
^ ^ a p o l e o n , Correspondance. XII, 114, Napoleon
to Eugene, 28 February ±806.
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France, careful collection of taxes, war contributions,
customs duties, and a loan from Venetian banking
houses. 39
If the absence of complaints concerning fi
nances in Eugene*s and Napoleon's letters is an indi
cation of financial condition, the finances of the
Italian government were in good condition by the end
of 1806.

Indeed, one historian reports that Italy was

the only Napoleonic state which did not suffer a defi
cit between 1806 and 1813— that until the Russian
AO
campaign a surplus existed.
Even so, the fact re
mains that Italy suffered under a heavy burden of
financial exactions during the French occupation, and

^ Ibid., 278, Napoleon to Mollien, 14 April
1806; 286-2577 Napoleon to Mollien, 15 April 1806; 287,
Napoleon to Eugene, 15 April 1806; Eugene, Memoires,
II, 367-368, the Minister of the Public Treasury of
the kingdom to Napoleon, 30 April 1806; 60-62, Eugene
to Napoleon, 6 February 1806; III, 210-211, Eugene to
Napoleon, 23 November 1806. Francis Mollien was the
Director of the Public Treasury in France.
40
%
M. H. Weil, le Prince Eugene et Murat. 18131814 (5 vols.; Paris: Albert %Font emoing, 1902), I, 12.
(.Hereafter cited as Weil, Eugene et Murat). It is not
intended to indicate that from 1806 -to 1&L2 there were
no times of financial stress. In 1807 Eugene was
obliged to borrow 500,000 livres for defensive works
from the reserve of the engineers at Venice, and late
in 1808 he reported a bad treasury situation to Na
poleon. In general terms it is true that Italy was
financially stable.

99
apparently Eugene's letters of 1805 and 1806 carried
4-1
requests for a reduction of taxes.
Becoming im
patient with such importunities from his viceroy, Napoleon wrote that the 2 ,5 0 0 , 0 0 0 franc monthly contri
bution of Italy provided hardly enough for his needs
and he wanted to hear nothing more of lowering Italian
taxes.

He told Eugene that Frenchmen paid heavier

taxes than the Italians and that not until the French
Empire was secure could he reduce the Italian contri
bution.^
Though Napoleon appointed a commission for
liquidation of the public debt in 1805* the absence of
commission of liquidation reports in available sources
makes it impossible to determine the amount of the
public debt.

The only statement that one can make with

certainty from available sources is that Napoleon

41
Available letters of the Viceroy concerning
financial conditions often carry mention of the blow
delivered to the Italian treasury by the necessity of
sending funds out of the state. Bepresentative of
such letters are ones dated 18 May 1806 and another
of 7 June 1806. Eugene, Memoires. II. 398-399, 427429.
“
42
^ Napoleon, Correspondance. XII. 173, Napoleon
to Eugene, 9 March 1806; 283-264, Napoleon to Eugene,
14 April 1806.
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recognized the public debt of the Kingdom of Italy and
43
refused to recognize the public debt of Venetia.
At
a later date the Emperor allowed the Italian government
44
to collect Venetian revenues for the Italian treasury,
but he never rescinded his refusal to recognize the
Venetian debt•
The shaky condition of Italian finances in 18051806 presented problems demanding attention to detail
for which Eugene's career as a soldier in a minor com
mand had not prepared him.

Yet by a careful husbanding

of resources, he surmounted the problems presented in
the field of finances.
In the budget controversy it can clearly be
seen that Napoleon intended, and Eugene understood, that
the state should be administered in dictatorial fashion.
The desires of Italian officials to order their own
affairs were disregarded and Italy was brought into
orderly existence.

^ I b i d . , 296, Napoleon to Eugene, 21 April
1806.
44
.
Eugene, Memoires. II, 228-229* Napoleon
to Eugene, 14 April 180&.

CHAPTER VI
SECURING THE STATE
Eugene's first step in the organization of a
fighting force in Italy was to reorganize the former
Presidential Guard, which had been renamed the Royal
Guard*

When the kingdom was born, the Guard consisted

of a general staff, one regiment of line infantry com
posed of two battalions, one regiment of cavalry com
posed of two squadrons, one company of light artillery,
and one service train company.

The number of troops

in the Guard totaled 1,919 men.
By a decree of 20 June 1805, Napoleon set the
composition of the Guard at four companies of Honor
Guards, twelve companies of Royal Velites, ten compa
nies designated as the Royal Line Guard, and one light
artillery company.1
The four companies of the Honor. Guards were to

B e a u h a m a i s Archive, Report of the Minister of
War. 1 January 1805 - 1 July 1807 . #he Presidential
Guard became t h e Royal Guard 17 March 1805 and had no
connection w ith the army. The Royal Velites were in
fantry as opposed to the Honor Guard, which was es
sentially cavalry.
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be composed of 100 men each*

In each company forty

troops were to be foot soldiers, and the remainder
were to be mounted.

Three companies of the Honor

Guard bore the names of the principal cities of the
kingdom, Milan, Bologna, and Brescia, while the fourth
bore the name of Homagna, an old Papal State which had
been seized by Bonaparte in 1300.

The only persons

eligible to enter the Honor Guards were young men
eighteen to twenty years of age from families wealthy
enough to pay an initial fee of 400 livres into the
company treasury and dues of 600 livres annually thereafter.

2

Upon completion of two years* service the

members of the Honor Guard could transfer to the Im
perial Guard if an opening existed.

After the same

term of service a mounted Honor Guardsman was entitled
to enter a line regiment of infantry in the regular
army as a second lieutenant, and the dismounted Honor
Guardsman was entitled to enter a line regiment of the
regular army as a sergeant.

■3

2
Eugene, Memoires. I, 143-145* Uapoleon to
Eugene, 14 June 1805* The franc and livre were syn
onymous from the time of Henry III. The sou was a
prewar bronze coin equivalent to l/20 of a franc.
The denier was a minor coin equal to 1/12 of a sou.
Eouveau Larousse (2 vols.; Paris: Bibrairie Barousse,

nTdl)1 I.

*2
Eugene> Memoires. I, 143-145* napoleon to
Eugene, 14 June 1^05.
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Each of the twelve companies of Eoyal Velites
consisted of 100 men, with the twelve companies divided
into three "battalions of four companies each*

Like

the Honor Guard, Eoyal Velites were to be composed of
eighteen-to twenty-year-old men, but their initial
entry fee amounted to only 200 livres and their yearly
dues were 300 livres.

After two years of service in

the Eoyal Velites a member could also transfer to a
line regiment of the regular army with the rank of a
second lieutenant, but it does not appear that the
Eoyal Velites were eligible for transfer to the Imperial
Guard.^
The ten companies designated as the Eoyal Line
Guard were to be composed of 100 men each and were to
be organized into two regiments of five companies each.
Finally, Hapoleon eliminated the artillery service
train company, while retaining the light artillery
company consisting of sixty-four men.

By such re

organization, ordered by a decree of 20 June 1805, the
personnel of the Eoyal Guard was increased to 2,664
men.

The reorganization made necessary the discharge

4
B e a u h a m a i s Archive, Beport of the Minister
of Var. 1 January 1805 - 1 January 1807*
^I b i d * ; S u p r a . 101•
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of a number of veterans of the infantry line regiment.^
In essence, The Royal Guard constituted a
private army for Eugene, and from the beginning of his
government he alone commanded it.

With the exception

of the addition of a fifth company to the Honor Guard
from Venice on 2 August 1806, two health officers per
company on 1 December 1805, and one veterinarian per
company on 12 October 1806, the composition and number
of the Royal Guard remained the same throughout the
existence of the kingdom.
Italy had practically no state defenses when
the kingdom came into existence.

Her small army

suffered chronically from a lack of supplies.

The

fortresses of the state at Mantua, Rocca d'Anfo, Verona,
Pizzighettone, and Peschiera lacked personnel and pro
visions.

The French army which remained after the re

creation of the Republic following the campaign of
1800 provided the only practical defense the Italians
enjoyed.

Along with the duty of overseeing the reor

ganization of the government, then, Eugene received
the task of developing and organizing a defensive
system for the state.

This task required a number of

6
»
Eugene, Memoires. I. 147, Eugene to Na
poleon, 15 June 1865* Tf was necessary to discharge
infantry personnel because of the new age limit in
the Royal Velites and the Honor Guard.
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years, for as the state grew with, the addition of the
Venetian departments in 1806, and the further addition
of the Papal Legations in 1808, the defensive demands
of the state increased.
The King instructed Eugene to take personal
command of the

cavalry and infantry at Milan and to

make it the nucleus of

the Italian army.

Napoleon

told Eugene that he must do for Italy what the Great
Elector had done for Prussia.

The King felt that with

the embryonic army commanded by the lieutenant of the
King, a better

type ofman might be attracted to it.'

This directive

pleased the Viceroy, who often complained

of not being used in the capacity for which his training
and talents qualified him, and he attacked the assign
ment with a will.

He organized a new cavalry unit and

proposed to call it the "Josephine Dragoons," but Na
poleon gently told him this just could not be—

a unit

with a woman*s name would soon be the butt of the army,
and suggested instead that it be designated as the
"Queen's Dragoons."

Eugene complied with Napoleon's

suggestion.8
At the same time, the Viceroy busied himself

7

'Napoleon, Correspondance. X, 553, Napoleon
to Eugene, 21 June 180*>.
Q

__

Ibid., XI, 2, Napoleon to Eugene, 3 July

1805.
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with the organization, of other units.

He organized

the pontoon companies into one unit and brought them
together.

He reduced the number of sapper companies

from nine to four, and also brought these troops together in one unit.

q

He later added a company of

bombardiers to each regiment.
For purposes of administration the Viceroy
organized the Italian army in the same manner as the
French army.

It had its own general headquarters,

chief of staff, general staff, and comptabilite.
Though the kingdom had a Minister of War and Marine,
it appears that it did not have a Minister Director
of Administration of War, but instead depended upon
the Minister Director of Administration of War of the
French Empire.

The Italian army had its own ordon-

nateur en chef .^paymaster. and inspectors of reviews.
At the time of the erection of the Kingdom of

• ,
■^Eugene, Memoires, I, 126-127, Eugene to Na
poleon, 21 June 1 6 6 5 .
q

^Napoleon, Correspondance. XI, 59-60, Na
poleon to Eugene, 4 August 1805• Bombardiers were
mortarmen.
^ B e a u h a m a i s Archive, Report of the Minister
of War* 1 January 1805 - 1 July 1807. The comptabilite
was the accounting department of the Italian army. fEe
ordonnateur en chef was the chief bursar. He was under
the direction of the Director-General of the Adminis
tration of War.
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Italy, Marshal Jourdan had command of the French army
providing its defense,

Adolphe Thiers maintains that

Jourdan served as the military mentor of the Viceroy,
for Eugene had never commanded an army.

This con

tention is vigorously denied "by. D u Casse in his role
as editor of Eugene's Memoires,

It is useless to

argue the point, for Eugene did not enjoy even nominal
command of the army when he became viceroy, and though
made commander-in-chief of the Army of Italy in December
1805, he did not exercise command in the field until
1809.

Whatever the truth of this argument might be,

upon Jourdan*s removal from command of the army in
September 1805 and the assignment of the command to
Marshal Massena,

the letters written by Eugene to

Massena strongly indicate that Eugene understood that
Napoleon expected him to observe the famous Marshal's
methods *14-

12
Thiers, Consulate and Empire, I, 673; Eugene,
Memoires, I, 254, n. 1.
13

Napoleon, Correspondance. XI, 147, Napoleon
to Eugene, 27 August 1805; 157, Napoleon to General
Duroc, 28 August 1805: Moniteur. 30 Fructidor. Year
XIII (17 September 1805).
"^See Eugene's letters to Massena, Beauharaais
Archive, September 1805*
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Because the Italians did not have sufficient
martial fervor, Eugene utilized the conscription of
twenty-year-old men to build the army*

The con

scription law had been in effect during the life of
the Italian Republic, but enforcement had been lax.
After 1805 the government of the Viceroy enforced the
conscription laws.

Napoleon, by a decree issued 24

June 1805, set the conscription for the year 1806 at
6,000 men.

The decree called 3,000 men to active duty

and placed 3,000 in the reserve.1'*
Expansion of the French Empire in 1805 brought
in its train the threat of war.

Therefore, Eugene

worked feverishly in the summer of 1805 to develop the
Italian army and had the Queen's Dragoons ready to take
the field at the end of August, though lack of heavy
cavalry equipment meant they were merely hussars.

He

reported to Napoleon that the war scare in Italy in
1805 had sent the cost of forage for horses from
twenty-three to thirty-five sous daily.1^

Later the

same day Eugene reported that he had ordered the
Queen's Dragoons to Bologna, and then to Descara.

17

15Moniteur, 22 Messidor, Tear XIII (11 July
1805). .
' ••‘V

^Eugene, Memoires. I, 261-262, Eugene to Na
poleon, 30 August 1805.

1*^Ibid.. 262-263, Eugene to Napoleon, 30
August 1805•
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In addition to the Queen*s Dragoons, Eugene,
by the end of* August, had organized another regiment
of cavalry, the "Napoleon Dragoons," composed at that
time of two squadrons dressed and equipped.

He in18
tended to complete this unit within six weeks.
He

also organized the Corsican Legion which, Napoleon
wrote, should make "some good soldiers." 19^
The growth of the Italian army in 1805 made
necessary an increase in the officer corps, and the
Italians* lack of experience necessitated that the
officers come from the French army.

Napoleon had re

fused to allow this in 1805; therefore, Eugene wrote
Berthier in early 1806 requesting him to use his influ
ence as chief of staff to gain Napoleon*s approval
for the transfer of French officers, two from each
corps, to the Italian army.

18
1805.

20

Since Eugene reported

Ibid.. 261-262. Eueene to Nanoleon. 30 August
”

19
^Napoleon, Correspondance. H ,
to Eugene, 1 October 1865.
20

270, Napoleon

Eugene, Memoires. II, 56-57* Eugene to
Berthier, 1 February 18(567 There is no answer to this
letter in the two thousand-odd letters s^nt from
Berthier to Eugene preserved in the B e a u h a m a i s Archive.
Neither Eugene's nor Napoleon's published correspondence
indicates the degree of Berthier*s success or even if
he made an attempt in this direction.
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to the Emperor that he would have an army of 36,000
ready to take the field by the end of 1806,
have received cadre personnel from Prance,

21

he must

Eugene,

by the end of 1805, had organized a force of three
divisions, numbering 17,000 fighting men, with general
headquarters at Padua.

22

Beauhamais intended to

raise an additional 18,000 troops by calling to duty
the conscriptions of 1804, 1805, and 1806.

In addition

to these conscripts, the Viceroy reported that he had
in hand 400 cavalry volunteers at Verona, enough to
form a new regiment of cavalry, which he could use
very effectively to strengthen existing forces if Napoleon so desired.

23

Each regiment needed only the

organization of a third battalion to be complete.
The Italian army, in 1805, desperately needed
small firearms.

Napoleon, in September, wrote Eugene

that he had ordered 60,000 rifles to be sent to Genoa,
10,000 of that number being destined for Mantua.

He

warned the Viceroy that he should take every precaution
to prevent any rifles from falling into the hands of

21Ibid., 87.
22Ibid., 3.
23

Ibid., 86-88. Eugene’s arithmetic was bad;
the 17,000 reported earlier plus 18,000 equal 35,000
not 36,000.

Ill
the peasantry.

At this time Marshal Andoche Junot was

suppressing an uprising in Parma, and Napoleon ap
parently feared that the peasants of south Italy were
sympathetic to the movement. 24 The arms the Italian
army received in September evidently did not satisfy
its requirements, for in February 1806 Napoleon wrote
Eugene that he could not send French rifles to Italy
and advised the Viceroy to ask Italian industry to
2 *5

supply the necessary arms. v

But the King, in April

1806, anticipated w a r and ordered that 10,000 ad
ditional rifles be sent from the great depot at Ales
sandria to the forces defending Ancona, and that the
rifles at the fortress of Mantua be sent .to Piacenza.
Eugene was to replace the arms from Mantua with
Austrian rifles taken at Venice.

Twenty thousand

Austrian rifles stored at Palmanova made that fortress
26
the most significant small arms depot in Italy.
Na
poleon, in the spring of 1807* due to the increase in

24
Napoleon, Correspondance. XI, 197* Napoleon
to Eugene, 14 September 180£.
25I b i d . , XII, 35, Imperial Decision, 12 Febru
ary 1806.
pfi

Ibid.. 302. Napoleon to Dejean. 22 April

1806 .
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the number under arms sent the Italian forces an ad
ditional 6,000 rifles.2^
The Italian armed forces also needed artillery.
Napoleon, in January 1806, transferred captured
Austrian guns to the Italian army.

This transfer

greatly increased the firepower of Italian artillery
28
units.
To strengthen the garrison at Venice, Na
poleon sent from Palmanova and Osoppo artillery not
29
needed for defense at those two fortresses.
But the
demands of the Grand Army brought the order two days
later to reduce the cannon in Italy to eighty-two
pieces and to place the artillery in Italy in three
parks, one at Palmanova, one at Verona, and one at
Padua.
Because of the inability of the Italian powder
plants to provide for the needs of the kingdom in 1805*

2^Ibid., XIV. 552. Napoleon to Eugene, 27 March
1807.
28Ibid., XI, 522-523, Napoleon to Berthier,
3 January 1806•
2^Ibid., XIII, 204-208, Napoleon to Eugene,
18 September 1806.
^8Ibid.. 229-231, Napoleon to Bejean, 20 Sep
tember 180F1!
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Napoleon, in 1806, ordered Eugene to put the powder
plant at Monte Chiarugolo, located in Venetia, into
full production at once and to take measures so this
plant could defend itself against attacks from the
peasantry of the region.

31

Italian industry produced shoes and uniforms,
and it appears that in the first stages of army growth
Eugene supplied clothing needs from his own territories.

32

As the army grew, however, he had to depend

more and more upon French producers for items of
clothing.
As the danger of war increased in the autumn
of 1805, the Emperor issued orders to the Viceroy to
put into action the defense forces Eugene was organ
izing.

Napoleon, on 5 September 1805, wrote Eugene to
*

order Massena (when he arrived in Italy) to form his
divisions along the Adige, place artillery in the
chateau of Verona, and he prepared to fight.

At what

ever cost, Massena should hold Verona and its bridge.^"*

31

Ibid., XII, 507, Napoleon to Dejean, 3 July

1806.
■^Eugene, Memoires. I, 385, 387, Eugene to Na
poleon, 22 September 1805.
3*
'Napoleon. Correspondance. XI. 179, Napoleon
to Berthier, 5 September 1805.
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Hostilities would start in. the first fortnight of
Yendemiaire, and Napoleon expected Italy to provide
1,000 to 1,200 conscripts for the Italian division at
34
Boulogne.
Eugene also received orders to contribute
substantially to the column dispatched to march against
the Kingdom of Naples if his support became necessary. ^
Not directly related to Italian action, but as
a precaution against possible reverses in Italy, Eugene
received instructions to have all funds held in departmental treasuries transferred to Milan.
As the possibility of war increased in the
autumn of 1805, Eugene gave particular attention to
strengthening the army on the northeastern frontier.
Following Napoleon’s instructions, Massena organized an
*i *
additional line division of 7*000 infantry, 1,000 ar
tillery, and 1,000 cavalry.

He utilized his heavy

*2 A

Ibid., 186, Napoleon to Eugene, 10 September
1805.
35
"xbid.. 103, Napoleon to Eugene, 19 August
1805; 102, Napoleon to Talleyrand, 19 August 1805; 122123, Napoleon to Berthier, 23 August 1805; 142, Na
poleon to Berthier, 26 August 1805; 146-148, Napoleon
to Eugene, 27 August 1805; Eugene, Memoires. I, 243244, Eugene to Napoleon, 11 August 1805Napoleon, Correspondence. XI, 209, Napoleon
to Eugene, 16 September 1805.
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cavalry (the cuirassiers and dragoons) as reserve.
Napoleon ordered Massena to invest the Austrian portion
of Verona at the end of September and to form a de
fensive line from the Adige Hiver on his rig;ht to the
mountains on his left.

This maneuver would force the

Austrian commanders to deploy their troops away from
Verona, which Massena could then use as a springboard
to invade Austrian territory at the outbreak of hos
tilities.^

At the same time Napoleon gave Massena

command of the Queen's Dragoons.

This unit and its

artillery increased Massena's reserve by some 450
?Q
troops.
Eugene appointed General Dominic Pino, the
Minister of War, as chief of staff, and General Francois
Fririon to assist Pino as under chief of staff.
Following French organization, the Viceroy separated
the artillery and engineering branches of the service,
with General Jean Sorbier commanding the engineer corps
and General Buchet commanding the artillery.

General

Louis Partouneaux commanded the first Italian division
stationed at Mestre and Padua; General Fiorella com
manded the second division located at Bavenna and

^ I b i d . , 246, Berthier to Massena, 23 Sep
tember 180*5*1

Beauhamais Archive, Eugene to Massena,
23 September 1805*
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Piave di Sacco; and General Jan Henryk Lombrowski com
manded the third division placed at Vicenza and Legnago. 39
In 1805 Napoleon coerced the Kingdom of Naples
into signing a treaty of neutrality with Prance.

When

war broke out between Austria and Prance in October
1805» Queen Maria; Carolina abrogated the treaty and
allowed Russian and English troops to debark at Naples.
The debarkation of enemy troops at Naples posed a
threat to the security of EugeneTs southern borders
As a result, Eugene, acting on his own authority, in
November ordered Councillor-of-State Guastavillani to
begin immediately in the southern departments of the
kingdom the formation of a national guard unit of
twelve battalions, each of which would have a strength
of 800.

The battalions were to be composed of ten

companies each, nine of chasseurs and one of grena
diers.

The members of the units were to be harangued

with the idea that now was the time for them to show
their devotion to the Emperor, and that their efforts
would save Italy even if the British should gain a
foothold.

59
.
^Eugene, Memoires. II, 3#
40Infra. 187.
41Beauhamais Archive, Eugene to' Councillorof-State Guastavillani, 20 November 1805.
x
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In addition to ordering the formation of a
national guard unit, Beauharnais made the following
disposition of troops between 20 November and 26 No
vember.

He ordered General Grouvion St.-Cyr to Bologna

w ith all the infantry and cavalry that could be spared
as soon as he could leave Venetia, if Massena, who was
St.—Cyr*s superior, approved; he mobilized the national
guards of the cities of Parma, Piacenza, and Guastalla;
he called the cavalry of the Hanoverian Legion, the
60th line infantry regiment, and a Swiss battalion from
the 27th military district of Prance and gathered t he m
42
at Parma.
The Viceroy replaced these troops w i t h a
regiment of militia from Piacenza.

He sent the Corsi

can Legion to Modena from Mantua and replaced it w i t h
an equal number of national guardsmen.

He intended to

bolster the national guard at Mantua w ith one-third of
the garrisons of Peschiera and Legnago.
The arsenal at Mantua provided arms for the
regiments being raised.
light artillery.

Modena received both heavy and

Sugene planned to use a portion of

the garrisons of Ancona and Livorno for the defense of
his southern frontiers, depending upon the movement of
Anglo-Hussian troops.

42

Vith all these troops plus those

The 27th military district of Prance con
sisted of Piedmont.
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he hoped to get from St.-Cyr the Viceroy would have
some 30,000 troops to pit against the 30,000 invaders
the Russians and English allegedly had debarked.^
Eugene, in the next week, began construction
of storehouses at Bologna and Modena, established an
artillery park at Reggio, and made plans for hospitals
at Modena and Parma
The action taken by the Viceroy had been
prompted by the belief that a formidable army threatened
his southern borders, but his information, he reported
to Napoleon on 6 December 1805, had been in error.

A

letter from Cardinal Joseph Fesch informed him that the
debarkation at Naples could not possibly number more
than 20,000, and Fesch begged Eugene not to send an
Italian army into the Papal States.

Eugene told Na

poleon that he thought it would do no harm to let the
Cardinal know that he did not intend to send troops to
the Papal States, but that it would be a good influence
on the Neapolitans if they believed an army of 30,000
was marching against them.

^Eugene, Memoires. I, 454-455, Eugene to
Massena, 26 November 180-5; 461-463, Eugene to Napoleon,
2 Daclsmber 1805. Eugene did not yet know that Mass&na
refused the request of St.-Cyr*s troops.
44

Ibid.. 461-463, Eugene to Napoleon, 2 De
cember 1805.
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At the time Eugene wrote the letter hie had
been in Bologna for two hours; he thought the spirit
of the people was good, and told Napoleon that the
45
national guard at Modena was superb. ^
According to the Moniteur the response to the
call for a national guard at Bologna exceeded the
Viceroy’s hopes.

It presently numbered 20,000 and

soon would number 30,000.
Eugene reported the volun4-6
teers in good spirits.
It is evident that this an
nouncement in the Moniteur was largely propaganda and
should not be taken too literally, for Eugene, ca 10
December, wrote Napoleon that he had seen the officers
of four battalions of the national guard at Bologna
and in an effort to give them heart had told them they
would not serve for any extended length of time.

They

assured him, he reported, that they were willing to
stay and serve as long as n e c e s s a r y . ^
Eugene felt that the concentration of national
guard troops at Bologna was greater than that city
could support and planned to disperse the unit there

4.5
^Ibid., 4-63-465• Eugene to Napoleon, 6 De
cember 1805*
Cardinal Eesch was Napoleon*s uncle.
^ Moniteur. 3 Nivose, Year H V

(24 December

1805).
i

47
'Eugene, Memoireg. I, 466-467, Eugene to
Napoleon, 10 December 1865*
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from Rimini to Reggio in cantonments of two battalions
each at Forli, Cesena, Faenza, Modena, Imola, and
Reggio.

He would keep eight battalions at Bologna, and

if news came of a movement from Naples against him, he
could call his units together easily. 48
During the time of such activity on the part
of the Viceroy, Napoleon, occupied with defeating
Austria and negotiating an armistice, did not find time
to write Eugene concerning the activity of the latter
in southern Italy.

In December the Emperor only asked

about the condition of the national guard and ordered
that some of the troops be sent to the Tyrol to police
Bolzano and Trent, which were soon to become a part of
the kingdom. 49^ Napoleon, two days later, ordered Eugene
to send part of his national guard to Rimini to give
protection against possible raids by Cossacks and other
light cavalry along the northeastern Italian littoral.^

4a

Ibid., 467-468, Eugene to Napoleon, 12 De
cember 1805.
49
Napoleon, Correspondance. XI, 486, Napoleon
to Eugene, 16 December 1805.
50
1805.

Ibid., 489, Napoleon to Eugene, 18 December
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Due to the activity of British, agents and re
fractory clergy among the Parmesans and the population
of Piacenza, an uprising occurred there in January
1806.

Eugene promptly put down the uprising with a

considerable degree of severity.'*1
The Treaty of Pressburg extended Italian fron
tiers eastward to the Isonzo River, and Napoleon, be
lieving it necessary to strengthen the armed forces in
Venetia, sent from Prance to Italy some 6,000 of his
reserve and allowed Eugene to distribute the reinforeements as he saw fit.
In the light of difficulties developing over
the transfer of Dalmatia to the French in 1806,**^Napoleon instructed Eugene to bring his units up to war
strength, i.e., companies of 100 men, regiments of
3,000 and divisions of 7,000.

Napoleon wrote that each

81
#
^ Eugene, Memoires. II, 46-4-7, Eugene to Na
poleon, 4 January ld6&.
82

J Napoleon, Correspondance. II, 522-523, Na
poleon to Berthier, 3 January 1806.
83
-""The Treaty of Pressburg called for the French
to take possession of Dalmatia within forty days follow
ing Austrian ratification of the" treaty, which occurred
on 1 January 1806.
The French, then, should have taken
possession of Dalmatia by 10 February 1806, but due to
difficulties of transport and the season failed to do
so. It was technically a breach of the treaty, and
under this pretext the Austrian administrator of Cat taro
turned Cattaro over to the Russians. Russian refusal
to evacuate Cattaro was the reason the Italian army
was put on a war footing at this time.
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cavalry regiment must have 660 horses and that a corps
in the Italian army should number 18*000 men at full
war strength,

Eugene was to reunite the artillery

then scattered throughout the kingdom.
In July, following the order to keep the
Italian army on a war footing, Napoleon instructed
Eugene to keep the 2nd corps of the Grand Army in a
state of mobility, to see that its two divisions of
infantry numbering some 13,000 men were fully armed,
and to keep the cavalry and artillery in condition to
take the field,^ ,
The French army in Italy under Marshal Massena
constituted the 2nd corps of the Grand Army, and in his
capacity as commander-in-chief of the Army of Italy
Eugene served as the channel through which Napoleon
issued orders to Massena,

Such an arrangement un

doubtedly had its disadvantages, for Eugene and Massena
were never on the best of terms,

66

64
^ Napoleon, Correspondance. XII, 182-184, Na
poleon to Eugene, 13 March 1806•
Ibid., 537-538, Napoleon to Eugene, 12 July
1806; XIII, 204-208, Napoleon to Eugene, 18 September
1806.
66

^
^ One of the main themes of the commentary con
tained in Eugene’s Memoires is the attempt on the part
of the editor to establish the dislike of Masslna and
Marshal Marmont for Eugene as the result of small souls
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Iii August 1806, further to secure the eastern
littoral of Italy, Eugene received orders to place
mounted troops on both sides of the Po, hussars on the
north, dragoons on the south, and directions that they
should be made to maneuver both on horse and afoot.
To encourage the troops in their work the Viceroy
should announce that Napoleon himself intended to
visit Italy and would review them in September.

37

Na

poleon undoubtedly wanted this last announcement to
reach the Russians, Austrians, and Prussians, leading
these powers to believe that he planned no movement
against them in the autumn of 1806.

The Emperor,

later in August,; strengthened the cavalry at Ancona by
adding another battalion of dragoons.

38

By mid-September the deterioration of PrancoPrussian relations and the attitude of Austria, plus
hostilities with Russia, caused Napoleon to place the
Viceroy in command of all troops in Italy, including

on th%ir part, and ‘their damning judgment of his mili
tary abilities as the result of jealousy for the pre
ferred position he held with Napoleon.
37

^'Napoleon, Correspondance. XIII, 85-86, Na
poleon to Eugene, 20 August 18b6.
38

Ibid., 116-119* Napoleon to Eugene, 30
August. 180£TI
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the corps stationed in Friuli, making a force of
36,000.59
During the autumn of 1806, Eugene was able to
strengthen his forces with additions from the Neapoli
tan army.^

From Dalmatia he received 12,000 troops

which General Marmont sent to Caraiola, ^ a n d from
France he received 20,000 conscripts in November and
December.

62

Eugene sent numerous units to the Grand

Army, but in spite of this some 60,000 men made up the
military force under the Viceroy*s orders at the end
of the year 1806.^
Eugene received orders to be prepared to take
the offensive on 1 December if the Austrians moved,
and he had full authority to take whatever action he
deemed necessary for the defense of the s t a t e T h i s

^9Ibid., 204-208, Napoleon to Eugene, 18 Sep
tember 1806.
^ Ibid.. 408-409, Napoleon to Eugene, 25 Oc
tober 1806; 476-478, Napoleon to Eugene, 4 November
1806.
^ I b i d . , 476-478, Napoleon to Eugene, 4 No
vember 180£T
62

Ibid., XIV, 8-9, Napoleon to Eugene, 1
December 1806.
C-Z

Ibid., XIII, 476-478, Napoleon to Eugene,
4 November 1806.
64Ibid«» 254.
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represents one of the rare occasions when Napoleon did
not insist upon directing the movements of his armies
himself•
Along with the addition of units to the Italian
army, in order to strengthen its administration, General
Henri Charpentier replaced General Pino as chief of
staff, and General Francois Lery "became commaruler-in65
chief of the engineers.
Field command of the 2nd
corps of the Grand Army went to General Louis Baragueyd'Hilliers, and General Marmont received command of the
66
Dalmatian forces.
Thus was the Army of Italy built.

The erection

of the army cannot be credited solely to Beauharnais,
for it contained elements which the Emperor had trans
ferred from other areas to Eugene's command.

The

organization of the armed service, however, was Eugene's
alone.

He was responsible for its supply and for

training its troops.

In the areas which were ex

clusively his, Eugene did an excellent job.

Napoleon

rarely complained of his Italian contingents, and when
he did, it was only concerning their uniforming, which
often was incomplete.

In the Prussian campaign in

^Eugene, Memo ire s. Ill, 29-30.
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1806, the campaign against the Russians in 1806-1807,
and the peninsular campaign, Napoleon reported himself well pleased with his Italian troops.

67

In addition to raising and training an army,
Eugene had to repair the existing fortresses of Italy
in order that nonperishahle foodstuffs and defensive
materials could he stored at these strong points.
Portresses utilized for this purpose were located at
Mantua, Rocca d ’Anfo, Legnago, and Peschiera.

The

Viceroy, due to the deterioration of relations with
Austria in 1805, took rapid action to provision and
arm the existing forts.
Eugene, in the summer, autumn, and winter of
1805, confined work on fortifications mostly to pro
visioning and arming the strong points and limited
labor on defensive works to repair of existing earth
works.

He did not begin a significant program of ex

tending defensive works until the spring of 1806.
Many details of the work done in fortifications
are missing, for orders from Paris did not always come
to the Viceroy.

The first mention of provisioning

forts is contained in a letter from Napoleon to Eugene
written at Fontainebleau, 14 July 1805, in which

67Ibid., 250-251, 255-256, 268-269, Napoleon
to Eugene, 6 January 1807; 14 January 1807; 14 Febru
ary 1807; IV, 248, Napoleon to Eugene, 16 December
1808.
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Napoleon stated that he had ordered biscuit for pro
visioning legnago, Verona, Peschiera, and Bocca d ’Anfo.
Napoleon did not indicate how much biscuit he had
ordered, but he did make it clear the provisioning
should be done with care, for he did not wish to alarm
Austria unduly lest she move before he was ready.

In

the same letter he ordered that Eugene concentrate all
68
armaments at Verona and Bocca d*Anfo by 1 August.
A letter which Eugene wrote nine days later
indicated that the provisioning ordered by Napoleon
must have included guns and that there had been a
previous unrecorded order for the placement of guns in
the forts.

The Viceroy informed Napoleon that the

Minister of War had reported a need for some 5,000,000
francs to complete the defensive works ordered at the
fortresses, which included both guns and e a r thworks.^
The same day Napoleon wrote that he was sending
a decree for the provisioning of the military posts in
Italy and added that he "imagined" the Viceroy had

68

Napoleon, Correspondance. XI, 17, Napoleon
to Eugene, 14 July 18d>5s Eugene.""Sfemoires. I, 196,
Napoleon to Eugene, 14 July 1805.

6^Eugene,. Memo! re s. I. 208-210, Eugene to Na
poleon, 23 July 18^5.
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carried out the measures he had suggested for various
70

forts*'

It would he most helpful to know what Na

poleon* s suggestions for the forts were*

A letter of

Eugene*s, partly reproduced here, gives some clues to
the Emperor*s desires:
Sire: I have the honor of informing
Your Majesty that in virtue of the
different decrees or private orders
I have caused the Minister of War to
take all measures that they ^decrees
or private orders^ may he executed
punctually. Eocca d*Anfo will he
armed ahout August 5* with the ten
pieces ordered hy Your Majesty.
Ahout the middle of August, the
hiscuit will he entirely finished,
and divided; in the following manner:
100.000 rations at Mantua, 50,000 at
Legnago, 50,000 at Verona, 50,000 at
Peschiera, 50,000 at Eocca d*Anfo,
50.000 at Pizzighettone. There are
ahout 900,000 pounds of powder in
the magazines and powder factories,
and we will have 300,000 or 400,000
more hy the end of the year. At
this time there are at Mantua 164
siege pieces of various calibres,
27 mortars, 30 howitzers, of which
sixteen are field cannon; 430,000
pounds of powder, and 1,747,205
cartridge halls*
At Peschiera, 25 pieces, 7 mortars
and 2 siege howitzers, 2 field
pieces and 3 howitzers, 92,635
pounds of powder, and 490,000
cartridge halls* At legnago, 20

70
Napoleon, Correspondance. XI, 30, Napoleon
to Eugene, 23 July 1865*
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pieces, 4 mortars, and 1 siege
howitzer, 44,450 pounds of powder,
and 200,640 cartridge halls.

'

At Ferrara, 2 mortars, 6 field
cannons, 2 field howitzers, 20,830
pounds of powder, and 25,725
cartridge balls.71
The lack of adequate cannon at the fortresses

was met hy ordering six twenty-four pounders and sixtytwo mortars cast at the arsenal at Mantua.

72

Eugene later reported that he had obtained all
the hiscuit and ahout half the other provisionings
ordered and that he had instructed the Minister of War
to complete the provisioning of forts hy 12 September
at the latest.

Mantua had received its artillery hut

had not placed it.

In addition, warehousing did not

exist there for perishable goods.^^

It would he neces

sary to erect warehouses.
The Viceroy, on 4 September, reported that in
accordance with Napoleon*s orders Mantua would receive
beef for 7»000 m e n for a year, legnago and Reschiera
would each have provisions for 2,000 men for six months,
and Rocca d*Anfo would receive enough to support 500

"^Eugene, Memoires. I, 221-223, Eugene to
Napoleon, 28 July 1865*
72

I b i d .. 234-236, Eugene to Napoleon, 3 August

1805 .
73

1805.

Ibid.. 265. Eugene to Napoleon. 31 August
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men for six months.

The same report carried the obser

vation that defensive works were far behind schedule,
especially at Eocca d'Anfo where the gun carriages for
artillery were too high and too large,

Eugene had

sent these back to the arsenal at Mantua,

The biscuit

for Bocca d*Anfo was still in warehouses at the foot of
the mountain.

He stated that to expedite things he

intended to visit the forts.*^
Eugene apparently left Milan immediately after
making his report of 4 September, for he wrote the
next day at midnight from Peschiera that he had ar
rived there at 10s30 the night of the fifth, having
spent half the fourth and most of the day of the fifth
at Eocca d'Anfo, which he had found in a better state
than he had expected from the reports on it.

He re

ported that Rocca d ’Anfo would be in condition to de
fend itself within ten days, and should have eight and
75

possibly all ten of its guns in position by that time,'
76

Back at Monza' on 18 September, Eugene reported

^ Ibid., 346-347* Eugene to Napoleon, 4 Sep
tember 180FT
75

Ibid., 348, Eugene to Napoleon, 5 September

1805.
76

Ibid., 374-375, Eugene to Napoleon, 18 Sep
tember 1 8 0 ^ Monza was the location of the palace
which the Viceroy used as a summer residence.
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that lie had received orders for arming and provisioning
Pizzighettone and Urbain and that he would follow them
out for Pizzighettone.

However, the fort at Urbain was

in such a state of disrepair that it would he impossible
77
to use it.
In answer to this report, Napoleon ordered
Eugene to destroy completely the works at TJrbain to
78
prevent an enemy using them if invasion occurred.'
Eugene reported that by the end of September he would
have a reserve of a dozen pibces of horse-drawn ar7Q
tillery and six or eight mountain pieces .'*
The summer activity had been expensive for the
state.

Eugene reported to the Emperor that defensive

needs had forced him to give the engineers an extra
ordinary sum of 100,000 livres for the months of August
and September, and that by 10 October he would provide
that division with an additional 450,000 francs for
80
defensive works.

77Ibid.
78
1805«
.
7Q

Ibid., 377* Napoleon to Eugene, 25 September

Ibid., 390-391* Eugene to Napoleon, 26 Sep
tember 180!TI The mountain pieces were to be three
pounders *
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In early autumn 1805 Eugene confined his ac
tivities in provisioning and arming the forts largely
to the areas near the eastern and southern borders of
Italy; but when danger passed with the negotiation of
the Treaty of Pressburg, he turned his attention to
the interior forts and those along the northern border
of the kingdom.
Eugene went to Munich in January 1806 to be
marridd.

While there he apparently received orders

from Napoleon personally for the provisioning of Palmanova and its armament, for he wrote in the second
week of February that he was taking the measures Na
poleon had ordered for the provisioning of that fort.
The foodstuffs, he reported, would come from his siege
supplies, mostly from Pizzighettone, to be transported
to Palmanova by water.

In addition to provisioning

Palmanova, he had begun there preparation of sites for
storehouses and hospitals.

81

Fifteen days later he reported he was due to
receive engineering plans for the defense of Palmanova
and promised to send the plans on to Napoleon when

_

__

Napoleon, Correspondance. XI, 529, Napoleon
to Eugene, 3 January 18()6; feugene, Memoires. II, 6769, Eugene to Napoleon, 10 February 1806. 'Eugene, in
January 1806, was married to Princess Augusta Amelia,
daughter of King Maximilian I of Bavaria.
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they arrived*

Chief of Engineers General Frangois

Chasseloup planned Ba system of fortifying three points,
running water through the ^draihage^ ditches of the
town into a small nearby stream.®

There was much ac

tivity in the preparation of barracks; he had barracks
for 2,000 and hoped to add enough to house 3,000 men*
Workers were constructing a 400-bed hospital and pre
paring stables for 600 horses.
would erect storehouses.

In a short time they

82

Following Hapoleon*s orders, Eugene had ar
ranged for the transfer of Austrian guns at Venice to
Italy,

and reported that the number of cannon at

Qp

Eugene, Memoires. II, 94-96, Eugene to Ha
poleon, 25 February 1806.
®^Ibid., 172-173, Eugene to Hapoleon, 18 March
1806.
Though Austria ceded Venice to France by the
Treaty of Pressburg and Hapoleon gave administration
of the area to Eugene in December 1805, Venetia did
not legally become a part of the Kingdom of Italy until
1 May 1806.
Early in February 1806 Hapoleon told
Eugene that all the guns captured at Venice during the
campaign had not been transferred to France by the
terms of the treaty. However, a number of guns
captured at Vienna had been transferred to France by
the terms of the Treaty of Pressburg. Hapoleon ordered
Eugene to arrange with the Austrian government to ex
change non-transferred guns at Venice for those trans
ferred and still remaining in Vienna.
Such an
arrangement would prevent the expense and trouble of
transportation of guns from Vienna.
Though the guns
would legally belong to France, they were to be trans
ferred to the Italian army and were to be considered
as Italian artillery.
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Venice amounted to some 400.

Of this number, he in

tended to provide ammunition for 180 and send them to
Palmanova.

84-

Early in May the Viceroy reported that the
Austrian guns were of different calibres than Italian
guns and though he had some usable ammunition on hand,
it was not sufficient for the defense of Palmanova.
He had placed an order for additional ammunition at
Ponte-Vico but could not complete provisioning Pal«e
manova until later in the summer. J
Napoleon, in August 1806, ordered an increase
in Palmanova*s defensive power by the addition of new
counterscarps and lunettes, which he ordered finished
by the end of 1806.

He also ordered Eugene to repair

barracks and to construct shellproof powder magazines
there.®^
The erection of a palisade was accomplished at
o7
Palmanova by November, and in December Eugene reported

M ibia.
85

Ibid., 370, Eugene to Napoleon, 5 May 1806.

86

Napoleon, Correspondance. XIII, 53, Na
poleon to Dejean, 7 August 1806•
87

Eugene, Mfemoires. Ill, 207-208, Eugene to
Napoleon, 15 November 1806>.
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the nine lunettes almost completed and the connecting
chemin couvert finished.

The construction of the lu

nettes was such that six soldiers could defend each
one, and each defender could view three lunettes at a
glance.

In addition to the earthworks, Palmanova was

well armed, artillery was plentiful, and the calibres
of the guns were regular.
of gun sizes.

Eugene did not make mention

Troop housing was shortj and barrack and

hospital facilities existed for only one-third of the
garrison*

If the storehouses remained as they were in

December, Eugene reported, an active enemy probably could
38
burn them.
Eugene eventually solved the problem of
powder magazines by acting on a suggestion made by Na
poleon that the caves at Palmanova would make good
shellproof shelters.®^
Napoleon, in 1808, ordered Eugene to repair the
counterscarps of two lunettes at Palmanova and to spend
the money earmarked for a third lunette to erect

Ibid., 228-230, Eugene to Napoleon, 19 D e 
cember 18057 The lunette was simply a curved trench
with earthworks thrown up before it. The chemin
convert was a connecting trench protected by a series
of earthen elevations in front.

®^Ibid*. 212. Nanoleon to Eugene. 29 No
vember 18057"-
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masonry redoubts at the end of the chemin couvert conqo
necting the lunettes.
To defend the northern border better, Hapoleon
ordered the construction of a masonry escarpment and
a series of counterscarps on the hills at Peschiera.
Such a system would make Peschiera too strong to at
tack from the north and east and would force an attack
ing body of troops to attempt the south, where further
construction (not specified) would bring them under a
cross fire.

Hapoleon developed this plan in Paris,

for he did not like the defenses planned by General
qi
Chasseloup.
Eugene discovered that not only Prenchmen were
capable of peculation, for he informed the Minister of
War that the company of Radailli and Campionni of
Brescia had supplied guns and cannon balls which did
not meet the specifications stated in their contract
qp
as furnishers, and that this abuse must stop.
Other abuses in the services appeared from time

qo

Hapoleon, Correspondance. XVII, 157-158, Ha
poleon to Eugene, 18 May 1868.
^1Ibid., XII. 307-308, Hapoleon to Eugene,
25 April 18357
02

Beauhamais Archive, Eugene to the Minister
of War of the kingdom, 14 October 1805•
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to time*

Napoleon, in May 1806, wrote that he had

learned the "biscuit was bad at Palmanova and it ap
peared the war commissar and the supplier were partners
in conniving to bilk the government,

Napoleon ordered

the replacement of the war commissar and an investi
gation of his activities.

The Emperor complained that

construction of defensive works at this fort had not
begun and rather brusquely asked Eugene if he wanted
Q 'S t

to lose the state as a result of negligence.
It is possible that the Emperor's critical
attitude toward Eugene stemmed from the efforts of the
other Bonapartes to undermine Napoleon's confidence in
his stepson.

The Emperor's family had opposed his

marriage to Josephine.

Eugene was the first of the

Imperial Family to be given the rule of a state.

This

evidence of the Emperor's favor rankled Napoleon's
brothers and sisters. 94Though hampered by expense and corruption in

93

Napoleon, Correspondance, XII, 352, Napoleon
to Eugene, 6 May 180'5’I
^^Eugene, Memoires. I, 314; Adolphe Thiers,
The History of the Consulate and the Empire of France.
trans, by 3). Forbes Campbell and John Spebbing (.12
vols.; Philadelphia:
J, B. Lippincott & Co., 18931894), IV, 167.
(Hereafter cited as Thiers, Consulate
and Empire (12 v o l s ,)),
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the work of fortifying Italy, Eugene persevered and
told Napoleon that Osoppo, a fort in the Venetian
territory, would he able to defend itself hy September
1806, and that work on other areas in Venetia was progressing satisfactorily.

The defensive works at

Palmanova were not yet complete due to scope and ex
pense, hut from the standpoint of strong defensive
points ringing the realm, Italy had far greater se
curity against land attack at the end of 1806 than she
had prior to becoming a kingdom.
Although Eugene had reported that Osoppo would
he able to defend itself hy September 1806, Napoleon
ordered Jean Dejean to send him the defense plans drawn
by the engineers.

96

Apparently the plans for Osoppo’s

defense did not satisfy the Emperor, for in January he
wrote Eugene that at Osoppo he wanted a fortification
which could be held by five or six hundred men but
which could accommodate from five to six thousand
troops if necessary.

95

97

A few months later the Emperor

<

^Eugene, Memoires, III, 159-160, Eugene to
Napoleon, 21 September 1^06.
96
97

Napoleon, Correspondance. XIII, 76.

Ibid., XIV, 216-218, Napoleon to Eugene,

20 January 1807•
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wrote that reinforced redoubts and a bridge over the
Tagliamento at Osoppo would be the best type of de
fense, for it could be held with a minimum number of
men.

The next year the Emperor ordered that Eugene

place guns on the mountain above Osoppo and construct
QQ
a system of trenches and a moat before the fort® ^
In 1809 Napoleon ordered the establishment of
a defensive line along the Adige, with the main de
fensive points at legnago and YerOna, and a bridgehead
at Eonco and Alberedo.

The waters of the Adige and

the Brenta rivers should be turned into the marshy
area separating Venice and the Adige so that an enemy
could not capture Venice until he had crossed the Adige.
Such a line would give the Viceroy a strong defense for
central Italy, with Palmanova, Verona, and Mantua to
fall back upon if necessary.

The forts would force the

enemy to leave large contingents of troops before them,
and by the time the Italian army had retreated beyond
the Adige, leaving only skeleton forces to defend the

Qg

Ibid., XV, 146-148, Napoleon to General
Lery, 24 April 1807.

•^Ibid.. XVIII, 29-31, Napoleon to Eugene,
29 October 1868.
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forts, the invader would be so weakened that he could
he defeated piecemeal.^®
While preparing the land defenses of the king
dom, Eugene did not neglect the water approaches to
Italy.

Late in July 1805 he reported to Napoleon that

he had taken steps to put a flotilla on Lake Garda.

101

Though he did not mention that he experienced diffi
culty in manning the boats there, supplying crews must
have presented a rather difficult problem, for late in
August Napoleon wrote that Eugene should use the troops
stationed at Rimini to arm the flotilla since they were
doing nothing.

102

With the development of events that

led to war in the autumn of 1805, Eugene sent a con
tingent of 100 sailors to Lake Garda to man the little
fleet; presumably he withdrew the soldiers.
In September Eugene reported that arming of

^ ^ Ibid.. XVIII, 213-218, Napoleon to Eugene,
14 January 186$.
^■^Bugene, Memoires. I, 225-227, Eugene to
Napoleon, 30 July 1865.
102

Napoleon. Correspondence. XI, 148, Na
poleon to Eugene, 27 August 1865.
103
Ibid., 188, Napoleon to Eugene, 11 Sep
tember 1805.
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boats on lakes Majeur, Lugano, and Como would begin
that same month, and that lake Idro already bad two
boats armed with one gun each*

The flotilla on lake

Garda by this date consisted of five boats, one with
four cannon, and the Viceroy reported that within
fifteen days he would add two more craft to his north
west water defenses*

On the Po River at Mantua he

planned to have six gun boats, four of which he in
tended to arm with one twelve—pounder and two threepounders, and the other two either with a field gun
or a howitzer, the size of which he did not indicate*

104 .

Eugene intended to utilize the northwest flo
tillas to aid in preventing the escape of army deserters
and to prevent the passage of contraband, while the
flotilla at Mantua apparently was to patrol the Po
River*
By October the boats on the lakes were under
the command of a naval lieutenant and a few ensigns
from Toulon*

Eugene believed the lieutenant and

ensigns would perform the duties required of them on
the lakes even though they were Italians and, the
Viceroy believed, unfit to sail at sea*

He told

1 0 ^Eugene, M e m o i r e s * I, 385-388, E u g e n e to
N a p o l e o n , 22 S e p t e m b e r 1605*
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Napoleon that the Italians expressed gratitude at
105
being allowed to serve in this capacity.
By the
end of 1805 the Viceroy had secured his inland water
frontiers.
In all matters pertaining to state security
Napoleon clearly determined action and policy.

With

the exception of the action taken in the erection of
the national guard in the autumn and winter of 1805,
Eugene took no truly independent action.

It is true

that he suggested the formation of a few new units for
the army, and he appears to have taken the initiative
in the formation of flotillas along the inland water
frontiers.

In most instances, however, he seems to

have been only the instrument through which Napoleon
labored,

Eugene faithfully followed the directives

issued and provided a strong buffer between Napoleon
and Austria— *not strong enough to challenge Austria,
to be sure, but strong enough that Austria could not
move a cannon without considering the possibility of
either an invasion through the Tyrol or a crossing of
the Isonzo,

Ibid., 416-417, Eugene to Napoleon. 11
October 18051 Beauhamais Archive, Eugene to the
Minister of War of the kingdom, 22 September 1805.

CHAPTER YII
EXPANSION OP THE KINGDOM OP ITALY
When Napoleon became King of Italy the new
kingdom's eastern boundary was the Adige River.

To

the east lay Tenetia, which Austria had retained
following the campaign of 1800.

But following

Austria’s defeat in 1805 at Austerlitz, Venetia and
the so-called Venetian countries were ceded to Italy,
though they were not made a part of the kingdom at
that time•
During the campaign of 1805 Marshal Massena
gave the Venetian territories a provisional military
organization and administered the conquered territories
while serving as commander of the military forces
stationed there.

Subordinate generals served as gover

nors of the Venetian provinces.
With the signing of the Treaty of Pressburg,
Napoleon gave administration of Venetia and the Ve
netian countries to Eugene.1

The Viceroy ordered the

Napoleon, Correspondence. XI, 466, Napoleon
to Eugene, 9 December 1805; see also, Moniteur. 9
January 1806.
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provisional governors to retain Massena*s governmental
organization until a thorough study of Austrian admini strative policies had been made. 2
Both Italians and Venetians complained to Eugene
about the rapacity of French units under Mass&na*s com
mand.

The Viceroy, making an effort to halt the loot

ing, ordered the commanders of the military units in
Italy and Venetia to give a strict accounting of the
funds in the treasuries in their areas and of what had
been paid in extraordinary levies since the occupation
of the territories by the French army.

He further

ordered that no future payments should be made or col
lections attempted without an order signed by him or
the army bursar whom he would appoint.

3

Ten days later Beauhamais ordered the Italian
Minister of War to have an accounting made of the ma
terials of war left in the magazines of Venetia.

The

inventory was to indicate clearly what goods were of
Austrian manufacture and what had been taken into Italy
by the French.

Ho material should be allowed to leave

2

Eugene, Memoires. II, 149-155* Eugene to Na
poleon, 11 March 1806; Napoleon, Correspondence. II,
529-530, Napoleon to Berthier, 7 January 1&06.
3

Beauharnais Archive, Eugene to Generals
Kolbert, Chailan, Duhesme, Testi, and Magny, 18 De
cember 1805*

I
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the magazines -without an order signed by the Viceroy,
the chief of staff, or the b u r s a r /

Eugene further or

dered a report to he made every Saturday on what requi
sitions had been made, how much had been delivered
during the preceding week, and whether the deliveries
had been paid for.
In addition, probably to avoid any possibility
of a clash between the French and the withdrawing Aus
trian forces and to prevent the possibility of war sup
plies falling into Venetian hands, Eugene ordered that
convoys intended for points beyond Udine and Palmanova
should halt and await further orders before proceeding
to their destinations
Eugene had reason to take precautions against
arms falling into Venetian hands.

Venetians were not

particularly happy with French domination.

Eugene re

ported that considerable opposition existed; he hastened
to add that the opposition was not so great as the sup
port Napoleon might expect to gain in the future.

^Beauharnais Archive, Eugene to the Minister of
War of the kingdom, 28 December 1805*
^Moniteur, 9 January 1806.

^Beauharaais Archive, Eugene to the Minister of
War of the kingdom, 28 December 1805•

146
The Viceroy mentioned in the same letter that
Massena had stripped the country of ready cash, and
that only valueless paper money remained*

It would he

some time before the territory would show a profit, and
he requested subsidies from the French treasury in
order that the Kingdom of Italy might not be impover
ished by the new acquisition*

The Yieeroy complained

that if he had to use his state treasury for Venetian
purposes, it would be impossible for him to pay for the
requisitions collected by Massena in Italy
On 31 December 1805 Eugene received a letter
from Alexandre Berthier, chief of staff and Minister
of War of the French Empire, stating that Napoleon
wanted all contributions collected by Massena in the
Venetian countries to be deposited in the bank of the
Messrs* La Bouillerie*

To this Eugene replied that he

could do nothing about the contributions already made,
for the monies collected had been spent or carried off
by Massena*

In response to a request from Berthier to

report the amount of contributions remaining to be col
lected, the Viceroy wrote that he had as yet no idea
of the amount due but would report it as soon as he
knew*

He requested Berthier*s aid in obtaining funds

'Eugene, Memoires, II, 32-36, Eugene to Na
poleon, 29 December 1805-
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from the imperial treasury to provide for the needs
g
of his army in Venetia*
Eugene hoped that Berthier
would have greater influence with the Emperor than any
other in matters concerning the welfare of the army*
On the same day Eugene reported that the Minis
ter of Finance was working on the financial organi
zation and promised Napoleon that he would send him
the organizational plans (plans for departmental di
vision) of Venetia the next day.

Eugene requested a

report on the income from Venetian tariffs and customs*
From this report he intended to have drawn a detailed
graph which would show at a glance the trade "balance
Q
of Venice.
The continued reiteration on the part of Eugene
that there had "been misuse of the funds collected in
Italy and Venetia by the armies under Massena*s command
caused Napoleon to order General Jean-Baptiste Solignac,
one of Massena*s aides, to Paris to give a detailed ac
counting of Venetian finances*

The results of the in

vestigation were the destitution of Solignac for his

8Ibid., 38-39» Eugene to Berthier, 31 December
1805*
Q

1805.

Ibid** 40, Eugene to Napoleon, 31 December
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part in the maladministration and an order to Massena
to return some 3,000,000 francs he had misappropri
ated.10
Venetian finances, however, continued to
plague the Viceroy.

As a result Eugene received a di

rective from Napoleon that a receiver-general of fi
nances should he appointed for the area and that the
Venetian treasury and the treasury of Italy should
never he joined.11

Three weeks later Count Jacques

Dauchy, former administrator of Tuscany, became the
1?
Administrator-General of Venetian finances.
In the meantime, to provide for governmental
needs, Beauharnais negotiated a loan of some two
million francs from Venetian hankers.

He thought this

sum would see him through February, when tax col
lections should become great enough to allow the govera13
ment to operate from its own revenues.
Without

Napoleon, Correspondence. XI, 529-530, Na
poleon to Berthier, 7 January 1866; Eugene, Mlmoires,
II, 125, 149-155, Eugene to Napoleon, 11 March 1806.
i:iNapoleon, Correspondan.ee« XI, 544-555, Na
poleon to Eugene, 19 January 1806.
12

Moniteur. 22 February 1806.

1*5

#

Eugene, Memoires, II, 53-54, Eugene to Na
poleon, 28 January 1806.
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■benefit of advice from a director-general of finances,
Eugene ordered a reorganization of banking in Venice,
and the work went forward with, considerable zeal.1^
Although Venetian commerce increased after the
end of the war, Eugene noted that the Venetians them
selves did not really expect much in the way of trade
H5
until a general peace had been made. v Whatever hopes
the Venetians had for a return of trading prosperity
diminished as a result of a decree, dated 6 February
1806, forbidding all English goods within the new
territory.

Eugene, in Venice at this time, ordered

that the decree not be published until he had taken
his leave.
From the beginning of his administration of
the Venetian countries Eugene had been pressed by Na
poleon for an estimate of the revenues that could be
expected.

On 8 February he reported an initial esti

mate that Venice would have a revenue of some twentythree million Milanese francs, w h ich he thought would

•^Moniteur. 20 February 1806.
1 5 IJbid.

^ Ibid.. 27 February 1806; Eugene, Memoires.
II, 62, Eugene to Napoleon, 6 February 1806.
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not quite meet the expenses of the state and the "burden
17
of the French army stationed there,
late in March 1806, Napoleon issued a decree
which provided for the annexation of Venetia to the
Kingdom of Italy on 1 May 1806.

The fundamental law of

the land should he the Code Napoleon, and the relation
ship of the church to the state should he the same as
in Italy under the concordat.

The decree provided also

for the establishment of the duchies of Dalmatia,
Istria, Friuli, Cadore, Belluno, Conegliano, Trevino,
Feltre, Bassano, Vicenza, Padua, and Rovigo.

The

duchies were to he sinecures, and one-fifteenth of the
revenue of the provinces collected hy the Italian
government should he paid to the holders of the fiefs.
In addition, some thirty millions of the revenue from
the national domain in the provinces should he ear
marked for them.

Also, 1,200,000 francs were ordered

set aside for bonuses to generals, officers, and
soldiers.

Until Italy had an army, a French army would

remain in Venetia, supported hy the Italian treasury;
the Venetians would pay 2,500,000 francs monthly to
the imperial treasury for a period of six years.

IV

This

'Eugene, Memoires. II, 64-65, Eugene to Na
poleon, 8 February 1806.
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sum represented the Venetian contribution to the up—
TO
keep of the imperial army.
Eugene announced the coming union of Venetia
with Italy by a proclamation issued at Milan 25 April
iq
1806. ^ Annexation did not mean for the Venetians that
they were the equals of either the Italians or the
French in the eyes of Napoleon, for Napoleon had
written Eugene that he would not recognize the national
debt as the Venetians requested.

He would recognize

and pay only the items recognized and paid by their
20
former oppressor, the Austrian Emperor.
In addition,
he told his stepson that he would not reimburse the
initial 2,000,000 franc contribution that Venice had
paid, for the Venetians were a conquered people and
should expect to be treated as such.

The only con

sideration they would receive from him would be that
he would be a good sovereign as long as they were good
21
subjects.

18Moniteur. 1 April 1806.
^9 Ibid., 5 May 1806.
20

Napoleon, Correspondance. XII, 296, Napoleon
to Eugene, 21 April 16(56.

21Ibid., 296-297* Napoleon to Eugene, 16 April
1806.
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Though formal expansion of the Kingdom of Italy
southward did not occur until 1808, the preliminaries
to expansion at the expense of the Papal States began
in December 1805 with the dispatch of troops under the
command of General Gouvion St.-Cyr to the borders of
the Kingdom of Naples.

22

A part of St.-Cyr*s command

occupied the port city of Ancona on the east coast of
the Papal States.
Napoleon, in May 1806, informed the Yieeroy
that General Jean Lemarois had been ordered to take
command of the port of Ancona and the eastern coast of
the Papal States from Rimini to the frontier of Naples.
Napoleon intended lemarois to close the coast to the
English and to stop English communications with the
Russians at Corfu.

25

The military occupation of the Papal territory
remained the same for the next several months, and not
until July of 1807 did Eugene receive orders for
further military operations in the Papal territories.
Napoleon, on 29 July, told the Yieeroy to reinforce

22

Ibid., XI, 474, Napoleon to Cardinal Fesch,
13 December 1805.
25

Ibid., XII, 357$ Napoleon to Eugene, 6 May
1806; 427, Napoleon to General lemarois, 1 June 1806.
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the forces at Ancona "by some 2,800 troops, ostensibly
for the purpose of more effectively preventing the
entry of British goods into the area.2^

On 4 August

Hapoleon instructed Eugene to gather troops at Bologna
and told him that if the Pope acted impudently, the
25

Papal States would he seized. J
The next day Napoleon sent Eugene instructions
to feel out the populace of the duchy of Urhino and
the marches of Ancona and Permo on the possibility of
Prench annexation of the areas.

Napoleon felt, he

wrote the Viceroy, that these three areas should be
annexed to the Kingdom of Italy in order that Italy
and Naples might have contiguous boundaries.

He asked

Eugene for a report on the revenues of the three areas,
the wealth of the population, and whether or not they
pg
could pay a greater contribution than Romagna.
On 16 August Napoleon wrote Eugene to send

24

Ibid., XV, 450, Napoleon to Eugene, 29 July.

1807.
25
•'i b i d .. 475, Napoleon to Eugene, 4 August
1807.
26

Ibid., 478, Napoleon to Eugene, 5 August
1807. Romagna, northernmost of the Papal States, had
been incorporated into the Italian Republic in 1800,
and was part of the Kingdom of Italy from the time of
its foundation.
There is no answer to this letter re
produced in E u g e n e ’s Memo ires or in the B e a u h a m a i s
Archive•
S4
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troops stationed at Bimini to Pesara, Fano, and Ancona
to confiscate all English goods to he found in those
places, 27
Napoleon, in October, ordered Eugene to send
General Lemarois to take possession and command of the
duchy of Urbino, the march of Ancona, and the provinces
of Macerata and Permo.

Lemarois should take command

of all Papal troops and establish his headquarters at
Ancona.

To prevent local governmental opposition to

the action, Napoleon ordered the establishment of a
provisional government under the control of Lemarois.

28

Papal opposition to Napoleonts high-handed
tactics and the French occupation resulted in a letter
from Napoleon to Beauharnais in "which the Emperor wrote
that Rome must accommodate itself to the facts; there
could be no question about who should govern the areas
seized by the French.

If the Papal court did not make

the required adjustment, all Roman provinces would be
seized.

27

Ibid., 502, Napoleon to Eugene, 16 August

1807.
no

___

Ibid.. XVI, 64, Napoleon to Eugene, 3 Oc
tober 1807.
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1807.

Ibid., Ill, Napoleon to Eugene, 23 October
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Due to chronic slowness in payment of as
sessments for the construction of defensive works at
Ancona, the Viceroy sequestered all hank funds in the
30
area controlled hy General Lemarois.
Napoleon, w hen
he learned of this unauthorized action on the part of
the Viceroy, ordered that Lemarois should use the se
questered funds to pay his men and to pay for defensive
31
works at Ancona.
The sequestered funds of the hanks of the
province of Ancona did not produce enough revenue for
Lemarois* needs, and w ith the Viceroy's approval
Lemarois increased taxes hy two-thirds.

Eugene asked

for Napoleon's approval of this action and requested
the appointment of a director-general for Ancona if
32
the Boperor did not approve the increase in taxes.
Other than the facts that a director-general for Ancona
was not provided and that Eugene did continue adminis
trative control, there is no indication that Napoleon
either approved or disapproved of the Viceroy's action
in this instance.

*50
Eugene, Memoires. IV, 65-66, Eugene to Na
poleon, 10 February 1868.
31

Ibid.. 69. Napoleon to Eugene, 17 February

1808.

^2Ibid.. V, 79-80, Eugene to Napoleon, 25
February 1808•
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Early in 1808 the Viceroy wrote Lemarois to
abolish all local treasuries and to centralize his
revenues at Ancona.

Lemarois was to send Eugene a

treasury report weekly and report monthly, one month
in advance, on items the government of Ancona would
need and what the cost would be; he would receive
50,000 francs monthly for the purpose of deepening and
widening the port of Ancona, and this work should be
started immediately.-^
Napoleon, in early spring 1808, determined to
annex Ancona and ordered Eugene to draw up a plan for
the organization of the Papal Legations into prefec
tures and sub-prefectures and to arrange for the ap
pointment of justices of the peace.

The Viceroy

received a directive to make his choices for prefects
in the proposed organization.

He should make plans

so that when he received the order for the annexation,
everything could be accomplished smoothly and within
*54.
forty-eight hours.
Napoleon, on 25 March 1808, wrote Eugene that
as soon as Lent was past, he intended to annex the

77

Beauhamais Archive, Eugene to General
Lemarois, 22 February 1808.
34.
Napoleon, Correspondence. XVI, 4-27-428, Na
poleon to Eugene, 20 March 1808.
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four legations to the kingdom•

The King ordered that

2,000 Italian infantry, a regiment of Italian cavalry,
and the French troops at Ancona he used for the seizure
of the areas*

He again asked for Eugene’s nominations

for governors of provinces, prefects, and other adminis
trative officials*

The nominations were to he pre

sented in the form of decrees needing only Napoleon’s
signature to he effective.

The coming annexation

should he advertised in order that it not take the
populace hy surprise»55v
The decree of annexation was to have heen issued
on 20 April 1808, hut on 2 April Napoleon wrote Eugene
to delay publication until 30 April*

The Emperor ex

plained that he had issued to Pius VII an ultimatum
demanding that His Holiness join the Kingdom of Italy
and the Kingdom of Naples in an offensive and defensive
league to provide adequate defense for the Italian pen
insula*

The King, to give the Pope time to decide be

tween acceptance or rejection of the ultimatum, ordered
Eugene to delay publication of the decree.

In addition,

Napoleon thought the extra ten days would give Eugene
time to perfect his plans for the annexation*

In the

event that the Pope accepted the ultimatum, Eugene

•^Ibid.* 433. Napoleon to Eugene, 23 March
1808.
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would be informed by the charge d 1affaires in time to
•ZC

stop the process of annexation.

On 3 May Napoleon

wrote the Viceroy to hold his publication of the decree
of annexation of Ancona for an additional ten days,

37

Following the annexation of Ancona on 13 May
Napoleon ordered that the concordat be published and
the laws governing the church in Italy be enforced in
the new departments,

*58

Ancona bade fair to be a lucrative addition to
the kingdom, and Napoleon expressed his pleasure at
learning that the departments of Ancona would return
some 8,000,000 francs yearly to his war chest,"^
Apparently Eugene feared that Ancona might be
attacked by sea, for Napoleon wrote that he did not
fear such an attack.

The King felt, however, that

Ancona should be guarded by three or four strong de
tachments in the event of attack or rebellion.

He

•ZC

Eugene, Memoires. V, 103, Napoleon to Eugene,
2 April 1808; Napoleon, Correspondence, XVI, 469, Na
poleon to Eugene, 2 April 1808,
37

Napoleon, Correspondence. XVII, 57, Napoleon
to Eugene, 3 May 18057
70

Ibid., 140, Napoleon to Eugene, 16 May 1808.
1808.

^Ibid., 151-153, Napoleon to Eugene, 17 May
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ordered a map of the city and port of Ancona which
would include the territory surrounding the city for
4.0
2,000 yards.
Some 300,000 francs should he spent
there on fortifications and the harbor should he
dredged and enlarged in order that it might handle not
only a larger volume of shipping hut also men-o*—

war.^
The area newly annexed to the Kingdom of Italy
became three new departments:

Metauro, w ith its capi

tal at Ancona; Musone, with its capital heing M acerata;.
and Toronto, with the capital at Permo.

The population

of the area totaled 700,000, giving the kingdom a popu
lation of approximately 6,600,000.
Eugene lost no time in organizing the new de
partments.

He appointed General Lemarois governor, and

two councillors-of-state.

The governor and the council

lors were charged with the promulgation and the imple
mentation of the laws of the realm concerning domains,
ecclesiastical corporations, the constitutional

4-0
Ibid., 14-0, Napoleon to Eugene, 16 May 1808.

1808.

^ Ibid.. 151-153, Napoleon to Eugene, 17 May
4-2
.
Eugene, Memoires. IV, 5*
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statutes, and the concordat.

In addition, Eugene es

tablished a tribunal of appeal for the three new departments at Ancona.

43

On 22 May the Viceroy reported to the Emperor
that he had taken all necessary steps so that the laws
of the kingdom, the concordat, decrees, etc., would be
put into force in the departments.

Eugene had ordered

the Minister of the Interior to make reports monthly on
the progress of public works.

The Viceroy had repri

manded the Minister of War for his unsatisfactory re
ports and had given him detailed instructions on the
form the reports should have.

And he had ordered the

bishops of the departments to present themselves at
Milan during the month of June to take the oath to the
^ 44

Emperor required under the terms of the concordat.

In July 1808 Eugene visited the new depart
ments and reported himself well satisfied with what he
found there.

The people expressed some dissatisfaction

with the idea of a direct impost which most of them
felt was heavier than the previous indirect taxes under
which they had labored.

In a proclamation, Eugene

pointed out that the single direct tax did not consti
tute so heavy a burden as the multiple Indirect

43Ibid., 5-6.
44

1808.

Ibid., 145-146. Eugene to Napoleon. 22 May
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taxation to which they had been subject.

In this

instance he failed to point out that the populace
would also be subject to the requisition system for
the support of armies.
Included in the proclamation was the assertion
that only by means of the conscription to which they
also objected could the people find the answer to
4-5
their nationalistic aspirations. ^
In this fashion the Kingdom of Italy, under
the direction of the Viceroy, enjoyed expansion south
ward.

The area under Eugene’s administration increased

significantly.

More important, new areas for Napole

onic exploitation were added to swell the flow of money
and goods into the imperial treasury.

Though mutter-

ings of discontent gave evidence of possible overt
opposition, Eugene, by the use of tact tempered with
firmness, avoided serious, open rupture.

^ Ibid.. 152-159; Mon.iteur. 16 August 1808

CHAPTER YIII
THE ITALIAN NAVY
The defeat of the French fleet at Trafalgar in
October 1805 made necessary a Herculean attempt to re
place the lost ships, and all parts of the Empire con
tributed to the effort.

In February 1806 Eugene wrote

Napoleon that he had started construction of a brig and
a frigate at the shipyards in Venice for two reasons.
The first, he said, was that he thought this was what
Napoleon wanted, and the second was to give employment
1
to the mass of unemployed shipwrights there.
Later that month Napoleon replied that while
he approved of Eugene*s actions, the latter had acted
too hastily.

In his eagerness to serve the Emperor

well Eugene had ordered the construction of the two
ships begun even though plans for the ships were not
on hand.

Such action, Napoleon felt, could only be
p

wasteful both of labor and money.

The same day, but.

^"Eugene, Memoires. II, 60-62, Eugene to Na
poleon, 6 February 1&06.
v
2
Napoleon, Correspondance. H I , 99-100, Na
poleon to Eugene, 25 February 1806.

162

163
in a different, letter, Napoleon told his stepson to
maintain the Venetian navy in the same condition and
size it formerly had unless Napoleon first ordered a
3
change or approved proposals for its enlargement®
Not until 3 March 1806 did Napoleon give in
structions for the type or number of ships Eugene
should fit out at Venice.

The King wrote the Viceroy

to fit out two frigates, the Adria and the Aquila. plus
two brigs, the Pollex and the Orion, which Eugene
should send to sweep the English corvettes and brigs
from the Dalmatian coast®

As an added observation, Na

poleon wrote that he felt the addition of the Austria,
rechristened the Austerlitz by Eugene, would strengthen
the Viceroy's naval power to the point that the British
would not be able to blockade successfully any point
along the coast without considerably strengthening
their forces in the Adriatic®^
In the same letter Napoleon demanded that the
Viceroy keep him informed on English naval activity in
the Adriatic, and late in the month of March Eugene

3

Ibid®, 104® Napoleon to Eugene, 26 February
1806.
There is no indication of the size or condition
of the Venetian navy in Napoleon's letter or the other
sources used for this work®

^Ibid., 128-129* Napoleon to Eugene, 3 March
1806.
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wrote that two British frigates, one Russian frigate,
and two brigs of unspecified nationality had been
sighted on 15 March, and that since 20 March ships on
mission had nearly all returned to the anchorage at
Venice.

Since that date, only small boats had put out,

and had reported no enemy naval activity.

In spite of

this, Eugene ordered that all ships sent out in convoy
avoid the enemy if possible.
Though there is no evidence in Eugene*s Memoirss
or in his correspondence with his cabinet and Prench
officers contained in the Beauharnais Archive to in
dicate that the Viceroy sent the fleet on any particu
lar mission in early spring 1806, he must have done so,
for on 20 April 1806 Napoleon wrote Eugene criticizing
him for sending the fleet into the Adriatic.

Napoleon

told the Viceroy that unless he had numerical and naval
fire cannon superiority, the fleet at Venice should not
fight the British.

Only against the Russians, from

whom Napoleon apparently feared little, if any, damage,
would such activity be allowed.

The Bnperor told the

Viceroy that Venice could be too easily blockaded if

5Eugene, Memoires,
*
II, 198, Eugene to Napoleon,
28 March 1806.
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the French navy in the Adriatic suffered defeat.

£

It

would seem that if the fleet could not leave Venice
for fear of heing defeated, and that such a defeat
would bring on a blockade, the port already was ef
fectively blockaded.
Napoleon*s rather contemptous evaluation of
the Russians as sailors seems justified by a report
made by Eugene on 10 May 1806 in which he told Napoleon
that the Italian Royal Navy gunboat the Commacchiere
had encountered and fought a Russian corvette and had
won the day.

The Russian Ohip was not sunk and the

Venetian naval commander asked for permission to send
sloops and gunboats after it.

Eugene refused this re

quest, he told Napoleon, and added that the encounter
would be written up in the Milan paper to show the
Italians how well one of their ships had done.^

In

response, Napoleon extended his congratulations to the
Italians, but again warned Eugene not to let his
frigates venture beyond the entrance of the port of
Venice unless against decidedly inferior forces.

In

order that the Viceroy might not misunderstand his

^Napoleon, Correspondence. XII, 295* Napoleon
to Eugene, 20 April 180e>.

n

Eugene, Memoires, II, 385-386, Eugene to Na
poleon, 10 May 180 (■>•
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instructions, Napoleon explicitly stated that if a
single corvette "insulted" Venice, two frigates should
chase it away.

He asked Eugene for the number of gun

boats and other light boats available to go to Tarento
to aid in an invasion of Sicily in the event the
O
Russians left the Adriatic.
The first report of a ship launching at Venice
is that of the brig the Sparaviere, carried in the 30
June 1806 issue of the Moniteur*. The Venetians cele
brated the event with a ball, and affectionately
called the addition to the fleet the Princess Augusta,
q
which pleased the Viceroy.
Though Eugene had begun naval construction
early in 1806 and had launched a brig, major con
struction did not start in the Venetian shipyards until
late summer and early autumn of that year.

In August

Napoleon sent a Dutchman to direct the construction of
ships of seventy-four guns.' In the letter announcing
the appointment of the'Dutchman, Napoleon wrote it was
his intention to build eight men-of-war and two
frigates at Venice, and the Emperor requested a report
on items the Venetians needed to build them.

Q

Of these

__

Napoleon, Correspondence. XII, 376-377, Na
poleon to Eugene, 16 May 1866.
"
Q

Moniteur. 30 June 1806.
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t e n ships, eight -mere intended for France and two for
Italy.

Napoleon told Eugene that not only would such

construction add to the defensive power of the state,
but that it would have a good effect upon the Italian
economy. 10 Though the Emperor announced his intentions
in August, not until November did he give the order to
the French Minister of Marine, Vice-Admiral Denis
Deeres, to order the construction of eight men-of-war
at Venice.

Napoleon hoped they would be completed by

November 1807®

He added that sufficient wood for ship

building existed in Germany along the Elbe near Hamburg,
and ordered that Deeres send engineers to survey the
trees and choose those best suited for the purpose
Late in November 1806 Eugene visited Venice®
He informed Napoleon that he had reviewed the maneuvers
of gunboats, and in general the performance of twelve
new crews pleased him.

He noted, however, that the

signal reading was poor and that both officers and men
needed work to be effective sailors.

The Viceroy felt

that his navy had nothing to fear cruising outside the
port and ordered it to do so to give the naval recruits

^ N a p o l e o n , Correspondence. XIII, 74, Napoleon
to Eugene, 14 August 1866.

^ I b i d o , 470, Napoleon to Vice-Admiral Deeres,
4 November 1806.
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training.

At the time the Viceroy reviewed the gun

boats, the frigates were at anchor off Chiogga and
could not leave because of a contrary wind, but Eugene
felt confident that with a little practice in the art
of sailing they could hold their own with ships of the
same classification.

12

By 1807 Eugene reported the navy increased to
the extent that the addition of two officers to the
naval staff had become a necessity, and asked for a
naval commander at Venice and a commander for naval
soldiers.

He asked Napoleon for ship-of-the-line

Captain Gaspard-Balthasar-Melchior Moras to command
the navy and frigate Captain Montcabrie to command the
15
naval soldiers.
Whether he got them is not recorded.
Whether from lack of able aides or not, the
work in the Venetian shipyards did not progress as Na
poleon intended, and he wrote Deeres in January 1807
to get things moving at Venice.

Of the ten ships

ordered in 1806, only two were under construction, and

12

Eugene, Memoires, III, 213-214-, Eugene to
Napoleon, 29 November 1806.
^ Ibid.. 252-253, Eugene to Napoleon, 7 Janu
ary 1807. The naval program at Venice had become too
large for a commissioner to handle alone. Therefore,
Eugene was asking for a commander for his naval di
vision and for a commander for naval infantry, which
correspond to the United States Marines.
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Napoleon reminded Deeres lie wanted to launch ten ships
there within the next two y e a r s A t

the same time

Napoleon asked Deeres whether it would he possible to
build a ship of seventy-four guns armed with bronze
cannon and which would draw only sixteen to twenty feet
of water.

If it could be done, Deeres should order
15
construction of two such ships at Venice. ^
In February Eugene answered Napoleon's com
plaint to Deeres about the lack of activity in the
shipyards at Venice.

The Viceroy reported five seventy-

four gun ships, two forty-four gun frigates, and two
brigs armed with sixteen carronades under construction
at Venice.

He admitted construction of the vessels

had not got under way until 1 February due to a short
age of material.

He added that two additional brigs

and three heavily armed schooners which had been built
since November 1806 would be ready for launching within
16
the next week.
But Napoleon was still dissatisfied

14

Napoleon, Correspondence. XIV, 203, Napoleon
to Vice-Admiral Deeres, 16 January 1807* In. November
1806 Napoleon had stated he wanted to launch ten ships
by November 1807* The slowness of the Italians ap
parently caused him to revise his goal.
^ Ibid.. 204-205, Napoleon to Deeres, 16 Janu
ary 1807.

"^Eugene, Memoires. Ill, 266-267, Eugene t o
Napoleon, 6 February 18O’/.
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with the program at Venice, and wrote Deeres in April
to organize the Italian navy to the advantage of Prance
and to propose an honest man for land, sea, and civil
17
administration of the city.
Perhaps to allay Napoleon’s displeasure, the
Publiciste. under a Venice dateline, reported that the
Viceroy had reviewed gunboats at maneuver in spite of
foul weather and had inspected the fleet.

The report

noted that Eugene pronounced himself satisfied with
what he found.

18
The report appeared in the Moniteur.

In May 1807 Eugene wrote Deeres to the effect
that since the Italian navy was beginning to get on its
feet, he needed French naval officers to train his
sailors.

The Viceroy warned Deeres to be sure to gain

Napoleon*s approval before sending any officers to
Italy.

Beauhamais told the Minister he thought the

Italians would learn their trade faster under French
19
officers than under any others. ■
Regardless of Eugene*s reports and announce
ments issued in journals, Napoleon continued to be

17
'Napoleon, Correspondence. XV, 4, Napoleon
to Vice-Admiral Deeres, 1 April 1807*
^®Moniteur, 28 April 1807*
19

Beauhamais Archive, Eugene to the Italian
Minister of Marine, 5 May 1807.
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unhappy with, the slowness of* construction at Venice.
The King, on 4 July 1807, wrote Deeres that since the
continental war was now over, the war on the sea must
he pushed with renewed vigor.

The Emperor expressly

ordered Deeres to hurry the construction of the ships
at Venice.

20

■

The same day, the Emperor wrote Eugene

to press the completion of warships under construction
at Venice, regardless of whether the ships finished
were for Prance or for Italy.

It was of utmost im

portance to get two ships into the water at once.

Ha-

poleon felt that two more ships in the Adriatic would
give France command of that sea, since the English had
only frigates there.

At the same time, he wanted to

know when the seventy-fours would toe ready for launeh..
21
mg.
As a result of this letter Eugene ordered his
own Minister of War and Marine to finish the ships at
Venice as quickly as possible.

In addition Eugene

asked for a report on the number of English and other
enemy ships in the Adriatic and the number of ships
the Minister thought it would require to wrest control
from the British.

He told the Minister that Mapoleon

20
__
Napoleon, Correspondance« XV, 382.

21Itoid., 385, Uapoleon to Eugene, 4 July 1807#
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thought it could be done with two ships added to ex
isting French and Italian forces.

In addition, Eugene

asked the Minister for information on the number of
sailors available, the amount of wood for building,
and the number of cannon available to arm the ships.

22

Napoleon, in August 1807, informed the Viceroy
that he intended to begin construction of three more
seventy-four gun ships in 1807, two to be charged to
France and one to be charged to Italy.

This would put

eight ships of this classification on the blocks at
Venice.

Four days later the Emperor asked Eugene

whether the new pass which would allow the seventyfour gun ships under construction at Venice to reach
the sea had been completed.

'

Because of the difficulty in putting to sea
from Venice, Napoleon, in November 1807, ordered that
the Viceroy send two frigates to Cattaro to make their
home port there since the harbor at Cattaro could

22Beauhamais Archive, Eugene to the Minister
of War and Marine, 19 July 1807* If Eugene reported
to the Emperor on the number of English ships in the
Adriatic, his letter is not reproduced in his Memoires.
The report of the Minister of War and Marine is not in
Eugene's correspondence with his cabinet.
23

Napoleon, Correspondence. XV, 477, Napoleon
to Eugene, 5 August 1807.
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easily be entered and sailed from under almost any
wind*
The letter also carried an order for a full
AJ

report on French and Italian naval construction.

Na-

poleon did not remark on the report made by Eugene on
the Italian naval construction until May 1808, and on
the sixteenth of that month Napoleon recorded his dis
satisfaction with Eugenefs naval reports*

His letter

reads in part s
My Son, I received your report on the
constructions for the first of May.
It
is full of incoherencies. For example,
in the column "Ships Under Armament",
your report states that the corvette the
Carolina had been put in the water in
December 1807, then it states that it is
in the 21/24 /stage of construction/, but
if it had been put in the water in December
it was then 24/24 of construction. Ex
plain that •
I see that my five war ships are not ad
vancing. The Bivoli is still only in the
8/24, it therefore will be impossible to
put it in the water in August.
It is of
the utmost importance that these works be
pushed with all haste. The Bellone is
carried as being put in the water in midMay, however it is only in the 15/24-1=
Is the Courrone in the water or not?

24.

Ibid., XVI, 142, Napoleon to Eugene, 6 No
vember 1807T
2 ^Ibid., XVII, 141-142, Napoleon to Eugene,
16 May 1808. For report purposes French naval con
struction was divided into twenty—four stages. With
out going into great detail Napoleon could know how
nearly a ship was finished by reading that a ship was
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In early 1808 Eugene continued to propagandize
the size of the works at Venice, announcing that the
Venetian shipyard was very busy constructing a number
of ships of the line and that several frigates also
were under construction*

P6

Napoleon fretted because of his decidedly in
ferior naval position.

Though Eugene kept him informed

monthly on the state of the construction at Venice, the
Emperor wrote in February 1808 demanding to know if the
frigate under construction at Venice was nearing com
pletion or had been launched, if the works for en
larging the pass at Venice progressed, and if the works
on the port at Ancona made any headway.

It was im

perative, he told Eugene, that these two harbors be
able to accommodate men-of-war. 27

Five days later

Eugene reported that the frigate the Corona had been

in the first twenty-fourth, and so on up the scale.
Napoleon was perhaps a bit more harsh than necessary,
for often at Venice ships were launched before decking,
superstructure, masts, cannon carriages, compartments,
and crews* quarters were complete to make way for new
ships to be laid down.
26

Moniteur, 29 January 1808.

27

Napoleon, Correspondance, XVI, 347* Napoleon
to Eugene, 18 February 1&08.
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launched, though much work remained to he done before
she could put to sea.

He hoped that it could be

finished by the first of June,

The corvette the

Garolina which Napoleon had launched while in Venice
in December 1807 would be completed by the end of
April,

The small corvette the Carlotta was at anchor,
28
and Eugene asked permission to send it to Ancona,
On 2 July 1808 the Moniteur announced that on 15 June
the Venetians had launched a corvette, but did not
oq

indicate which one. *
The slowness of the dredging at Venice taxed
Eugenefs patience to the limit, and he inspected the
works in June 1808.

In reporting the inspection to Na

poleon, the Viceroy wrote that he was extremely dis
satisfied with the work.

The Venetians told him the

slowness was due to the fact that plans had not been
returned from Paris,
excuse.

This, Eugene wrote, was only an

The real trouble lay in a squabble over the

allocation of funds which he had put to rest by trans
ferring control of funds from the municiualite to the
chief engineer.

The chief engineer assured him that

28

Eugene, Memoires. IV, 78, Eugene to Napoleon,
23 February 1808.
^ Moniteur. 2 July 1808.
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the works would near completion by winter.
Concerning shipbuilding, Eugene reported that
the Carolina would be able to sail in less than a
month, the frigate the Corona would sail by the end of
September, and the Bivoli, one of the seventy-four gun
ships under construction, would be launched in October
1808.

The Viceroy informed the Emperor that the budget

for shipbuilding would need to be larger if Italy was
to accomplish anything significant. 30
Though Eugene had announced to the Emperor in
February 1808 that the brig the Carlotta was ready for
action, he apparently had been unable to utilize it or
it had suffered losses in engagements at sea, for he
wrote the Minister of War of the kingdom late in October
to complete her crew and the crew of the corvette the
Aquila immediately.

The Carlotta needed twenty-five

men and the Aquila needed twenty.

At the same time

Eugene ordered the manning of two new packet boats, the
Gazelle and the Diligent.

The addition of these two

50
Eugene, Memoires, IV, 185-186, Eugene to Na
poleon, 14 June 1868. The Moniteur reported on 6
October 1808 that Eugene watched the launching of a
frigate, two brigs, and two smaller craft. It may be
that the frigate was the Corona.
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small "boats raised the total of such craft in the
31
Italian navy to five.
The operation of the Italian ships in the Adri
atic was not without risk, and in autumn 1808 Eugene
lost the Hortense and the Pe.iche. "both classified as
sloops.

He ordered them replaced immediately.

To in

sure that the replacements were better sailers than
the Hortense and the Pe.iche he gave instructions that
their armament should consist of two eight—pounders
fore, four eight-pounders port and starboard, or two
twenty-two-pounders and six: twelve-pound carronades.
In this letter Eugene did not designate the shipyard
32
where the ships should be built.
Ships built in the Venetian shipyards could not
be stationed there due to the difficulty of sailing
from Venice.

To overcome this disability, Napoleon

wrote Eugene to provision the Carolina with a six
m o n t h ’s supply of food and a four m o n t h ’s supply of

31
B e a u h a m a i s Archive, Eugene to the Minister
of War of the realm, n.d.
The letter appears between
letters dated 23-29 October 1808. The packet boats
were used in communication with Dalmatia.
They were
very fast sailers and could run from Venice or Ancona
to Zara and Corfu overnight.
32

Ibid., Eugene to the Minister of War of the
kingdom, n.d.
The letter appears between letters
bearing dates of 31 October 1808 and 18 November 1808.
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water and send it from Venice to Ancona in the company
of two "brigs and a gunboat, if the latter was availa
ble.

The Princess Augusta and the Jena, both stationed

at Ancona, should be placed under the command of the
captain of the Carolina to form a naval division
charged with sailing against the British fleet then
blockading Trieste.

In addition to this duty, the di

vision could be utilized to convoy supplies to Corfu
*2 •T

and Cattaro from Ancona.

Following this advice, the

Yiceroy sent the frigate the Carolina and the brigs
the Lepanto and the Mameluke to Ancona, where they
were joined by two unspecified frigates and a few tinspecified brigs from Corfu.

The new frigate the Corona

also was stationed at Ancona, increasing French naval
■54strength in the Adriatic.
In the spring of 1809 Eugene told the Italians
that his navy could hold its own with the British and
that a flotilla of frigates, corvettes,and armed sloops
would put to sea to give battle to English warships

33
Napoleon, Correspondence, XVIII, 200, Na
poleon to Eugene, 12 January 1809.
34

1809.

Ibid.. 298, Napoleon to Eugene, 1 March
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7c

lurking off* the coast at Venice*

This was primarily

propaganda, and in April Napoleon exposed it as such
by sending Rear-Admiral Carentin-TJrbain-Jacques
Bertrand-de Leissegues, who had the rank of captain of
a warship, three frigate captains (unnamed), eighteen
lieutenants, and one hundred seventy-seven sailors to
Venice to aid in its defense.

Rather than ships,

Eugene ha;d to use rafts and boats armed with cannon to
make the defense of Venice in 1 8 0 9 * ^
The campaign of 1809 crowded thoughts of the
navy into the background during most of that year.

As

a result, the completion of the frigate the Rivoli was
delayed.

A second frigate, the Regenerat ore * was al

most complete in early 1810, and another, the Favorite,
was started*
Napoleon again told Eugene it was important
that the British not be able to blockade the gulf, and
ordered Eugene to send the two frigates, when finished,
to Ancona with a Russian frigate stationed at Trieste.
This addition to the naval strength of the port of
Ancona would make it impossible for the British to

^^Moniteur. 2 April 1809.
7r

Napoleon, Correspondence. XVIII, 442, Na
poleon to Eugene, 6 April !L6£>9.
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maintain naval superiority on the Adriatic without the
addition of a few men-of-war. 37 Napoleon*s reference
to the addition of a Russian frigate to Eugene*s naval
force elicited from the Viceroy the statement that
Russian ships ceded to the Kingdom of Italy were practi
cally worthless.

Only three of seventeen were sea

worthy, and Eugene recommended that the others he
■
20

scrapped or sold.
In addition to Venetian shipbuilding in 1810,
Marshal Marmont built a fleet of small boats at Tri
este. ^
During the years 1809 and 1810 the importance
of Ancona as a home port for French and Italian shipping
in the Adriatic increased.

As a result, Napoleon, in

July 1810, wrote the Viceroy it was his intention to
increase the capacity of the port of Ancona from four
men-of-war and six frigates to nine men-of-war and six
frigates.

In addition he intended to extend the sea

37

Ibid., XX, 257, Napoleon to Eugene. 8 March

1810.
70

Eugene, Memoires, VI, 326-327, Eugene to
Napoleon, 12 April 1810.
39

^Beauhamais Archive, Marmont to Eugene, 7
July 1810.

/
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wall there by 150 yards to give greater protection to
ships riding at anchor.
In spite of Eugene's expectations that the
Rivoli and Regeneratore would be finished early in
1810, slowness on the part of the French treasury in
paying a 1,700,000 franc credit which Italy had on the
French navy delayed the project.

In reporting this to

Napoleon, Eugene remarked that the launching of the
two frigates at Venice could not be accomplished until
March 1811 because the dredging of St. Mark's canal
had been slowed as a result of hard dirt.^1
This report did not particularly impress
Napoleon, for he ordered that the Rivoli, the Regeneratore, and the Mont-Saint-Bernard be launched in Febru
ary and sent to Ancona to be armed.
under the escort of five frigates.

They should be
At the same time

the Emperor ordered that two more frigates be put on
the blocks and demanded to know why two more previously
ordered were not under construction.^

4-1

,

Eugene, Memoires. VI, 372-376, Eugene to
Napoleon, 2 September j.810.
42

___
Napoleon, Correspondence, XXI, 190, Napoleon

to Eugene, 6 October l6l6•
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Napoleon, in April 1811, wrote Eugene that he
had received his "state of the navy," and noted that
the Rivoli and the Regeneratore would he complete by
August.

He ordered the Viceroy to send them to rendez

vous with the escort ships the Boulogne and the Uranie
at Malomocco.

Prom that point the ships should proceed

to either Ancona or Pola to he armed.^

Rue to the

shallowness of the Venetian pass it would he necessary
to utilize piontoons to float the ships over the bar.
By July the vessels lay in the water, and Napoleon re
peated the order.^
In July 1811 there were three ships under con
struction at Venice, each in the 3/24th stage of com
pletion.

Resperate for shipping, the Emperor ordered

work stopped on two ships and all efforts concentrated
on the third.

The same order carried instructions to
43
complete three additional ships by the end of 1812. v
To this order Eugene replied on 24 July that
such an amount of building could not be done at Venice

because of a shortage of labor.

Napoleon rejected this

43

1811.

Ibid., XXII, 55, Napoleon to Eugene, 11 April
The Boulogne and the Uranie were French ships.
44

1811.

Ibid., 332-333, Napoleon to Eugene, 15 July
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complaint.

He wrote the Viceroy that labor could be

gained by conscription if necessary.
The real problem
4-6
would be obtaining iron and wood.
Eugene*s feeling
may have been more correct than Napoleon’s, for in
spite of the fact that naval construction personnel
was gained in Italy through conscription, Napoleon
sent men and officers from Toulon, the Roman depart
ments of the French Empire, Illyria, and Tuscany in
order to place crews on the Rivoli and the Mont-SaintBernard.

47

'

Though Napoleon and Eugene had thought the
Rivoli, the Regeneratore. and the Mont -Saint —Be m a r d
would be in action in mid-summer of 1811, they were
still at Venice at the end of the year.^®
did not leave there until early 1812.

The Rivoli

The time was

inauspicious, and this ship, a precious seventy-four
gun addition to the French battle fleet, was captured
by the British while sailing for Pola to be armed.
Napoleon laid the blame for the loss of the ship
squarely on Eugene, accusing him of negligence in not

46

Ibid., 359-360, Napoleon to Eugene, 29 July

1811.
^ Ibid., 362, Napoleon to Eugene, 31 July 1811.
48

'
___

Ibid., XXIII, 131, Napoleon to Eugene, 29 De
cember 181X7
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going to Venice to oversee the sailing, not waiting
for reports from couriers to Pola and packet boats,
and in sending the ship alone.

He frostily demanded

that Eugene read his mail more carefully.

AQ

In another

letter of the same day Napoleon wrote his stepson not
to be discouraged by the loss of the Rivoli, but to
send the Regeneratore, the Mont-Saint-Bernard. the
Castiglione. and the Princess of Bologna to Malomocco,
and to build more pontoons in order to be able to send
more than one ship at a time out of the Venetian
harbor.

He added this note:
When the time comes to send these
vessels to Ancona, I will send a
division of vessels which will
render me master of the Adriatic.
While awaiting it, the English
will be obliged to hold a few
vessels in the Adriatic.50
The last announced launching at Venice occurred

on 2 August 1812, with the launching of the Castiglione.
the Reale Italiano. and the Piave.

The first two were

men-of-war and the last was a brig.'*'*'

^ I b i d . , 281, Napoleon to Eugene, 3 March 1812.
80

Ibid., Napoleon to Eugene, 3 March 1812.

81
Moniteur, 11 August 1812. This announcement
indicates ihat Napoleon was thinking far in advance of
realities in March when he wrote the Viceroy to send
the Castiglione to Malomocco.
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The effectiveness of the Italian naval effort
is extremely difficult to determine.

The announcements

of naval affairs carried in the Moniteur all smack of
52
propaganda,
and one should hesitate before placing
much faith in them.
Between 1806 and 1812 the Venetian shipyards
provided at least seven ships of the line, eight
frigates, six brigs, two corvettes, two sloops, five
packet boats, and an undetermined number of gunboats
and other small craft.

The determinable total of

fighting ships produced at Venice thus stands at twentyfive.

Eugene's naval power, however, was not great

enough to sweep the British from the Adriatic.

Indeed,

the evidence indicates that the Viceroy found it diffi
cult to hold his own and protect his shores and
shipping.

Napoleon found it necessary to send sorely

needed French ships to the Adriatic.

After 1812 the

Italian navy became increasingly insignificant•

As a

result, invasion of Italy by British-transported
Austrian troops was a relatively easy task in 1813.

52Infra. 253-255

CHAPTER IX
ITALIAN MILITARY CONTRIBUTIONS
Though Italy made substantial contributions to
the campaigns fought by Napoleon in 1806 and later, her
contribution to the campaign of 1805 was not great, for
to all intents and purposes there was no Italian army
at that time.

The army commanded by Marshal Massena

in Italy and Austria consisted primarily of French
units, though there were a few scattered Italian con
tingents serving under his command.1

A few Italians

also made the campaign in Germany with Napoleon, but
their number was negligible.

2

Italy*s greatest contributions in 1805 con
sisted of the reports made by the Yiceroy to the
Emperor concerning Austrian movements and troop numbers

1Eugene, Memoires. I, 276 ff.
2
Napoleon, Correspondance♦ XI, 70, 151-152,
169-170, Napoleon to Eugene, 7 August 1805? Napoleon
to Berthier, 28 August 1805; Napoleon to Eugene, 31
August 1805.
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on the Italian frontiers,

3

and the formation of a

national guard to protect Italy from a possible in
vasion in December of that year*^
During the next year Italy became more valuable
to Napoleon*

In 1806 Eugene continued to provide
e
information on the movements of Austria,
and his de

velopment of fortifications between the Isonzo and the
Mincio rivers provided a buffer zone which would hold
an invading army from the eastern boundaries of France
g
no inconsiderable length of time.
In addition the
conscription of the year 1806 provided Italian soldiers
for the battlefield, and the training directed by the
Viceroy made Italian troops capable of holding their
own in a campaign*

■^Eugene, Memoires. I. 202, 241-242, 246, 254257, 589, 422-427, 4 5 1 - U 4 , 446, 447, 450, 452, Eugene
to Napoleon, 17 July 1805; 9, 17, and 24 August 1805;
24 September 1805; 18, 19, 20, and 25 October 1805; 2,
4, 6, 7, 9, 11, 13, 15, 19, 20, and 22 November 1805*
^Supra, 116*
5
*
^Eugene, Memoires, II, 225, Eugene to Napoleon,
11 April 1806; III, 35-45, 228-230, Eugene to Napoleon,
19 December 1806; Napoleon, Correspondance, XI, 560,
Napoleon to Eugene, 27 January 1806* I h e c i t e d letters
of Eugene are only representative of the reports made
by the Viceroy in 1806,

^Supra, 126 ff.
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When Napoleon moved against Prussia in October
1806, Italian units served in every major engagement.

7

After initial Prussian defeat in October, French, occu
pation forces at Berlin had Italians in their midst.
But King Frederick William III of Prussia refused to
accept the defeat of Prussian arms in October as a
final action in the defense of his realm.

He there

fore withdrew his remaining forces into East Prussia
and continued the hopeless struggle.

Italian units

participated in the campaign in East Prussia and
8
9
Poland, and aided in the capture of Danzig.

n

'Eugene, Memoires, III, 165, Eugene to Napoleon,
9 September 1806; Napoleon, Correspondence, XIII, 162,
Napoleon to Berthier, 10 September 1866; 166-68, 231232, 264, Napoleon to Dejean, 10, 20, and 24 September
1806; 301, Napoleon to Berthier, 1 October 1806; 383,
Napoleon to Dejean, 22 October 1806; 408-409, 448-449,
Napoleon to Eugene, 5 and 31 October 1806; 479-480,
Napoleon to Lagrange, 5 November 1806.
8Eugene, Memoires. Ill, 200-201. 216-217, 230233, Eugene to Napoleon, II November 1866; 4, 21, and
25 December 1806; Napoleon, Correspondence, XIII, 476478, Napoleon to Eugene, 4 November 1806; XIV, 8-9,
154-155, 160-161, Napoleon to Eugene, 1 December 1806;
6, 7 January 1807; 150-151, Napoleon to Dejean, 5
January 1807; 573-575, Napoleon to General Lacuee,
30 March 1807; XT, 40, Napoleon to Marshal Adolphe
Mortier, 6 April 1807; 197-199, 216, Napoleon to
Eugene, 6 and 10 May 1807; 220, Napoleon to General
Henri-Jacques-Guillaume Clarke, 14 May 1807.
^Napoleon, Correspondence. XIV, 185-187, Na
poleon to Berthier, 13 January 1807; 193-194, 304,
Napoleon to Eugene, 14 January 1807; XT, 166-167, 169170, Napoleon to Berthier, 29 April 1807; 221, Napoleon
to Marshal Jean Lannes, 14 May 1807; 355, Napoleon to
General Clarke, 21 June 1807.
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Though. Eussia in 1805 had been a member of the
Third Coalition, for all practical purposes she had
withdrawn from it following the defeat at Austerlitz.1 ^
However, in the- summer of 1806 Eussia and Prussia con
cluded a defensive a l l i a n c e F r e n c h action against
Frederick William III drew Eussia into the war-

Eus-

sian involvement with Turkey prevented Alexander I
from sending troops to succor the Prussian king until
after Napoleon had advanced into Poland.

The Eussians,

in November 1806, crossed the Niemen Eiver.

This

action on the part of Eussia led to a winter campaign
which lasted into the next year.

12

In 1807 Italian cavalry and infantry con
tributed heavily to the forces which defeated the

10

Eose, Napoleon I . II, 38; Geoffrey Brunn,
Europe and the French Imperium (The Else of Modern
Europe 1 ed. William L. h a n g e r / N e w York* Harper”&
Eow, 1938^), 119(Hereafter cited as Brunn, French
Impe riumT.
■'"^'Brunn, French Imperium, 122; Eose, Napoleon
I, II, 86.
12

Brunn, French Imperium, 123-125.
But see
Eose, Napoleon I . II, 83. Eose contends Eussia was
slow in coming to the aid of Prussia because Alexander
I had no confidence in Frederick William III.

190

Russians at Prussich-Eylau and Friedland.

The victory

at Friedland led directly to the negotiation of peace
between Napoleon and Emperor Alexander I of Russia.
Italian forces were present among the troops of the
Grand Army while the Emperor negotiated the Treaty of
Tilsit ending the campaign of 1806-1807.^
In addition to serving in the Prussian and
East Prussian campaigns, many Italians, in 1806 and
1807, served under the command of General Jacques Law
Lauriston, General Gabriel-Jean-Joseph Molitor, and
General Marmont in the effort made by the French to
force Russia to evacuate the mouth of the Cattaro River
on the Dalmatian coast.

Italian troops also aided in

the seizure of the Republic of Ragusa.1^
Besides providing troops in 1806 for Napoleon's

13
Napoleon, Correspondance. IV, 331, Napoleon
to Marshal Lannes, 13 June 1807; 340-341, Bulletin of
the Grand Army, 17 June 1807. Prussich-Eylau was a
Pyrrhic victory. Napoleon claimed the victory solely
because Russian forces withdrew from the field during
the night. Both sides suffered heavily.
^ Ibid., 375-376, Napoleon to Eugene, 27 June
1807; Moniteur. 27 July 1807.
^Napoleon, Correspondance. XII, 491, 501-502,
521-523, Napoleon to Eugene,
and’ 28 June 1806; 8 July
1806; Eugene, Memoires, II, 418-420, Eugene to Napoleon,
3 June 1806.
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armies in Germany, Poland and Dalmatia, Eugene had at
Naples a considerable detachment of troops which from
time to time required replenishing.

The Viceroy also

provided the infantry and cavalry occupation forces for
the island of Elba.1 ^
The need to keep these units up to strength,
plus Napoleon’s demands for men drained Eugene's man
power pool, and on one occasion the Viceroy reported to
Napoleon that 600 conscripts could not be sent to the
Grand Army simply because they were not available.

18

By the end of the year Eugene had to send ad
ditional cavalry units to bolster the forces of the
Emperor in East Prussia.

Unable to meet the Emperor's

demands from his own units, the Viceroy took cavalry
from the 2nd corps of the Grand Army, which was
stationed in Friuli as a corps of observation.

19

Napoleon, Correspondance♦ XII, 52, Napoleon
to Eugene, 19 February 1806; 249-^50, Napoleon to
Joseph, 31 March 1806; XIV, 35, 42* Napoleon to Eugene,
5, 7, December 1806.
17

Eugene, Memoires. II, 266, Eugene to Na
poleon, 30 April 1806.
~
18Ibid., III, 216-217, Eugene to Napoleon,
4 December 1 8 b £ .

■^Napoleon, Correspondance. XIV, 190-191, Na
poleon to Dejean, 5 JanuaryI 867; 194-195, Napoleon to
Eugene, 6 January 1807.
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During the Peninsular war Italian units served
with French forces in Spain until the French were forced
out of that country in 1813.

20

During all the campaigns mentioned above, Eugene
remained in Italy administering the state and providing
for the state*s defense by provisioning forts and organ
izing additional units.

The lack of military activity

during these years irked the Viceroy, and he often com
plained to Napoleon about being confined to his office.
Nevertheless, he accepted his role, however reluctantly,
and continued with less glorious, albeit just as im
portant, tasks.

The Viceroy provisioned his forts, de

veloped a navy, and established a viable transportation
system.
Not the least of Eugene*s duties in 1808 and
early 1809 was the gathering and reporting of information
on the activities of Austria.

For some time the Viceroy

had been convinced that the pretensions of Austrian
friendliness were unfounded in fact and reported his

20

Eugene, Memoires, IV, 226-228, Eugene to Na
poleon, 24- October 1808; V, 397-398, Eugene to Napoleon,
26 September 1810; Napoleon, Correspondance«.XVII« 326,
435* Napoleon to Eugene, 20 June 1808 and 10 August 1808;
XVIII, 128-129, Napoleon to Eugene, 16 December 1808;
XXI, 161-162, Napoleon to Eugene, 1 October 1810;
Beauhamais Archive, Eugene to the Minister of War of
the empire, 5 July 1808 and 23 September 1808; Eugene to
Berthier, 30 July 1808; Eugene to the Minister of War of
the kingdom, 19 January 1809.
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feelings to the Emperor*

21

When his suspicions were

proven true in 1809 , he received the reward for which
he had yearned so long— active command in the field in
the support of his stepfather*
Napoleon, in making preparation for the campaign
of 1809, warned the Viceroy to make his troop dispo
sitions carefully and quietly lest Austria become
alarmed at the preparations being made on her south
western border.

Eugene suggested gathering his troops

and going into camp in March, but Napoleon vetoed this
suggestion*

He told the Viceroy it was too cold, and

besides there was nothing to fear as yet; April would be
soon enough.

Eugene demurred’, but accepted and followed

the Emperor's directions*

22

As a result of Eugene’s following the Emperor’s
directives the Italian army was badly scattered early
in 1809*

In order not to alarm Austria the permanent

Italian summer training camps along the Italo-Austrian
border were manned by normal peace-time garrison
numbers.

This number, approximately 900 men per bat

talion, was only half of normal war strength.

In

^ E u g e n e , Memoires, IV, 355-356, Napoleon to
Eugene, 1 March 1809*
22

Napoleon, Oorrespondance. XVIII, 292, 298299t Napoleon to Eugene, ^7 February and 1 March 1809;
Eugene, Memoires. IV, 365-366, Eugene to Napoleon, 8
March 1809.
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addition Eugene gathered his cavalry some seventy-five
miles west of the Italo-Austrian-"border "behind the
23
Adige Elver.
In the event of attack, which Eugene
feared, his inadequate infantry forces would "be at a
distinct disadvantage, for they would "be pitted against
vastly superior numbers supported by cavalry.

Should

the Viceroy*s units break under an Austrian onslaught,
without cavalry to provide a screen and reconnaissance
duty, regrouping would be almost impossible.
The Viceroy spent most of the month of March
1809 ahorse visiting the eastern borders and directing
troop encampments.. Early in April, still unprepared to
face an attack, Eugene left Milan to take command of
the army in the field
While making his own preparations, Eugene di
rected the preparations of General Marmont*s troops in
Dalmatia.

The Viceroy warned Marmont to exercise un

common care to avoid giving Austria alarm for the safety
of her borders touching Dalmatia.

Italy supplied the

Dalmatian forces with artillery, ammunition, and the
necessary manpower so that Marmont, acting in concert

2^Eugene, Memoires. IV, 298-299.

2^Ibid.. 300-301; Beauharnais Archive, Marmont
to Eugene, 19 March 1809.
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with Eugene's own forces, would he able to force Austria
25
to disperse troops over as great an area as possible.
The spring of 1809 was an unusually wet one,
and cavalry contingents west of the Adige were ef
fectively cut off from the Viceroy's infantry when the
Austrians invaded Italy on 10 April under the command
of the Archduke John.

26

The Viceroy was at Udine when

the invasion occurred, and he immediately began ordering
the dispersed Italian units to the rear.
ment cost him time and territory.

27

This move

Hot wanting to give

up the Piave River, Eugene gave battle to the Austrians
at Sacile on 16 April and suffered defeat.

His troops
28

left the field in complete disarray and disorganization.
Ten days later Eugene fought again, but this

25

__

Napoleon, Correspondance. XVIII, 552, 356358, Napoleon to Eugene, 14 and 16 March 1809; Eugene,
Memoires, IV, 274, 420, 446-449» Eugene to Napoleon,
3 and 12 April 1809; B e a u h a m a i s Archive, Marmont to
Eugene, 24 and 29 March 1809.
26

B e a u h a m a i s Archive, Eugene to Marmont,
18 April 1809.
2^Ibid., Eugene to Marmont, 11 April 1809*
Eugene, Memoires, IV, 441-442, Eugene to Napoleon,
10 April 1809.
28

Eugene, Memoires. V, 134-138, Eugene to
Napoleon, 14 and 17 April 1809*
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time lie had his cavalry with him and he won the day.

29

The forces commanded by the Viceroy consisted of some
60,000 men.

Approximately half of the Viceroy’s forces

were Italian, and the remainder were French.

They were
30
well horsed, well clothed, and well supplied.
After
the initial debacle, which cannot be laid to a lack of
valor on their part, the troops commanded by Eugene
fought well and, in the main, successfully.
By 3 May Beauhamais told Marmont, who had been
active on the Dalmatian border, to take the offensive
31
in that area.
Marmont*s entry into the campaign was
more impressive than Eugene’s; his. men captured 500
prisoners on the first day they crossed the Austrian
frontier.^
During the month of May the Viceroy’s troops
fought their way through the C a m i c Alps and made
junction with the. Grand Army late that month.

Eugene’s

29

Ibid., 149-153; Beauhamais Archive, Eugene
to General Clarke, 23 April 1809; Eugene to General
Baraguey-d’Hilliers, 23 and 25 April 1809.
30
Ibid., IV, 9, 368; Napoleon, Correspondance,
XVIII, 356-358, Napoleon to Eugene, 16 l^arcii 1809.
31
Beauhamais Archive, Eugene to Marmont,
3 May 1809.
32

Ibid., Marmont to Eugene, 5 May 1809.
Marmont*s figures should not be taken too seriously.
Like the other generals, he often padded his figures
unless directly under Napoleon’s observation.
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forces then made up the right wing of the Grand Armyand moved into the Hungarian plain. 33
In Hungary Eugene was still faced "by the
Austrian Archduke John, whose troops were by this time
sadly depleted.

While Eugene pursued Archduke John,

Napoleon seized Vienna, and Archduke Charles prepared
to give battle to the French.
to Charles* aid.

John attempted to come

In an effort to prevent John from

joining Charles, Eugene forced a battle at Saab, and
34
won.
John, unable to cross the Raab River, retreated
down the Danube toward Komorn, where a bridge provided
facilities for crossing to the north side.

If John

crossed the Danube at Komorn, he could shortly join
Charles north and west of Vienna.

Eugene, in an effort

to destroy the bridge and thus prevent J o h n ’s crossing,
floated millwheels and boats laden w ith rock against
the bridge piling and bombarded the bridge with heavy
artillery.
Komorn.

The Viceroy failed, and John crossed at

If Eugene had succeeded, John would have been

forced to cross the Danube at Euda, a far greater
distance from Vienna.

33
Napoleon, Correspondance. XIX, 47-49, N a 
poleon to Bernadotte, 27 May 1809; Napoleon to
Josephine, 27 May 1809; Napoleon to Eugene, 27 May 1809.

54Ibid., 70, 80-82, 84, 98-99, 115-116, Na
poleon to Eugene, 3, 7, 11, and 16 June 1809.
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Eugene remained at Raab, reconnoitered the
country, and established a strong defensive line
there. 35 While he was at Raab, Napoleon called him to
*56
Vienna.
The Viceroy arrived just in time to partici
pate in the battle of Wagram.

The Italian army arrived

at the battle scene on the night of 4 July at 11 p.m.
and took part in the crossing of the Danube which oc
curred at 2 a.m., 5 July.

In the fight at Enzerdorf,

where the crossing of the Danube was made, Eugene per
formed adequately, and the next day at Wagram his army
formed the second line of attack behind Marshal LouisNicholas Davout's corps. "57 Following the battle of
Wagram Napoleon used Eugene's cavalry to pursue the
Austrian army along the March River, and Eugene had occasion to visit the battlefield at Austerlitz.
While Napoleon negotiated peace with Austria

35

Ibid., 173-176, 186, Napoleon to Eugene, 25,
26, and 28 June 1809; Moniteur. 2 July 1809.
2

fT

Napoleon, Correspondance. XIX, 186-187, 195197, 203-204, 211, Napoleon to Eugene, 28 and 29 June
1809; 1 and 3 July 1809.
^ Ibid.. 205-208, 217, Napoleon to Josephine,
7 July 18097
58Ibid., 221, 224-234, Napoleon to Eugene, 7
and 9 July 18i)9. The pursuit did not begin until the
day after the battle. Eugene’s cavalry had no sig
nificant brushes with the enemy.
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after tiie battle of Wagram, the Italian army occupied
Carinthia and Carniola and engaged in putting down an
uprising in the Bavarian Tyrol.

Laibach, Klagenfurt,

Graz— all the strong places of the former Austrian
39
territory— felt the tread of Italian soldiers.
After
the peace of Schonbrunn, which ended the campaign, the
Viceroy became the administrator of the areas ceded to
Prance by the treaty.
Buring Eugene*s absence from Italy the ad
ministration of the kingdom was in the hands of his
wife, Augusta-Amelia, and according to the editor of
E u g e n e fs Memoires she accomplished the task with
ability.^

The only area in which she had no control

was the administration of the army.

In June, after the

junction of the Italian and French armies, General
Francesco Caffarelli was sent to Milan by Napoleon to
4-1
administer the Italian army.
The years 1810 and 1811 were quiet ones for

•^I b i d . . 241, 245, 262, Napoleon to Eugene,
13, 14, and 17 July 1809; Eugene, M e moires. VI, 40,
49, Napoleon to Eugene, 13 and 24 July; 5T, Eugene to
Augusta, 15 October 1809.
^ E u g e n e , M emoires. V, 133, 303-304, Eugene
to Augusta, 12 April 1809*
^ I b i d . . 303-304; N a p o l e o n , C o r r e s p o n d a n c e ,
XIX, 125, N a p o l e o n to C a f f a r e l l i , 17 June 1809; ^ 26 ,
N a p o l e o n to Eugene, 9 A u g u s t 1809*
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i

the Viceroy as far as military action was concerned*
The only Italian units which saw active fighting duty
1Q

were those in Spain.

But early in 1811 Napoleon in

structed Eugene to prepare to take the Italian army to
Germany by May if necessary. 43 The Emperor also in
structed the Viceroy that his active army should total
50,000 men plus 30,000 infantry which should remain in
Italy.^
It did not become necessary to take Italian
troops to Germany, but the attitude of Russia caused
the Emperor to plan action against Emperor Alexander I.
As a result, 1811 and early 1812 were months of feverish
organizational activity in Italy.

The army the Viceroy

prepared in 1811 did not consist entirely of Italians;
as a matter of fact, it was two-thirds non-Italian.
The non-Italian units were largely French, but contained
some Spanish units, some Hanoverian troops, a regiment
of troops from Illyria, and two Croatian battalions.^

__
Napoleon, Correspondance. XXII, 294, Na
poleon to Eugene, 29 June 1811.
42

^ Ibid.. 77, Napoleon to Eugene, 17 April 1811.
44

__
Ibid.. XXIII, 86-88, Napoleon to Eugene,
16 December 1811.

*5Ibid.
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Napoleon, in December, told Eugene he should
reach the Vistula with 38,000 fighting men.

Service

troops would swell that number to 50,000.
At the same time Napoleon informed the Viceroy
that it was necessary to number the divisions of the
Grand Army and designated Eugene*s divisions as the
13th, 14th, and 15th d i v i s ions.^

If it did nothing

else, this administrative reform made it much easier
for the Department of War to keep track of troops in
action.
A short while later the Emperor told the
Viceroy it would be necessary to buy a "great quantity"
of hard liquor to be stored at Magdeburg.

He told

Eugene to buy 1,500 thirty-gallon barrels of liquor
and send it to the central storage point.

The 9th

transport was to haul 1,200 barrels of the liquor and
Italian civilians the rest.

The liquor would be trans

ported from Magdeburg to the Vistula by canal.

In the

letter Napoleon asked if Italian liquor was as good as
French cognac, how plentiful it was, how much it cost,
and above all how much could be bought in Italy.

At

the end of the letter he noted that there was much
foreign foodstuff in Milan and asked if it might not be
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possible to hire the wagoners who hauled in foodstuffs
47
to haul liquor back to Germany.
The movement of the army toward Russia began
in the third week of February 1812, and the Brenner
Pass had to be cleared of snow by the sappers. 48 The
Viceroy did not accompany the army when it left Italy,
and Marshal Junot commanded in his absence.
Napoleon ordered the Viceroy to spend a month
in Paris and join his troops at Glogau at the end of
March. 49^ After his arrival at Glogau, Eugene was at
the head of his wing of the invading army.

From the

plains of Poland to Moscow, the Viceroy commanded the
left wing of the Grand Army.^

Napoleon added the

troops of the Bavarian army to Eugene’s command, which
then consisted of the 4th and 6th corps of the Grand
51
Army, totaling some 80,000 men.

47

Ibid., 132, Napoleon to Eugene, 29 December

1811.
^ I b i d ., 197, 215-216, Napoleon to Eugene,
29 January 1812; 8 February 1812.
^ Ibid.. 219-220, Napoleon to Eugene, 10
February 1812.
50

1812.

Ibid., 481-483, Napoleon to Eugene, 10 June

51rbid., 346-347.
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possible to hire the wagoners who hauled in foodstuffs
47
to haul liquor back to Germany.
The movement of the army toward Russia began
in the third week of February 1812, and the Brenner
I&ss had to be cleared of snow by the sappers. 48 Eugene
did not accompany the army when it left Italy, and
Marshal Junot commanded in his absence.
Napoleon ordered the Viceroy to spend a month
in Paris and join his troops at Glogau at the end of
49
March. J After his arrival at Glogau, Eugene was at
the head of his wing of the invading army.

From the

plains of Poland to Moscow, Eugene commanded the left
wing of the Grand Army.

Napoleon added the troops of

the Bavarian army to Eugene's command, which then con
sisted of the 4th and 6th corps of the Grand Army,
totaling some 80,000 men.^1

^ Ibid.. 132, Napoleon to Eugene, 29 December
1811.
48

Ibid., 197, 215-216, Napoleon to Eugene,
29 January 1812; 8 February 1812.
^ Ibid.. 219-220, Napoleon to Eugene, 10
February 1812•
50

1812.

Ibid.. 481-483, Napoleon to Eugene, 10 June

51Ibid., 346-347.
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Eugene's Italians fought well in the one major
battle on the route to Moscow.

There is nothing to

indicate their collective behavior in Moscow.

However,

on the retreat from Russia, Eugene's forces fought
savagely at Smolensk, Viasma, Krasnoi, Malo-Jaroslavetz,
53
and the Beresina.
As the rest of the Grand Army in Russia, the
Italians froze, starved, and were killed.

Eugene and

his men went where they were ordered to go and did what
they were ordered to do.

Most of them died doing their

duty; he brought back to Smorgoni approximately 5»000
of the 50,000 men he had led from Italy.

Of the Italian
54contingent, there remained 121 officers and 112 men.
After the retreat from Moscow in 1812, the Italian army
(with the exception of the troops left as a defense for,
Italy in case of need) to all intents and purposes no
longer existed.
Peeling his services no longer needed, Eugene
requested on 5 December 1812 that he be allowed to

•^Sloane, Napoleon. Ill, 344-.
53Ibid., 362.

3^Weil, Eugene et Murat. I, 2-3.
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CC
Napoleon refused the request, ^placed

Joachim Murat in command of the remnants of the Grand
56
Army, and left for Paris to raise another force.
Murat, soon overcome by the hopelessness of the situation, deserted his command and returned to Naples. 57
Thereupon Napoleon appointed Eugene commander of the
58
Grand Army.
As commander of the Grand Army, the Viceroy
fought a masterly retreat across northern Germany in
January and February 1813.

Every foot of territory he

gave up was gained by the enemy only after a stubborn
contest, and each day Eugene delayed the descent of the
Russians and Prussians upon west central Europe gave
Napoleon another desperately needed twenty-four hours
59
to gather his new army.
Napoleon returned to the Grand Army with fresh
soldiers in April 1813.

Eugene commanded a portion of

■^Napoleon, Correspondance, XXIV, 338-339,
Napoleon to Eugene, 5 December 1812.
56Ibid.
57
^'Ibid., 430, Napoleon to Eugene, 23 January
1813.

58Ibid.
*^Weil, Eugene et Murat, I, 2.
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the new army and contributed significantly to the
victory at Eutzen in early May.

But the eastern flank

of Prance was now exposed to possible invasion, and
Napoleon ordered the Viceroy back to Italy to build a
.
60
new Italxan army.
Manpower did not constitute the only contri
bution made by the Kingdom of Italy to Napoleon's
military adventures.

Wars are not fought by men alone—

money and supplies are also needed.

This portion of

Italy's contribution to the military effort is more
difficult to determine than her contribution in the
form of soldiers and officers, but it is possible to
make some observations.
Italy contributed 50,000,000 livres annually
to the upkeep of the Grand Army.
represents a significant sum;

This amount alone

additional contributions

from Venetian cities make Italy's monetary support very
important
The value of supplies furnished to the Grand
Army by Italy is even more difficult to determine.
Eugene's letters to Napoleon contain scattered refer
ences to the supplies provided by Italy for French

60Ibid., 1.

^ Supra. 150.
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armies, but such, references are confined to the early
years.

For example, in 1806 Eugene reported to the

Emperor that in the previous campaign Italy had sup
plied all the replacement gun carriages for the Grand
Army and had supplied six million artillery cartouches
while France had supplied only two million. 62 In
addition, Italy supplied all the food and shelter for
the Army of Italy in the campaign of 1805 and was re
sponsible for all hospital services for the French in
Italy.63
Though the evidence is scanty, it indicates
that Italy was important to Napoleon for reasons other
than the number of men she could put in the field.

It

is simply another indication that the wars in which
Napoleon engaged cost the satellite countries heavily.
According to M. H. Weil, Italy was more important to
Napoleon than any of the other countries with which he

6?
Eugene, Memoires. II, 250-252, Eugene to
Napoleon, 25 April 1806. While cartouche translates as
cartridge, the artillery cartouche was not a cartridge
or shell in the normal sense of the word. The cartouche
was a bag of powder, pre-measured at the point of m a n u ~
facture in the correct amount to propel a given pro
jectile a given distance. The infantry received such
measured amounts of powder for muskets also.
£•2

Ibid.. 149-155. Eugene to Napoleon, 11 March
1806; Eugene~?Tarle, Le blocus continental et le royaume
d fItalie (Pariss Librairie Felix Alcan, 1928), 27.
(Hereafter cited as Tarle, le blocus continental).
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s urrounded himself*

She provided more m e n for his

armies, more cash for his w a r chest, and a greater
degree of security f o r France than any other single
Napole onic state.

64

^ W e i l , Eugene et Murat, I, 1-5

CHAPTER X
CULTURAL DEVELOPMENT
Educational reform was one of the important
policies of the French in Italy, and under Napoleon*s
direction Eugene "began to apply the French system of
education in the kingdom,,

Napoleon instructed Eugene

to transform the University of Pavia into a military
school and to organize it in the same fashion as the
military school at Fontainebleau.

Also, the uni

versities of Pavia and Bologna should each have a chair
of military engineering, fortification, and tactics.
The holder of the military chair would have the function
of an adjutant-major.

Napoleon further instructed the

Viceroy to form a student battalion at the University
of Pavia, to be composed of two companies consisting of
one sergeant major, four sergeants, eight corporals,
and eighty soldiers.

Napoleon gave Eugene the authority

to name a battalion commander who would have the re
sponsibility of policing the battalion.

Each military

student would enroll in a company, and all military
students would wear a uniform prescribed by the govern
ment.

In addition to classroom work, Napoleon required
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the university to offer one hour of calisthenics daily
and each military student to spend four hours each
Sunday on military exercises*"*"
On 13 June 1805, Eugene wrote Napoleon that he
had given the Minister of Education, Pietro Moscati,
orders to present plans for the reorganization of
Italian schools*

Moscati had expressed the desire to

go to Prance to study the system of public instruction
in order to bring Italy*s public instruction into line
2
with that in Prance*
Napoleon refused to approve this
request of Moscati, telling Eugene that Moscati could
get all the information he needed from the Bulletin des
lois and that he could come to Prance at a more oppor3
tune time*
Whether Moscati ever made the trip to
study the French education system is not recorded*
Public schools and certain technological insti
tutions were established in 1805*

A veterinary school

and a school of "equitation" were founded in Milan in
August of that year*

The latter was for the benefit of

^Napoleon, Correspondance * X, 517, Napoleon to
Eugene, 12 June 1805•
O
Eugene, Memoires. I, 139-140, Eugene to Na
poleon, 13 June 1865•
3

^Napoleon, Correspondance« X, 526-527, Napoleon
to ^Eugene, 14 June 1865•
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officers and noncommissioned officers then serving in
the army, and the course of instruction was to last
eighteen months.

4

The only other reform in public education ac
complished in 1805 was the state assumption of the cost
of public instruction.
While at Bologna to review the national guard
being formed there, Eugene visited a school for girls
operated by Mme. Laugers and was so impressed with the
founder and the work she was doing that he named the
school the Maison Josephine and endowed it with 2,000
livres from his personal funds.

The school was to use

1,800 livres as scholarships for two poor but deserving
girls, and 200 as a prize in the form of books for the
best behaved and most able students.^
After the annexation of Tenetia to Italy, Eugene
apparently restricted the University of Padua rather
severely, for the Emperor wrote the Viceroy not to de
stroy the university but only to pare away its luxuries.

^Moniteur, 26 Thermidor. Year XIII (14 Ausust
1805).
^Ibid., 28 Pructidor, Year XIII (15 September

1805).
^Ibid., 3 January 1806.
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In the same communication Napoleon told his stepson
that he was occupied w ith the reorganization of public
instruction in Prance and that much of the new French
7
educational program would be applicable to Italy.
The government established a conservatory of
music at Milan on 1 April 1807, and later in the year
the announcement appeared in the Moniteur that the
state would establish another music conservatory in the
suppressed Convent of the Passion.

This conservatory

would accept eighteen male and six female students, all
of whom Eugene would choose, and supplies would be free.
The director of the school would be the music director
O
of La Seala Opera House in Milan.
Perhaps the most important special school in
Italy was the school of civil engineering established
in 1807.9
The reform of public education seems to have
achieved its greatest proportions in 1 8 0 7 °

An an

nouncement in April stated that Italy had established

7
'Napoleon, Correspondance. XII, 454, Napoleon
to Eugene, 10 June 1806•
o
Eugene, Memoires. Ill, 360; Moniteur. 16 Oc
tober 1807.
q

Moniteur. 28 January 1807.
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eight new lycees.

Six of the new schools were located

north of the Po; one each at Milan, Bergamo, Mantua,
Venice, Verona, and Novaro, and two south of the Po,1^
the locations of which were not given in the announce
ment •
Eugene, in 1808, established three additional
lycees in the newly annexed Papal Legations, one a
resident school at Urbino and the other two non-resident
schools at Fermo and at Macerata.

The Viceroy also

established a special school at Macerata.

11

Apparently there were no more schools es
tablished in Italy until 1811 when the Viceroy author
ized the municipalite of Trevino to establish three
secondary schoolso

It appears that the establishment

of the schools did not appeal too greatly to the popu
lation there, for the announcement of the establishment
of the institutions also carried the notice that parents
had received assurance that the promotion of children
from the elementary schools to the secondary level would
enable the students to do more easily the work demanded
%

in the lycees, colleges, and universities.

IP

10Ibid., 1 April 1807; Eugene, Memoires, III,
360.
^ Moniteur. 10 July 1808.
12Ibid., 23 January 1811.
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In 1811 Eugene established a free school of
design in Milan.

Students for the school came from the

'• ■./

public and private schools, and although merit consti
tuted the only requirement for attendance, the Minister
13
of Interipr appointed six students.
Thq final action in the field of education
taken by Eugene occurred in August 1813 when he es
tablished a school of applied chemistry at Milan and
named the chemist at the lycee in Urbino as Professor
of Chemistry.1 ^
It is impossible to determine the number of
students who took advantage of the educational oppor
tunities in Italy or to assess the impact of increased
educational opportunity on the state.

There.can be

little doubt that the public educational system in Italy
suffered from state control and poorly trained in
structors, for the only persons with teaching experience
were the clergy, who were barred from teaching in the
public schools.
The primary schools taught reading, writing, and
arithmetic.

The colleges offered classical languages

and the first principles of history and science.

•^Ibid., 22 January 1811
^ Ibid., 8 August 1813.

The
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curriculum of the lycees consisted of classical
languages, history, rhetoric, logic, elementary mathe
matics, and physical sciences.

Private institutions

instructed on the same level and within the same cur
riculum as the colleges.

The universities offered ad

vanced learning; the course of instruction was heavily
loaded with the sciences, hut not to the exclusion of
the arts.

It was at the university level that bacca-

laureat degrees, licentiates, and doctoral degrees were
IS

conferred. ^
In applying the educational system of Prance to
Italy, Eugene, in 1808, ordered the organization of a
National Institute in Milan.

The Institute was to be

composed of the faculties of the academies of Pavia,
Bologna, Yenice, and Padua.

Por membership in the

Institute a candidate was required to gain the support
of three-fourths of the academies.

"L6

Two years later

the name of the National Institute was changed to the
Institute of Sciences, Letters, and Arts.

The new

organization was located at Milan, with branches at
Yenice, Bologna, Padua, and Yerona.
the Institute was set at sixty.

The membership of

It had a general

15Ibid., 19 March 1808.
-|g

Napoleon, Correspondence, XVII, 156-157*
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secretary who had his residence at Milan and who corre
sponded with the Institute’s branches on all items con
cerning the work of the Institute.

He also corresponded

with Italian and foreign learned societies.

The consti

tution of the Institute required it to publish its acts
and provided that it hold a general assembly every two
years at Milan.

The Institute resident in Milan met

once monthly, and the member branches met every six
17
months.
At the same time all other learned societies
received the order to reorganize in such a fashion that
they would be represented by only one society in any
given town.
There is evidence that Eugene encouraged Italian
scientists to make efforts to advance Italy in a number
of fields.

In 1811 Giovanni Amici, an algebra teacher

at the lycee of Panaro, built an eight foot telescope,
which he presented to the Palace of Arts and Sciences
in Milan.

The instrument was of exceptional quality,

and the Viceroy was so impressed with what he learned
of the instrument that the builder received a govern
mental subsidy to finance the building of a larger one.
Eugene hoped this development indicated that Italy would

17

Moniteur, 15 January 1811.
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no longer “be dependent upon Germany for optical equip18
ment and astronomical instruments.
By December of
1811 Amici had completed the project subsidized by the
government.

The telescope presented in December was

seventeen feet long and eleven inches in diameter.
Italian astronomers announced that the polish of the
tube left nothing to be desired.

The astronomers re

ported they had been able to read the finest of charac
ters at a distance of 700 feet and that the marks
iq
between letters were quite clear.
Air science did not escape the attention of
Italian scientists during the viceroyalty.

In August

1808 a pair of intrepid balloonists, Pasquale Andreoli
and Brioschi made an ascent at Padua and observed their
reactions.

When the mercury stood at fifteen inches,

Brioschi noticed a stronger heartbeat than usual; he
fell asleep when the mercury stood at twelve inches.
When the mercury measured nine inches, Andreoli reported
that he experienced a feeling of total inflation and
lost the use of his left arm.

With the mercury at eight

and one-half inches the balloon burst and made a quite
rapid descent.

Both of the occupants escaped injury. 20

18Ibid., 26 May 1811.
^ I b i d . , 29 December 1811.
20

Ibid., 6 September 1808.

According to
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In May of 1812 a Bolognese balloonist made an
ascent of one and one-half miles and descended safe and
sound.

In this flight the crowd of onlookers lost sight

of the balloon for half an hour.

21

In September of 1812

Count Francesco Zambeccari announced that in the near
future he intended to direct a balloon while in flight.
The count had intended for some time to make the flight,
but it appears Italian balloonists had made certain
criticisms of his machine, for the count reported that
he had read the criticisms that had been made and had
corrected the "faults" of his apparatus.

22

Grood as his

word, the count attempted the flight on 25 September
1812, but his luck was bad.

On the first attempt at

ascent a leak developed in the balloon and delayed the
flight.

Having repaired the leak, he attempted the

flight a second time, but due to the wind and apparent
failure of his guidance apparatus the balloon drifted

Dr. Hulen B. Williams, Head of the Chemistry Department
at Louisiana State University, a measurement of eight
and one-half inches would indicate an ascent of about
seven and one-half miles.
21Ibid., 18 June 1812.
22

Ibid., 25 September 1812. The nature of the
"faults" and objections is not indicated in this report.
The Moniteur mistakenly refers to the balloonist as
Count Zambinari in this issue.
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into a tree.

His unnamed companion grabbed a tree

branch and abandoned the balloon, but Zambeccari, re
fusing to disappoint his public, remained in the basket
of the balloon.

The impact of the collision with the

tree broke the alcohol reservoir, and the burning alco
hol poured down upon Zambeccari.

According to the re

port, he fell from the balloon without benefit of
parachute, and burst when he landed. He lived about
p1
?
eighteen hours after the fall.
A little over a month
later an ex-monk claimed that he had discovered a method
to direct the ascent or descent of a balloon without the
use of valves or fire.

Marcheselli of Bologna intended

to use the method in his next ascension.^

There is no

available record of this flight.
The Continental System introduced by Napoleon
in his attempt to destroy English commerce demanded
that certain products formerly supplied through foreign
trade be produced upon the European continent.

Napoleon

hoped that at least two of the items could be produced
in Italy, and in 1810 the Emperor established a fund of
150,000 Italian livres to encourage cotton culture in

^ Ibid.. 9 October 1812; Enci 'edia Italiani
(36 vols.; Giovanni Treccani, 1929),
', 875.
24
Moniteur. 8 November 1812.
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Italy.

The program of increasing cotton production in

Italy came under the direction of the minister of the
interior.

It appears that Napoleon’s program did not
2C5
meet with too great success.
Italy experienced a greater degree of success
in a program of agricultural and scientific experimen
tation designed to discover a means of producing sugar.
Italians first experimented with fruits, particularly
raisins, in their search for a new and better source of
sugar.

In an effort to encourage experimentation, Na

poleon established a prize of 50,000 Italian livres to
be divided between the four establishments which propg
duced the most sugar from the raisin.
By December
1810, J. B. Sommariva of Milan perfected a method of
extracting a syrup, rather than sugar, from the raisin.
Sommariva claimed that the syrup was clear, odorless,
and of excellent quality.

The success of the method,

the Moniteur reported, was so great that the Viceroy
intended to introduce it throughout the kingdom, and
Sommariva intended to continue experiments with other
27
fruits such as figs and apples. ‘ In September 1811

^ Ibid.. 30 September 1810.
26Ibid.
^Ibid.,

5 January 1811.
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the report came from Sinigaglia that researchers there
had perfected a method of manufacturing sugar from
apples and pears which could he utilized for confection28
ary purposes and for the manufacture of liqueurs.
In spite of the success the Italians reported
in the manufacture of sugar from fruits, the sugar beet
became the principal source of sugar production.

Re

searchers perfected the refining process at Verona, and
established a water-powered refinery there.

The plant

was capable of processing 1,000 kilograms of sugar
beets in half an hour, and the sugar was of quality
equal to that derived from the cane of the islands.

29

As a reward for sugar production, Eugene decreed a
prize of 50,000 francs to be divided between the four
manufacturers who produced the most sugar from sugar
beets.

The prize was to be divided in proportion to

the amount of sugar produced.

In order to be eligible

for the prize a processor must process more than 4,000
pounds of sugar.

28Ibido, 25 September 1811.
29Ibid., 9 September 1811.
Ibid., 13 October 1811. The prizes established
by Napoleon and Eugene for the production of sugar are
identical with the exception of the amount of sugar re
quired to be eligible for the Viceroy’s prize.
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late in October 1811, Dr* Duigi Sacco, an emi
nent Italian physician, announced that he had discovered
a plant indigenous to Italy that produced a high-quality
sugar and yielded a very fine white flour in addition*
According to the doctor, the sugar yielded was superior
to any yet produced from any other vegetable source and
had the advantage of not requiring the addition of
foreign substances in the manufacturing process*

He re

ported that the plant could be produced any place in
agricultural Italy and that the manufacture of sugar
from the plant was neither expensive nor difficult•

He

intended to make the name of the plant known to the
public in short order*

His discovery created a great

deal of interest because of his devotion to truth and
public service.

The name of the plant, if Dr. Sacco

ever divulged it, did not gain publicity in the journals
of the French Empire.
The sheep raising industry also received at
tention.

In 1810 the Moniteur announced that wool pro

ducers of the districts bordering on Switzerland had
imported the merino sheep and had greatly increased wool

Z^id *, 16 November 1811; Enciclopedia Italiani*
XXX, 394. The Enciclopedia does not mention the search
for sugar in its article on Dr. Sacco.
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production as a result.

In addition, they had intro32
duced Spanish rams into their herds.
Evidence as to Eugene’s interest in public

health is more indirect than direct.

The Er. Sacco

mentioned in connection with the production of sugar
introduced the practice of vaccination against smallpox
in Italy and successfully rendered that service to each
of the Viceroy*s children within a few days after
birth.33
In 1809, in an effort to curb the incidence of
yellow fever and malaria, Eugene restricted the planting
of rice near cities and communes.

According to the

decree, rice fields must be at least 8,000 meters from
Milan, 5*000 meters from communes of the first class
and forts, 2,000 meters from second class communes, and
500 meters from third class communes.3^
Though Eugene’s letters to Napoleon give no indi
cation of his interest in scientific advance, journals
of the day often carried announcements of his visits to
fairs and exhibitions.

Typical of such reports is one

in the 28 August 1810 issue of the Moniteur announcing

32Moniteur, 7 July 1810.

394.

33Ibid., 2 June 1807; Enciclopedia Italian!, XXX,
“
3^Moniteur, 4 March 1809,
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that on 18 'August Eugene -visited the Palace of Arts and
Sciences with the Minister of Interior to see the ex
hibits.

While there he examined in detail all the items

produced by Italian manufacturers and expressed his
satisfaction with progress made.

Certain unspecified

items drew his particular attention, and he placed
orders for a number of articles for his own use.
One of the advances made in the Prench- Empire
in which Eugene showed particular interest was the tele
graph system introduced by Napoleon as early as 1805*
In 1810 the system connected Venice to Paris by way of
Milan.

Por non-confidential matters the telegraph

system was a boon to communications.

By 1810 Eugene

received within ten minutes replies to messages sent to
Turin, and received in one and one-quarter hours replies
to messages sent to Paris.

It required thirty minutes

to send a message to Venice and receive a reply.J
One item which receives little attention in the
Memoires of Prince Eugene is his attitude toward the
restoration of Italian national landmarks, and one must
again largely depend upon journals of the day for infor
mation.

Only one such item is recorded in the Moniteur.

35rbid., 28 August 1810
3^Ibid*, 23 August 1810
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and that reference is. very short*

It appears that in

mid-January 1811 Eugene received a silver model of the
mausoleum of King Theodoric from the commune of Bavenna
as a result of the Viceroy*s restoration of the tomb* 37
The church as well as the education system felt
the reforming hand of Beauharnais.

The church in the

Italian Eepublic functioned under a concordat arranged
by Cardinal Ercole Consalvi in 1803*

The Italian con

cordat was more friendly to the church than the con
cordat arranged by Bonaparte while he was Pirst Consul.
But Vice-President Melzi deprived the church of much of
the benefit of the Italian concordat by organic articles
applied soon after the concordat was arranged.

Though

the Italian concordat existed at the time of the es
tablishment of the kingdom, four days prior to his coro
nation as King of Italy Napoleon ordered that the Prench
concordat be extended to the Italian church.

■*q

It is

evident that he intended to take from the Italian church
freedoms not enjoyed by the church in Prance.

The

bishops and archbishops of the Italian church reportedly

^ Ibid., 29 January 1811 .
Eo E. Y. Hales, Napoleon and the Pope (Londons
Eyre and Spottiswoode, 1962). 53. (Hereafter cited as
Hales, Napoleon and the Pope).
-^Moniteur. 11 Prairial, Year XIII (31 May
1805).
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took on 2 June 1805 at Milan the oath to Napoleon pre4-0
scribed by the constitution.
Napoleon, on 22 May, issued a decree which
ordered that all cures, bishops, and archbishops render
an account of their incomes to the Minister of Religion
within ten days.

The decree provided that if members

of the clergy falsely lowered their income in the re
port, they would receive the income they c l a i m e d . I t
appears that the Minister of Religion made the reports
on income from vacant bishoprics, for the Viceroy re
ported to Napoleon in August 1805 that he had these
reports and recommended that they all be reduced to the
amount of the lowest, which was 20,000 livres.42

40Ibid., 21 Prairial, Year XIII (10 June 1805).
Probably the reference is to the imperial constitution*
for Italy did not have a constitution.
However, accu
racy in all things is not one of the virtues of the
Moniteur. and the fact that Italy had no constitution
does not necessarily rule out the possibility that the
article referred to the constitutional statutes.
The
announcement is not wholly true, for certain bishops
were arrested and taken to Milan before they took the
oath.

4-2
#
>.
Eugene, Memoires. I, 24-6-24-7, Eugene to Na
poleon, 17 August 1865 * The bishopric of Udine was one
of the vacancies listed, but since Udine was in Venetia
and under Austrian control in 1805, it seems unlikely
that Napoleon would be receiving a report on the income
of that bishopric. Probably this reference is to the
bishopric of Urbino.
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Whether the government received the reports of the
clergy when ordered is not recorded in either the of
ficial Correspondence or Eugene*s Memoires, and there
is no mention of it in the Beauhamais Archive«
One of the innovations introduced into Italy
provided for ecclesiastical salaries to "be paid twice
annually instead of each two months as had been done
under the Italian Republico

When this provision ap

peared in the Law of Finances in 1805, it caused oppo
sition to the law in the Council of State.

Eugene

wrote Napoleon asking him to pay ecclesiastical salaries
on a two-month or even a four-month basis rather than
every six months, stating that payment twice yearly
would undoubtedly cause hardship at the lower levels.
Also, Eugene feared that to force such a hardship on
the lower clergy would cause a great deal of resentment
and would lead to unnecessary difficulties.

4-5

In this

instance, at least, Eugene exhibited greater statesman
ship than Napoleon, for the latter insisted that sala
ries be paid the clergy as he had ordered.
Cardinals who enjoyed Italian citizenship re
ceived a stipend from the crown treasury, a right
established by a decree of 12 September 1805.

Article

^ Ibid., 147-148, Eugene to Napoleon, 15 June
1805.
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One of the decree reads:
Cardinals b o m in the Kingdom of Italy
and recognized as citizens 'who, counting
everything, do not have a total income
of 50,000 Milanese livres, will enjoy an
annual salary /traitement/ of 15,000
livres paid from the treasury of the
crown* 44Cardinals who could claim the stipend were placed on
the civil list.
The government also reorganized parishes in
Italy in order to hring "better administration to the
church and to facilitate supervision.

Ten days after

taking the oath as Viceroy, Eugene sent Napoleon for
his signature a decree designed to accomplish the reor
ganization.^

Eugene proposed to decrease the number

of cures and vicars.

Napoleon, in his reply, instructed

B e a u h a m a i s not to suppress the clergy, "but to enlarge
the parishes and to promote cures to vicars.

Upon the

death of a vicar, a cure should "be promoted to the
vacancy.

Napoleon felt, he wrote, that this method

would reduce difficulties with the c l e r g y . ^

44.

Ibid., 417-418, Eugene to Napoleon, 12 Oc
tober 1805.
^ Ibid.. 152, Eugene to Napoleon, 17 June 1805•
46
Napoleon, Correspondance, X, 540, Napoleon
to Eugene, 19 June 180^.

228

Bishoprics also felt the hand of the government.
In Italy there existed a number of areas which fell
under the care of a foreign bishop, a practice which
Napoleon refused to tolerate.

He instructed Eugene

that any portion of Italy appertaining to a foreign
bishop should arbitrarily be attached to the neighboring
Italian diocese.

He ordered further that any diocese

which had its seat in Italy, but a portion of its terri
tory in a neighboring state, should be reduced to cover
only the Italian parishes.

A case of just this nature

existed in Verona, and Napoleon made Verona a diocese
largely because of the fact that a cathedral already
existed there.

When diocesan boundaries finally were

organized, there should be at least one diocese to each
department of the kingdom.^
This last provision apparently created a number
of new bishoprics in addition to those vacant at the
time of the establishment of the kingdom, for Napoleon
wrote Eugene to send his recommendations for the persons
to fill the vacancies.

He cautioned the Viceroy to

nominate only young priests who would support the French
policy for Italy and to avoid old cardinals who would
V.- 48
oppose him.

4-7

Ibid., 554, Napoleon to Eugene, 21 June 1805.

48
Ibid., XII, 60, Napoleon to Eugene, 17 Febru
ary 1806 •
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In reply to Napoleon’s request for nominations,
the Yiceroy listed the following as good candidatess
Francesco G-amboni ^sic/1who had been appointed Bishop
of Vivegano but had not yet been consecrated by the
Pope; Nava, Napoleon’s almoner and cure of S a n t ’ Ambrogio; Zerbini, vicar general of the bishopric of
Modena; and Dallegri, a Councillor-of-State, (auditor)
wholly devoted to Napoleon,

Eugene wrote that he also

wished to nominate the vicars of Brescia and Bologna,
but that he did not have their names at the present, and
would send them to Napoleon at a later date.

He added

that he would appreciate it if Napoleon named a bishop
as first almoner to his wife Augusta* 4-9 If Eugene ever
reported the names of the vicar of Brescia and Bologna
to Napoleon, the editor of his correspondence did not
see fit to include the letter*
Napoleon’s religious policy in Italy soon
brought protests from Pius VII.

Napoleon wrote Pius

VII from Boulogne in August 1805 that the protests
voiced by the Pope disappointed him greatly, for all
that he had done only bettered the Church in Italy and

^Eugene, Memoires, II, 99-100, Eugene to Na
poleon, 27 February 1806*
This represents only a
partial list of Eugene’s nominees.
They are ones about
whom Napoleon had doubts and wanted information.
The
full list of nominees is not given.
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enriched her.

He had organized the church more ef

ficiently and made it possible for the clergy to give
its attention to the primary function of the church,
the saving of souls.J

This argument hardly satisfied

the Roman pontiff, and his irritation with Napoleon in
creased with the military occupation of Ancona.

The

Pope could only view this action as an invasion of his
temporal authority, and he protested vigorously.

Na

poleon’s reply to this complaint was that the action
had been taken only as a protective measure designed to
prevent the Pope and the Church from falling victim to
the English, the Greeks, or the Turks.

He told the

Pope that he recognized Pius VII’s right to choose his
friends as he would, but that he hoped the Pope would
realize the actions which distressed him so had been
31
taken for the good of Rome.
The same day Napoleon
wrote his representative at the Roman court, Cardinal
Fesch, that the Pope could accept his occupation of
Ancona or suffer the consequences.

The consequences

Napoleon threatened included the appointment of a
Protestant layman as ambassador to Rome, not allowing

SO
Napoleon, Correspondence. XI, 99-100, Na
poleon to the Pope, 18 August 1805.
•^Ibid.. 527-528, Napoleon to the Pope, 7

January 1806>C
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a Russian or Sardinian ambassador in Rome, and reducing
the Pope to the status of mere bishop of Rome.

52

One of Napoleon*s major difficulties with the
papacy was Pius VII*s refusal to invest newly appointed
bishops unless they journeyed to Rome for their conse
cration.

To prevent the newly appointed bishops from

being exposed personally to the influence of the Pope,
the Emperor in May 1806 issued a decree, of which the
following is Article Ones
No bishop of my Kingdom of Italy will
be constrained to render himself to
Rome to be consecrated. They will con
form to the custom of the Catholic
Church of Germany, of Prance, and the
rest of the Christian world.53
The next reference in letters to consecration
of bishops is found in Eugene*s correspondence with the
Italian Foreign Minister, which contains two letters on
the subject.

On 11 November 1806 Eugene wrote Mares-

calchi that he had received a report from the Minister
of Religion stating the refusal of the Holy Father to
give canonical institution to the bishops appointed by
Napoleon to Italian bishoprics.

Eugene sent these ob

jections to Napoleon, resulting in Napoleon*s making

52

Ibid., Napoleon to Cardinal Peach, 7 January
1806; Hale, Napoleon and the P o p e . 94; Sloane, Napoleon.
II, 396; 0*Meara, Napoleon in Exile. II, 51*
53

^Napoleon, Correspondance. XII, 403-404, De
cree , 26 May 1806.
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new demands on the Papacy to consecrate the "bishops.
Eugene proposed to send the demands through the Foreign
Minister, but Napoleon ordered that they be sent through
the Minister of Religion.

Eugene thought this was a
34breach of diplomatic courtesy.
The abrupt departure
from accepted diplomatic form displeased Marescalchi,
and Eugene wrote him that if Napoleon accepted and
signed the nominations he submitted, the Foreign Minis
ter would present the nominations in the normal diplo
matic channels regardless of Napoleon*s directives.

In

addition to this, Eugene utilized a different form for
the presentation of the nominations than had been demanded by the Emperor.
At the time of the controversy over investiture,
Eugene had to deal with the machinations of the portion
of the clergy friendly to the Papacy.

He wrote the

Emperor on 29 November 1806 that he had learned of a
trip made by Cardinal Luigi Braschi to Cesena to a
meeting of ecclesiastics, who, in Eugene*s words, were
**not noted” for their attachment to Napoleon.

He re

ported that he had broken up the meeting by the threat

54
Beauhamais Archive, Eugene to the Minister
of Foreign Relations, 11 November 1806.
55

Ibid., Eugene to the Minister of Foreign
Relations, 27 November 1806.
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of banishment to a seminary.

Though, he allowed the

Cardinal to remain at liberty and to move as he saw fit,
Eugene warned him that it would not be wise to stay
56
long at Cesena.
Eugene*s concern about disaffected clergy indi
cates that he was not insensible to the influence of
the clergy on the population of Italy,

His desire to

have the clergy accept the regime indicates that he
understood the state could succeed more easily with
the support of the priests.

It is interesting to ponder

the effect the Papal position had upon his peace of
mind as well, for he apparently had genuine respect for
the Papacy,

However, he evidently had greater respect

for Napoleon than for the Pope,

In early 1807 he wrote

the Emperor that the Court of Rome meddled in Italian
religious affairs through the device of advising bishops
not to perform ecclesiastical d u t i e s , ^
Napoleon informed Eugene on 3 April 1807, that
while the bishops continued to draw their salaries,
they would perform their administrative duties regard
less of whether their consciences would allow them to

56

,
Eugene, Memoires. III, 213-124, Eugene to Na
poleon, 29 November 1806,
57

Eugene*s letter to Napoleon is not in his
Memoires. but the content is clearly indicated in NapolionTs answer of 3 April 1807, See Napoleon, Correspondance, XV, 17, Napoleon to Eugene, 3 April 1807,
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perform ecclesiastical duties.

In the letter the King

stated that he was enclosing a letter to the Pope.
Viceroy was to have the letter

The

copied in his office,

sign it, and thus cause the Pope to believe the letter
was from Eugene and that Napoleon had no knowledge of
the whole affair.

However,

Napoleon must have changed

his mind, for he did not enclose the letter.

The King

added a postscript to his letter to Eugene stating that
he would not condescend to argue with such a simpleton
as Pius VII. Instead, he would ignore him. 58
By the summer of 1807 Napoleonic treatment of
the Pope apparently had caused such a popular protest
that Eugene became concerned, for he wrote the Emperor
that it would be very easy to make the Pope a martyr
in Italy.

50

Eugene appreciated the force of the Catho

lic conscience morefully than did Napoleon.
Undoubtedly a portion of the difficulties with
the Papacy in Italy stemmed fromthe introduction of
the Prench catechism in the late summer of 1806.

Even

Napoleon had some reservations about its acceptance in
Italy; when he sent Eugene a copy and suggested that

58
Napoleon, Correspondance, XV, 17, Napoleon
to Eugene, 3 April 1807*

•^Eugene, Memoires, III, 375-376, Eugene to
Napoleon, 30 July 1807*
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it be introduced in the kingdom, lie advised the Viceroy
to consult his Minister of Religion about proclaiming
it throughout the kingdom as a wholeo

If the Minister

of Religion felt it would cause trouble applied on a
national scale, it might be possible to persuade the
60
bishops to publish it as a diocesan catechism.
For
almost a year there was silence on the problem of the
catechism*

Eugene apparently had some success in

getting the bishops to publish the catechism in their
dioceses.

Others, including Pius VII as bishop of

Imola, did not.

Napoleon, on 5 July 1807, wrote the

Viceroy not to be concerned about the refusal

of the

Pope to publish the catechism in his capacity as the
bishop of Imola, since at least some of the other
61
bishops had published it in their dioceses.
Though
62
Napoleon tried again in late August 1807 to reduce
Papal opposition to the Italian religious policy, he

60
Napoleon. Correspondance. XIII, 56, Napoleon
to Eugene, 7 August 1806.
61
Pius VII apparently remained bishop of Imola
when he became Pope in 1800*
The bishops who had
published the catechism were those of Bologna, Ferrara,
Ravenna, Trevino, Venice, Vicenza, and Padua. Na
poleon, Correspondance, XV, 388, Napoleon to Eugene,
5 July 180*/.
6?

1807.

Ibid., 502-503, Napoleon to Eugene, 16 August
“
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never did achieve his end.

In spite of Papal pleas and

the Catholic conscience, the new catechism was applied

g

'Z

throughout the newly annexed Papal legations in 1808.
In July of 1808 the government arrested Cardinal
Julio G-abrielli, who was bishop of Sinigaglia, and
brought him to Milan to force him to take the oath to

Napoleon required by the concordat.

Napoleon wrote his

stepson to sequester the property of the Cardinal and

distribute half the proceeds to the churches in his
64
bishopric and the other half to hospitals.
Unable to enforce changes in the relationship of
clergy and the state while the Pope enjoyed his liberty,
Napoleon ordered the arrest of the Holy Father in 1809.
The Pope was confined at Savona until nearly the end
of Napoleon1s career.

While there the Pope stubbornly

refused to surrender his spiritual prerogatives to the
Emperor, and Napoleon had no greater success gaining
his ends during the period of the Pope's confinement.
Indeed, the laying of violent hands on His Holiness
caused the roots of opposition to grow even deeper. 63

C*Z

Beauhamais Archive, Eugene to Councillor-ofState Vaccari, 29 May 1808.
^Napoleon, Correspondance, XVII, 402-403, Na
poleon to Eugene, 17 June 1808.

63
^Hales, Napoleon and the Pope, 120-127*
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It is true that in 1811 the Moniteur carried
reports that the bishops of Italy had given Eugene
their pledges to support the statement of the Princi
ples of Gallicanism rendered to Napoleon by the ca—
thedral chapter at Paris on 6 January of that year,

66

but the Moniteur is the only place that this claim is
made, and it is quite probable the statement was in
tended purely as propaganda.
Religious organizations as well as the church
in Italy felt the heavy hand of the state, and on 16
June 1807 the Journal italien announced that all laic
religious organizations except that of Saint-Sacrement
were dissolved, and even Saint-Sacrement no longer had
the privilege of meeting at night.

Only one group of

the allowed order could continue to exist in a parish,
and it was responsible to the ordinary and the cure.
The above restrictions did not extend to persons em
ployed in the church itself, though no persons were al
lowed to subscribe to or support a foreign holy order.
The order did not apply to any person teaching in the
church schools
Though the French church accepted Napoleonic

^ Moniteur. 11, 14, 16, and 19 February 1811.
67Ibid., 27 June 1807.
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domination, the Italian church had no such history of
relative freedom from direction by Rome as did the
church in France•

TJltramontanism was too deeply rooted

in the Italian character to be destroyed in nine years.
It cannot be successfully argued that the collapse of
the Kingdom of Italy after the downfall of Napoleon
resulted from the resentment of the Italians over the
treatment of the Pope and the Church, but that was
certainly one of the reasons for its failure.

CHAPTER XI
CENSORSHIP, PROPAGANDA AND PUBLIC WORKS
One of the features of the Napoleonic domination
of dependent countries which has received the attention
and criticism of scholars of the period is the censor
ship to which the countries were subject.

Italy was no

exception.
On 11 June 1805 Eugene wrote Napoleon that he
had ordered the Minister of Interior to resume news
paper censorship, which apparently had been allowed to.
expire.

The Viceroy added that the government had re

served the right to punish the author of an article if
it deemed punishment necessary.^
To this information Napoleon replied that too
strict a censorship would destroy newspapers in Italy,
and that Eugene should allow editors and journalists
freedom to answer ambassadors and to write vague criti
cisms of certain powers.-

In an effort to prevent too

great a degree of freedom for newspapers, however, the

"'"Eugene, Memoires. I, 124.
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Emperor warned that the Viceroy could not allow in
Italy the degree of freedom that English newsmen en
joyed.2
Book publishers as well as newspaper editors
fell victim to the censor's activity.

The program of

book censorship disturbed Napoleon, and he wrote Eugene
to stop censoring books since the spirit of the country
was bad enough without doing anything to make it worse.
Instead of open censorship Napoleon recommended that
publishers present to the police for examination a
printed copy of each publication seven days before
placing books in the hands of vendors.

If the publi

cation contained anything contrary to the government,
3
the government should then suppress it.
As a result of this directive, Eugene es
tablished a Bureau of Freedom of the Press which, Na
poleon wrote in March 1806, constituted nothing more
than a censorship bureau.^"

The decree establishing the

Bureau, reproduced in the 1 August 1806 issue of the
Moniteur. provided in part:

2

Napoleon, Correspondance. X, 512, Napoleon to
Eugene, 12 June 18Q!n
3

Ibid., 526-527, Napoleon to Eugene. 14 June

1805.
4

Ibid., XII, 248, Napoleon to Eugene, 31 March

1806.
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Any time an author wishes to assure
himself that the publication of his
work will not expose him to an in
vestigation, he may present the manu
script to the Bureau of Freedom of
the Press before having it printed.
If the Bureau judges that the publi
cation is without inconvenience, it
will return the manuscript to the
author after having taken the pre
caution of causing all the pages of
the said manuscript to be counter
signed by one of the members of the
Bureau, as well as returning any
notes on it.5
In addition the decree stated that if the work
contained any items which the Bureau deemed it neces
sary to suppress, the Bureau should give its objections
and suggested revisions to the author orally and should
return the manuscript unsigned.

The decree continued:

In the event that any author or
publisher is prosecuted because of
the publication of a work the manu
script of which has been read and
signed by the Bureau of Freedom of

5

Moniteur, 1 August 1806.
It is not certain
that this decree is the one to which Napoleon made
reference in his letter of 31 March 1806. The decree
in the Moniteur is entitled Un acte de S.A.I. le prince
vice-roi. dat§ de Monza, le 17 de ce m o i s . and is a re
print from the Journal italien of 22 July.
This does
not necessarily mean i^hat t h e d e c r e e was issued in July
1806, for the editors of the Moniteur give evidence in
many places that they indiscriminately used material
from Italian journals, and even back issues of the
Moniteur. for fillers. For instance, the Moniteur
carried the announcement of the celebration of Eugene's
birthday at the court in Milan on 11 September 1812,
and the identical announcement was carried in the
Moniteur on 24 November 1812.
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the Press, the minister should im
mediately prevent the sale of the
said work, hut the author and
publisher will be indemnified for
all the costs of the printing at
the expense of the members of the
Bureau, against whom any additional
measures judged advisable will be
taken.6
These excerpts from the decree clearly show
that Eugene did indeed introduce censorship more
stringent than might appear at first glance.

However,

there is a measure of protection for publishers and
authors in the requirement that if posterior determi
nation placed a published work on the proscribed list,
the government would assess members of the Bureau the
cost of the publication.

In addition, this clause had

the virtue of causing the Bureau to be careful about
the books allowed for publication.
The only available reference to an author*s
feeling the wrath of the government because of a pub
lished work is contained in a letter from Eugene to
Francois Antoine Testi.

In the letter, written 23 Sep

tember 1807, the Viceroy informed Testi that the author
of an attack on the Queen of Etruria had been arrested.
The same day the Viceroy wrote to Fernando Marescalchi,
minister of foreign relations of the kingdom, that he
had reprimanded the Director-General of Police for

6Ibid.
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having allowed a story entitled Courrier /sicZ des James
to "be published.

The Spanish minister at Milan had com

plained because he thought the story critical of the
Queen of Etruria.

The government had suppressed the

journal in which the story appeared, had severely repri
manded the publisher and had threatened him with crimi
nal prosecution.

The Viceroy had told the Spanish

minister of the government's action, and it was Eugene’s
wish that Marescalchi inform the Emperor.

The Viceroy

requested further directions if his handling of the af—
fair did not meet Napoleon’s approval.

n

In addition to censoring vehicles of public ex
pression, Eugene directed a comprehensive propaganda
program.

In the program he made use of a number of

techniques.

At various times the Viceroy utilized army

bulletins, the theatre, proclamations, and of course,
the news sheets of the time.

It is quite probable that

public schools served as propaganda tools.

Even the

churches from time to time served in this area.

The

bishops and priests, at the behest of the government,
performed Te Teums after military victories.

There was

no dearth of propaganda vehicles in the Kingdom of
Italy.

7
B e a u h a r n a i s Archive, Eu g e n e to C o u n c i l l o r - o f State Testi, 23 S e p t e m b e r 1807; Eugene to Marescalchi,
23 S e p t e m b e r 1807.
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During the existence of the Italian kingdom,
Eugene publicized such items as Napoleon’s coronation
journey, the digging of canals, French legal benefits,
public schools, military victories, Napoleon’s charges
against the allies, the Venetian naval program, trade
conditions, in fact all activity which might cause the
Italian reading public to look with favor upon his
government.
Eugene selected news items to be reprinted in
Italian journals.

He read the Moniteur daily, clipped

what he felt the Italians should read, and sent the
clippings to the editors of Italian journals with instructions to reproduce the items verbatim.

8

Napoleon used his own speeches for propaganda
purposes, but he harshly refused to allow the Viceroy
Q
to publish his own.
Though Napoleon gave no reason
for this refusal, it may be that he feared that Eugene,
a stranger to proper techniques, might fail to be con
vincing.

Whatever the reasoning Eugene, in 1806,

promised Napoleon that no more of his speeches would

Q
Ibid., Eugene to the Minister of Foreign Af
fairs, 29 September 1807. Citations for propaganda
items can easily be extended. I have cited only repre
sentative reports throughout this chapter.
,
^Eugene, Memoires. II, Napoleon to Eugene,
4 February 1806.
q
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appear in Italian journals.

There is no further mention

of the subject in letters exchanged between the Viceroy
and the Emperor.
Immediately following Napoleon’s coronation as
King of Italy and Eugene*s appointment as Viceroy the
journals of the kingdom became vehicles for items Na
poleon wanted the Italians to read.

Napoleon had barely

started his tour of the Italian kingdom before he ordered
Eugene to place articles about his progress in Italian
journals.

Eugene dutifully followed instructions, and

such articles appeared in the Italian Journal officiel
and later in the Moniteur. ^
In addition Napoleon ordered Eugene to use the
Italian Journal officiel to publicize measures taken to
improve Italy, such as the canal at Pavia and the sani
tation program at Mantua, though he told the Viceroy not
to limit himself to the use of the Journal officiel.
Napoleon felt that if Italians became aware of the
French program for bettering Italy, they would not think
that the only result of French domination was additional
cost•

Moniteur. 1 Messidor, Year XIII (20 June
1805); 4 Messidor, Year XIII (23 June 1805); 7 Messidor,
Year XIII (26 June 1805).
The list could easily be ex
tended through June and the first week of July. Those
cited are representative.

^Napoleon, Correspondence. X, 550, Napoleon to
Eugene, 20 June 1805; Eugene, Memoires, I, 169-170,

246

Eugene apparently made an attempt early in his
career to use Italian papers to refute rumors of war.
The Moniteur carried an extract from a private letter
reportedly written from Vicenza that Austrian and French
soldiers attended halls together in that city, and that
the Austrians openly said that if a war came, they could
not win.

The same article carried the statement that

around Brescia the general feeling was that if war had
started a few weeks earlier, the French could not have
held their own, hut that now the populace felt absolutely secure. 12
Napoleon, late in July 1805, informed the Viceroy
that it was not necessary to refute rumors of war, hut
instead to publish news of Austrian war preparations and
to make certain the articles appeared in the Journal
officiel.

The Emperor, in September 1805, ordered

Napoleon to Eugene, 20 June 1805* In the Memoires this
letter is misdated 21 June 1805 and is designated as a
letter from Eugene to" Napoleon. This is clearly an
error, for Eugene always used the salutation "Sire,tt
and the salutation in this instance is "Mon cousin.”
which is the salutation Napoleon used when writing im
perial officials.
12

Moniteur, Fourth complementary day, Year XIII,
(21 September 1865)• The conflict in dates between this
announcement and Napoleon*s letter in the next citation
is probably due to lateness of reproduction in the
Moniteur. It may, however, reflect independent action
on Eugene 1s part.
13

Napoleon, Correspondence, XI. 44, Napoleon
to Eugene, 26 July 1865.
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Eugene to use the Italian papers to publish a procla
mation informing the Italians of the "treacherous
/Austrian^ attack" upon Bavaria.

The King told Eugene

to assure the Italians that Austria would be punished.
In addition the Viceroy should inform Italians that at
all times the Emperor represented the interests of his
Italian subjects."^
At the same time, but in another letter, Na
poleon directed the Viceroy to tell the Italian press
that the Emperor was with the army and was on the move,
and that the Austrians were already in flight; nothing
should be reported about hostilities being in progress*
If possible, news of hostilities should be kept from
*

the Italians until Marshal Massena began his movement.

15

The next day Napoleon wrote the Viceroy that as
soon as Austria attacked Italy, he should release news
of Prussian opposition to Russia.

He should let the

Italians know the numbers of troops contributed to the
Grand Army by Bavaria, Baden, Hesse-Darmstadt and
Wurttemberg.

In addition the Viceroy should publicize

Ibid.j 261, Napoleon to Eugene, 29 September
1805; Eugene, Memoires. I, 395, Napoleon to Eugene,
29 September 1&05•
15

Napoleon, Correspondance. X, 261-262^ Na
poleon to Eugene, 29 September 1^05; Eugene, Memoires,
396, Napoleon to Eugene, 29 September 1805*
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the number of recruits taken from Prance.

In the letter

the Emperor told Eugene to relay the above information
to the Italian army generals, the Archtreasurer of
Genoa, and the Princess of Lucca so that a comprehensive
refutation of enemy propaganda might be made.1^

Na

poleon ordered Joseph to have the Moniteur print news
of two great victories in which there were no desertions
or losses by death, and that all the Germans were well
disposed toward the French. 17
After the outbreak of war on the Italian fron
tier Eugene utilized the journals to convince the
Italians that there was nothing to fear.

He put a

notice in the papers that though Austrian armies were
only forty-five leagues from Milan, there was no panic
or fear that the Austrians would penetrate Italy
proper.
Eugene, in November 1805, accused the British
of starting the rumor that he had experienced diffi
culties with the Senate and had been hissed by the

Napoleon, Correspondence. X, 268, Napoleon to
Eugene, 30 September 1805; Eugene, Memoires. I, 401403, Napoleon to Eugene, 30 September 1805.
17
'Napoleon, Correspondence. X, 271, Napoleon to
Joseph, 2 October 1805.
See also Eugene, Memoires. I,
405, Napoleon to Eugene, 2 October 1805.

18
Moniteur, 28 Brumaire^ Year XIV (18 November
1805).
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people.

He carefully explained to the Italian provinces

that this simply was not true.

He countered the sup

posed British rumor with the statement that the Italians
bore the war with good faith and grace, and announced
to the people that even demands for food had "been met
by the peasantry with cheer. 19 The announcement is
wholly false, and ties in with the Napoleonic program
of "blaming uncomplimentary news upon pro—British rumor
m o ngers.20
In reporting to Napoleon on the public spirit
in Italy, Eugene, in October 1805, wrote that he had
received Tallyrand’s announcement of the Emperor*s
first victories and would publicize them in the meeting
of the Council of State on the morrow.

He anticipated

public joy at the news and told Napoleon that Massena
and his troops were anxious to join the battle and gain
military glory.

He rather wistfully remarked, **it is

difficult to follow Your Majesty’s movements on maps**
when he yearned to serve in the field.

21

^ I b i d ., 13 Frimaire, Year XIV (4 December 1805)20
Bobert B. Holtman, Napoleonic Propaganda
(Baton Rouges
Louisiana State University Press, 1950),
74, 118. .(Hereafter cited as Holtman, Napoleonic Propa
ganda )•

Eugene, Memoires.♦ I, 418—419, Eugene to Na
poleon, 15 October 1805•
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When the British and Russian troops debarked at
Naples Eugene wrote the Emperor that he felt the public
should be made aware of the debarkation in terms de
nouncing the court of Naples, for the Italians must be
excited against that government and be given courage.
To encourage the Italians he had written just such an
article to be published in Italian journals.

Eugene

enclosed a translated copy asking the Emperor's approval
of both action and motive. 22
During the course of the campaign of 1805 Eugene
had the bulletins of the Grand Army posted in order that
the populace might read them.

He ordered that the

bulletin announcing and describing the battle of Austerlitz be read at the Scala Opera House following the
evening performance on 8 December.

According to the

Moniteur, the Yiceroy had publicized his intentions to
have the bulletin read after the play, but the crowd
refused to let the play proceed until the bulletin was
read.

After the reading of the bulletin the crowd dis

persed, and only about 100 people remained for the

2^Ibid., 460-461, Eugene to Napoleon, 29 No
vember 180*?T
23
Moniteur, 18 Erimaire, Year XTV (9 December
1805). Assuming that this report is true, it is safe
to assume that the opera presented was undoubtedly a
French effort at propaganda and did not appeal to the
Milanese.

251
Eugene, on 31 December 1805, issued a procla
mation stating that Venice liad "been given up by the
Austrians and was now under French control.

He told

the Italians and Venetians that their days of being
pawns in continental wars had e n d e d . ^
It should be the function of news media to in
form the populace of all events.

However this was not

the role played by journals in Napoleonic Italy.

The

Emperor allowed the journals to print only items he
deemed beneficial to French rule.

Among such items

found in the Moniteur is an announcement, taken from a
Venetian paper, of the occupation of Venice in January
1806.

The article stated that the French had been re23
ceived with joy by the Venetians.
In light of the

Viceroy’s report that the Venetians showed signs of
opposition to the French, the news report cannot be
taken as representing the truth to the Italians.
Papers read in Italy also served as vehicles
for expression of Italian delight and contentment with
French rule.

At the time of Eugene’s marriage, the

Chamber of Commerce of Milan celebrated the event by

Ibid., January 1806.
When Tuscany was an
nexed, the French there utilized the same technique.
See Koenig, "Tuscany," 37 ff.

25^Moniteur. 30 January 1806.
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establishing forty dowries of 300 Milanese livres each
for deserving Milanese girls.

At the same time the

Council of State extended its congratulations and stated
that its members knew that Italian welfare and security
depended upon the wise laws of Napoleon.

This body of

august men asserted that only under Napoleon and Eugene
26
could Italy be prosperous and happy.
When Eugene and his bride arrived at Verona
late in January, the Moniteur announced that Italian
papers reported that all the principal officers of the
provisional government of the Venetian states were very
well impressed with the new princess.

Though only

seventeen years of age she was an accomplished hostess.
Augusta endeared herself to all by speaking to each of
them in his own language.

She very graciously accepted

a gift of hand-painted Venetian silk.

27

The new Vice-Queen, Augusta Amelia, received
her introduction to Italian propaganda the first night
she and Eugene spent in Yenice by attending a play en
titled "Italy and the Adriatic Delivered and Reunited
by the Genius of Mars."

According to the Moniteur, when

the royal couple entered Milan, they received the city’s

2^Ibid., 4 February 1806.
2^Ibid., 6 February 1806.
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adulation, and the munic ipalit e of Milan informed Eugene
no

he had heen missed as much as he was cherished.

That

statement might have meant almost anything.
Following the campaign of 1805 and the loss of
the French fleet at Trafalgar, Italian papers devoted
much space to French and Italian naval successes.

Re

ports included the success of corsairs, the lack of
29
British warships at Venice, and Italian ship movements.
The publication of Italian ship movements incensed Na
poleon, who immediately wrote the Viceroy a stinging
letter telling him that such aritcles were advantageous
only to the British.

The British could read, and the

publication of ship movements endangered his precious
ships.

The King ordered the Viceroy not to allow such
articles to be printed. 30
Two items appearing in 1809 are of interest if
only for the reason that they did not follow the general
pattern of reporting victories at sea against heavy
odds, though that aspect was not neglected.

The first

28Ibid., 23 February 1806.
29Ibid.. 9 May 1806; 25 July 1806; 18 September
1808; 26 October 1808; 22 April 180930

Napoleon, Comespondance. XII, 511, Napoleon
to Eugene, 3 July 1806: Eugene. Memoires. Ill, 53, Na
poleon to Eugene, 3 July 1806.
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is a story about the British capture of an Italian ship,
the Fortune.

According to the report, the prize crew

placed on the captured Italian ship consisted of a
young lieutenant who could not navigate and six crewmen.
Their orders were to sail the ship to Malta.

The

British lieutenant asked the Italian captain to sail
the ship into a port where two British ships had been
sighted.

Instead of doing this the former Italian com

mander sailed the ship to Zante, which was under French
control.

The French boarded the ship and made the

English prisoners.

An added fillip to the story was

that the British had replaced the original cargo of the
Fortune with cotton, a commodity which the Italians
31
found very precious in 1809.
The other article carried the extract of a
letter reportedly written by a French soldier being
transported to Corfu.

The letter read:

I hasten to give you the news of our
happy arrival at this port. Above
Cephalonia we met two English brigs
which were taken by our frigate and
sunk after a very one-sided fight.
We took their crew and garrison
aboard. We also stopped a polacre
laden with diverse merchandise and
left it at Cephalonia, about forty
miles from Corfu. In our course we
were met by two English frigates.
After a three hour fight one of

^ Moniteur. 14 April 1809
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these frigates was so badly damaged
it took flight*
Our loss consisted
of two cannoneers killed. We did
not lose another sailor.32
It is rather unlikely that one frigate would
have been sailing the Adriatic alone after Napoleon’s
orders that they should venture out only if they out
numbered the enemy, and less probable that one French
frigate would be able to outfight two British ships of
the same class.
Another story the next year told of two English
ships becalmed two miles off Ancona.

The English took

advantage of a sudden wind to escape the Italian navy
33
which was bearing down upon them.
One might question
how some ships could sail without wind while others
stood still, and why the wind which helped the British
escape could not have aided the Italians to overtake
them.

Perhaps it was simply an ill wind that blew no

good.
In an effort to convince the Italians that com
merce was flourishing in the kingdom, Eugene had Italian
journals report the number of ships entering and clear
ing Italian ports.

Three such instances deserve mention

32
Ibid., 2 May 1809.
A polacre was a small,
square rigged merchant ship used on the Mediterranean
Sea.

33Ibid., 5 July 1810.
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because of patent falsity.

Italian papers announced in

% April 1809 tbat in the week of 24 March, thirty-seven
trading ships entered and left the port of Ancona, and
that in the week of 2 April, thirty-nine had entered and
34
cleared the same port.
On 19 August 1811 the Moniteur
carried an announcement that 342 ships from Adriatic
ports carrying all sorts of goods had entered and
cleared at Venice.

Of the 342 ships, 283 had carried
35
the products of Italy.
And in June 1813 Venice re
ported that 422 ships entered the port in May carrying
oil, iron, heating and construction wood, salt, rice,
and bronze and that 380 left carrying non-prohibited
7 /*

goods to Illyria and Apulia.

Either historians who

contend that the Continental System damaged Italy ex
tensively are wrong, or these reports are absolutely
false.

It is strange that the Italian government would

issue such claims.
decline in trade.

Italians certainly recognized the
They knew the British navy waited

off Venice and prevented trade.

If Eugene expected

such reports to be believed, he must have expected the
believers to be non-Italian.

34Ibid., 20 April 1810.
33Ibid.. 19 August 1811.
36Ibid., 29 June 1813.
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Eugene used the papers of Italy extensively to
publish items about the army as well as the navy, par
ticularly in the last years of French control. In June
1810 the Publiciste announced that French and Italian
troops had been in Venice for some time and had earned
the admiration of the population of the city for their
good behavior.

According to the Publiciste their

bearing and discipline had been perfect. 3 7'

In 1812 the

role of troops commanded by Eugene at the battle of
Borodino received wide publicity, and the implication
was voiced that if it had not been for Eugene1s forces
storming and holding the center of the grand redoubt,
70

Napoleon might have suffered a crushing defeat.
To publicize and commemorate the seizure of
Moscow, Eugene, in September 1812, decreed that the

37Ibid., 15 June 1810.
^ I b i d . , 2 November 1812; Jean Hanoteau (ed.),
Memoirs of Armand de Caulaincourt (2 vols.; Vol. I,
With Napoleon in Russia; Vol. II, No Peace with Na
poleon! ; New Yorks William Morrow and Company, 19351936>), I, 99*
(Hereafter cited as Caulaincourt,
Memoirs).
Caulaincourt claims his brother took the
grand redoubt. But see Rose, Napoleon I , II, 234-235,
and Mrs. Arthur Bell (trans. and ed.). Memoirs of Baron
Lejeune (2 vols.; Londons Longmans, Green, and C o ~
1897), II, 181-182.
(Hereafter cited as Lejeune,
Memoirs).
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street named Saint Theresa in Milan, which ran from the
mint to the Tenaglia Gate, would henceforth be called
Moscow Street, and the Tenaglia Gate itself wouid be
knows as the Gate of Victory. J

The Italian government

promulgated the decree one day before Eugene fought
desperately at Viasma in support of Marshal Eavout
during the French retreat from Russia. 40
In January 1813 the Moniteur carried a letter
reportedly written by Eugene to General Henri Clarke
denying that the cowardliness of Eugene's troops had
permitted Russian General Ivanovitch Platoff to capture
most of the Viceroy’s artillery on 8 November 1812.
The letter stated that the Viceroy indeed had lost his
artillery, but that this reverse was due to the loss
of great numbers of horses from freezing.

Eugene's

troops destroyed the artillery before abandoning it.
Eugene also refuted the claim that the Russians took
3,700 of his troops prisoner on 8 November.

According

to the letter, the only troops captured by the Russians

3Q
Moniteur. 25 October 1812; 12 November 1812.
On the day the retreat from Moscow began, a le Eeum
was sung in Saint Ambrose Cathedral in Milan in praise
for the victory at Moscow.
40Sloane, Napoleon. Ill, 360.
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were those who took refuge in villages to escape the
cold which struck on 7 November.41 Curiously, this
letter supposedly written to Clarke on 6 January 1813
did not make mention of the heroism of Eugene*s corps
in rescuing Marshal Michel Ney and his division from
Platoff on 9 November 1812 as they struggled toward
Smolensk. 42

According to an eyewitness Eugene lost his

artillery and his baggage because it became stuck in
the mud on the banks of the Wop River. 43
In the dark days of 1813 Eugene utilized the
news services to bolster the public spirit of the
Italians.

He published the news of troop arrivals in

tended to strengthen the sagging Italian military force.
He later published articles which indicated that the
Austrians experienced greater difficulty than the Prench
44
in holding their positions.
Eugene, in September 1813, issued a decree
calling to the army men previously discharged or re
jected.

The decree contained a proclamation which was

41

Moniteur, 27 January 1813*
It is this writer's
opinion that "the letter was written by some person other
than Eugene for propaganda purposes.
42
43

Sloane, Napoleon, III, 364.
Lejeune, Memoirs, II, 215-

44Moniteur, 20. July 1813; 25 August 1813; 11 Oc
tober 1813.
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an impassioned appeal to the Italian people to come to
the defense of the kingdom, and Eugene hoped it would
encourage the Italians to make even greater sacrifices.45
In October the Milanese paper, II Corriere Milanese,
carried yet another appeal in which Eugene attempted to
stir the nationalist spirit of the Italians.

The plea

made by the Viceroy appeared on 17 October, and on 21
October the report came from Brescia that the procla
mation had been well received there and that Bresciafs
quota would be filled in a short time— indeed, men of
that area were anxious to take their places under the
flag.

Brescians reported that they remembered a time

when Napoleon could boast of their fidelity, and they
intended to prove the truth of his words.

4-6

As fortune continued to turn her face from the
forces of the Empire in 1813, and it became more and
more apparent that Italy might be forced to depend upon
the populace for defense, civic guards were formed over

^ I h i d . , 21 October 1813.
^ Ibid., 24 and 28 October 1813; Leon Lecestre,
Lettres inediies de Napoleon Ier (2 vols.; 2nd ed.;
Paris: E. PIon, Nourrit et cie, 1897), II, 298, Na
poleon to Eugene, 18 November 1813. (Hereafter cited
as Lecestre, Lettres inedites). That the Italian public
spirit was bad in the autumn of 1813 is proven by Na
poleon^ letter to Eugene of 18 November in which he
told, the Viceroy not to be discouraged by a bad public
spirit in Italy.
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the realm..

According to the news releases, this program
met with good response from the populace. 47 Individual
departments were cited by the government for their ex
ertions in this matter.
Battles and skirmishes, whether Italian forces
won or lost, received coverage designed to cause the
Italians to believe the Austrians always suffered more
greatly than the army of the Viceroy.

If Eugene was

on the site of the battle, his presence was invariably
49
reported as being an incentive to the troops.
The
retreat of the army across Italy was reported in matterof-fact fashion, but as each new position was taken,
Italian papers made it appear that the Viceroy was re
grouping his forces to take the offensive, and the
Austrians were pictured as barely holding their own.

50

In November 1813 the papers announced that French rein
forcements were at Turin and were advancing to the aid
of the Italians . ^

^ Moniteur, 24 December 1813.
^8I bid., 2 and 20 January 1814.
49

For representative report see Moniteur, 10
November 1813.
50
J For examples of such reports see the issues
of the Moniteur for October and November 1813, and
February 1814.

-^Moniteur, 16 November 1813.

262
In the same month the Italian papers also an
nounced that the Viceroy’s family went to Verona to
visit him and intended to stay a ’’few days.”

One is

tempted to believe that this announcement represents an
effort on the part of the government to allay popular
fears that an invasion of Lombardy proper was imminent.
The same announcement carried the report that an officer
from the headquarters of the Italian division in Spain
had come to Verona and had told the Viceroy and the
people there that the greatest desire of that division
was to return to Italy and defend her soil.

He reported

they were overjoyed when they received orders to do just
that.52
While the papers made the attempt to prove the
devotion of the Italians to the French, they unwittingly
indicated that this was perhaps more wishful thinking
than fact.

In October 1813 the papers warned that if

the Austrians overran Italy, they would show no mercy
to state functionaries and others who supported the
Napoleonic regime, and quoted Marie-Louise’s speech to
the French Senate to prove the point.

According to the

report, Marie-Louise told the French, ”1 know better

52Ibid., 25 November 1813
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than any person what our people will have to suffer if
53
they ever allow themselves to he conquered."
To give some indication of Austrian repression
to come, the papers announced in November 1813 that the
Austrians freed criminals and made them officers in the
Austrian army, and that they robbed the inhabitants of
the Tyrol by paying for requisitions with scrip, making
the specious promise to pay later in cash. 54 In January
1814 the Italians were consoled by the government wj^th
the observation that though the Italians suffered from
the- war, the Austrians also suffered. 55
In mid-February 1814 the Italian government
made a final effort to prove1-the bestiality of the
Austrians.

The government reported that the safety of

Mantua had been jeopardized by Austrian release of a
chain gang of prisoners taken captive by an Austrian
contingent.

"This is one of the benefits we owe to the

generosity of our enemy," ran the report in the Italian
Journal officiel.3^

53Ibid., 26 October 1813.
54Ibid., 8 and 27 November 1813
55Ibid., 6 January 1814.
56Ibid., 23 February 1814.
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To improve the kingdom, and to convince Italians
that French control did not mean only exaction, the
government entered into a comprehensive program of
public works.

The first public works project was de

signed to control the flood waters of the kingdom’s
major rivers.
The Po River, which drains the great plain of
Lombardy, rises in the Cottian Alps southwest of Turin
and meanders 418 miles to the Adriatic.

It is fed by

the Loria Battea River, which rises in the G-ratian
Alps; the Agogna River rising in the Pennine Alps; the
Ticino River, which both feeds and flows out of Lake
Maggiore and rises in the Lepontine Alps above Locarno,
Switzerland; the Adda River which rises in the Raetian
Alps above Lake Como and both feeds and drains that
lake; the Oglia River, also with its source in the
Raetian Alps; and the Mincio River born at Lake Garda.
These rivers all flow almost directly from north to
south, and each carries a large volume of water in the
springtime from melting winter snow.

The main tribu

taries of the Po from the south are the Tanaro and the
Tebbia Rivers, both of which have their sources in the
Ligurian Alps and likewise carry a large volume of
water from melting snows.

The annual spring thaw of

the snowcaps fed into the Po by the tributaries make
the relatively short river a torrent of destruction.
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Almost immediately after his coronation as King
of Italy, Napoleon decreed a levee-building program to
control the spring floods.

He recognized that a project

of such an ambitious nature would constitute a task too
great for the communes and villages situated on the Po
to bear, and ordered that the Kingdom of Italy bear onethird of the cost.

The villages located in the flood

area were to share proportionally the remaining twothirds of the cost. 67 In the early stages of con
struction the need of horses for military transport
interrupted progress. 58 In times of peace the work
continued, and five years later the only reports of
59
flooding came from Pavia and Mantua.
The Sesia River, with its source at the Great
St. Bernard Pass, also was subject to flooding, and
Napoleon issued a decree designed to put a program of
flood control into effect in the department of Agogna*
This area depended largely upon irrigation, and the
farmers protested that the flood control project, which

^^Moniteur, 23 Prairial, Year XIII (12 June
1805).
58
^ Beauharnais Archive, Eugene to the Minister
of Administration of War, 10 December 1806.
69

Moniteur, 14 October 1810.
The exact amount
of work done on the levee along the Po cannot be de
termined from available sources.
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consisted of diverting water to the Ticino, would de
prive them of their water rights by reducing the flow
in the Sesia.

Eugene reported to Napoleon that the

farmers had protested against the flood control project,
but neglected to mention on what grounds the farmers
made their complaint.

Therefore, Napoleon demanded to

know why the farmers protested, and Eugene instructed
Testi to survey the area to determine the extent of
damage the farmers would suffer from the project.

Ap

parently this report was sent to Napoleon, for the King
promised Eugene he would consider the complaints of the
. .
60
proprietors.
To control partially the waters of the Reno
River, which rises in the Apennines above Bologna and
flows into the Adriatic about thirty miles south of the
Po, Napoleon ordered a system of canals diverting water
to the Po.

To provide cheap transportation between

Pavia and Milan he ordered the construction of a canal
to link the Adda and Ticino Rivers.

The same order

gave instructions for dredging the Mincio to provide a
navigable inland river, and made provision for a project

60Eugene, Memoires, I, 175-176, 182, 190-192,
Eugene to Napoleon, 21 June 1805? Napoleon to Eugene,
25 June 1805 and 4 July 1805? Beauhamais Archive,
Eugene to Councillor-of-State Testi, 27 June 1805.
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of cleaning and deepening the lagoons at Venice.

6 "L

Still another flood control project attempted by the
government was a program of diking the Brenta and
Bacchilione Rivers located in Venetia.

go

The funds for the construction of the PaviaMilan canal, provided in the budget of 1806, proved to
be insufficient, and in 1809 Eugene decreed that the
Department of Olona and the government would share the
remainder of the cost.

The government assumed four-

fifths of the cost, for Eugene felt that the state and
the department should share the cost in proportion to
the benefit derived from such a project.
Eugene appointed a commission of hydraulic engi
neers to review the water ways at Venice.

The com

mission consisted of two members from the Department of
the Adriatic and one member each from the departments
of Adige, Lower Po Brenta, Bacchilione, and Tagliafi4.
mento.
The commission had the task of presenting
plans for the development of Venetian water communi
cation, both in the city and in the lagoons, in addition

g “t

Napoleon, Correspondence, XII, 369» Napoleon
to Eugene, 13 May 1806.
^ Moniteur, 2 August 1811.
^ I b i d . , 2 August 18Q9«

^ I b i d . , 25 September 1806.
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to proposing a solution to the conflicting ideas of
Venetians and the people of the surrounding area con65
cerning the usage of water
Later Eugene appointed two commissions to develop
a program of "beautification for Milan and Venice.

In

each instance the mayor of the city served as the presi
dent of the commission aided by members of the faculties
of the schools of fine arts.

66

Work on the program of

beautification did not get under way at Milan until
later on in the year (1807).^7

The Milanese beautifi

cation commission ordered the planting of trees and
flowering shrubs, and the development of boulevards.
By autumn serious work was under way, and by late Sep
tember the first stones of Milan's arch of triumph had
been laid.

68

While Milan could boast of civic develop

ment late in 1807, Venice did not get a beautification
program under way until somewhat later.

cq

Mot until

1811 could Venice report that the beautification program

^ Ibid., 19 August 1806.
66Ibid., 25 January 1807.
67Ibid., 7 October 1807.
68Ibid.
^ Ibid., 2 April 1809.
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had made an appreciable difference in the appearance of
that city.7*"*
Though the Italian government expended the
greatest effort on beautification and civic improvement
in Venice and Milan, other areas received attention.
Eugene, on 28 November 1806, ordered the Minister of
Interior to provide for the paving of the streets at
Monza.

Streets there were so rough and full of holes

that the Viceroy expressed amazement that horses and
carriages had not suffered damage. 71
While concerning itself with the development of
a system of canals and flood control projects, the
Viceroy's government did not lose sight of the necessity
to develop a system of roads throughout the realm.

On

12 July 1805 Eugene ordered a highway built between
Piacenza and Sestri, and at about the same time Eugene
wrote the Minister of Bridges and Roads to begin plans

70Ibid., 30 April 1811.
71
Beauharnais Archive, Eugene to the Minister
of Interior, 28 November 1806. According to the letter
of the Viceroy, the order to pave the streets at Monza
stemmed from the King's visit.
If this is true, either
the. letter is misdated or Eugene was exceptionally slow
in getting anything done, for in November 1806 it had
been a year and a half since Napoleon last visited Italy.
His next visit was November 1807.
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for a road over the great Simplon Pass.

72

By 21 Sep

tember Eugene reported to Napoleon that he had es
tablished post roads from Milan to the western frontiers
of the kingdom.

This would make it possible to send

couriers either by way of the Simplon or the St. Gothard
Pass.
The Viceroy sent a representative to the chief
magistrate of the Republic of Valais to arrange for the
passage of couriers through his territory, and hoped
that everything would be arranged with Valais by 29 September. 73 Though Eugene made no mention of the success
of the negotiations with Valais, the fact that one of
Napoleon*s couriers came to Milan in early October by
way of the St. Gothard and that Eugene sent him back by
way of the Simplon indicates the agreement was made.^^
In the second week of October 1805 Eugene re
ported to the Emperor that he had inspected the road
over the Simplon and had found it very good.

It could

72
Moniteur, 14 Thermidor, Year XIII (2 August
1805); Beauharnais Archive, Eugene to the Minister of
Interior, n.d. This letter is undated, but it appears
between letters of 12 July 1805 and 3 October 1805.
"^Eugene, Memoires, I, 380-381, Eugene to Na
poleon, 21 September 1805.
74

Ibid., 405, Eugene to Napoleon, 3 October 1805*
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toe used for the transport of artillery readily during
the spring, summer, and fall, tout lie tliouglit it would
75
toe useless during the season of heavy snow.
It appears that the funds appropriated for the
road from Piacenza to Sestri were insufficient, for on
22 April 1806 Napoleon decreed the expenditure of
200,000 francs for the same purpose.

Writing in July

to determine if the project was under way, the King
suggested that inland Italy toe connected to the sea toy
a series of roads.

Napoleon wrote that he wanted a

road from Parma to La Spezia, Piacenza to Sestri, and
Piacenza to La Spezia.

He preferred a road which would

connect with the road from Genoa to Italy since Genoa
served as the gateway for French goods entering Italy.

76

Later that same summer Eugene issued a decree
authorizing the construction of a road from Belluno to
Serravolle. and from the latter place to Cadore.

The

government did not share in the cost of this road, for
the department through which it would pass had asked
for permission to touild it.

A decree provided for a

loan of 400,000 livres from the Italian treasury to

^ Itoid.. 416-417, Eugene to Napoleon, 11 Oc
tober 1805*
76

Napoleon, Correspondance, XII, 506, Napoleon
to Montalivet, 3 July 1806.
Jean—Pierre Montalivet was
Director-General of Public Works.
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provide funds for building the road with the stipulation
that tolls collected should pay the loan.

At the same

time, the Viceroy provided for a road between Ferrara
and Padua and the repair of the road from Padua to
Fusina and Pont-Longno. 77 While constructing these
roads Eugene began a road to connect Cenada, Brixen, and
Belluno.

The Viceroy halted this project to begin con

struction in the Department of Piave on a road con78
necting Trevino, Belluno, and Feltre.
Such a road
would make possible rapid transport of material from
Venice to Cadore to supply his army in the event that
he needed it.
Only two bridges, one at Priula on the Piave
River and one crossing the Ticino, are mentioned in
Eugene’s and Napoleon’s letters.

Napoleon ordered that

both should be built with stone and should serve a
military purpose.

The bridge crossing the Ticino should

be located on the most direct route from Milan to Turin
and be built so that the right bank should dominate the
left.

The only mention of cost in connection with the

two bridges is Napoleonfs directive to Eugene that he

^ Moniteur, 19 August 1806.
78
Beauharnais Archive, Eugene to Paradisi, Di
rector-General of Waters and Roads, 13 June 1808.
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keep the cost of the "bridge at Priula to less than.
2,000,000 f r a n c s . ^
For some reason not recorded, work did not pro
gress on the public works ordered by Napoleon so rapidly
as he desired, and in June he wrote the Viceroy a
grumbling letter in which he posed the question, "What
80
the devil are you doing in Italy?"
He told the
Viceroy not to retire until he had made certain that
his orders had been obeyed.

Whatever the reason for

the delay, Napoleon’s bad temper had no effect, and he
was still writing letters complaining of slow progress
Q"|
as late as November 1808.
To remind Italians that they owed independence
from Austria and existence as a state to him, Napoleon
ordered the erection of a number of battlefield monu
ments.

Following this order, Eugene erected monuments

79
*
'^Eugene, Memoires, II, 182, Eugene to Napoleon,
22 March 1806; Napoleon, Oorrespondan.ee, XVII, 151» Na
poleon to Eugene, 17 May 1808.
80

Napoleon, Correspondance, XVII, 340-341, Na
poleon to Eugene, 30 June 1808.
The delay in con
struction probably was due to the fact that in 1807
Eugene had supplied large numbers of horses and men to
the E m p e r o r ’s army.
In 1807 the summer was excessively
hot and many people died.
The spring of 1808 was un
usually wet.
All these factors combined might have
caused delay.
QT

__

Ibid., XVIII, 74, Napoleon to Eugene, 20 No
vember 1808.
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at Kivoli, Tagliamento, Castiglione, and Lodi.

82

Dedi

cated on 13 May 1809, the inscription on the monument
at Lodi read:
16 May. Under the inspiration and
leadership of Napoleon, the French
having crossed the Alps and defeated
the Austrian armies returned to Italy
after centuries of inertia and op
pression her energy and freedom.
Italy commends her destiny to the
courage and devotion of Napoleon. In
recognition and joy Italy raises this
monument:to the glory of the French
•warriors, conquerors at Lodi under
the inspiration and command of Na
poleon the Great.83
Due to statistical shortages one is hard
pressed to arrive at firm conclusions as to the effect
of the above mentioned programs initiated by Napoleon
and the Viceroy in Italy, but a few tentative con
clusions may be drawn.
The crushing censorship imposed upon Italy by
the Viceroy could have done nothing except stultify
intellectual curiosity and development during the period
of his rule.

It is all the more striking because Na

poleon issued more or less confusing directives con84
cerning press censorship in Italy.
Though this

82

Ibid., XII, 480, Napoleon to Eugene, 21 June
1806; Moniteur, 25 July 1806.
83Moniteur, 29 May 1809.
84
Holtman, Napoleonic Propaganda. 80-81.

275
program may “be defended on the ground that such activity
is necessary for the success of a given type of govern
ment, there is no justification for an attempt to control
the mind of man.
The effectiveness of the propaganda effort in
Italy is impossible to determine.

In order for written

propaganda to be effective it must be read, and though
opportunities for schooling had increased significantly,
undoubtedly far more Italians were illiterate than
literate during the life of the Kingdom of Italy.

For

the literate there was no shortage of printed propaganda
in Italy, as is evidenced by a letter of the Viceroy to
Fernando Maresealchi in which he stated that unless it
was the intent of the Emperor to flood Italy with news
papers, the new Courrier d ^ t a l i e and the Journal
italien, both published in Paris, were unnecessary. 85
Yet both of these papers were distributed in Italy, and
excerpts from their pages covering Italian news appeared
in the Moniteur every year from 1807 to 1814.
The public works program which encompassed most
of the Kingdom of Italy undoubtedly provided employment
in large areas.

The flood control projects which were

effective in areas where the work was completed made

85
B e a u h a m a i s Archive, Eugene to the Minister
of Foreign Affairs, 29 September 1807.
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life easier and property more secure in areas formerly
at the mercy of rampaging rivers.

Monuments, though

dedicated to the French, must have encouraged some hope
of national recognition.

CHAPTER XII
COMMERCIAL CONTROL AND THE CONTINENTAL SYSTEM
Napoleon attempted to make the satellite
nations economic colonies of Prance.

At the same time

he intended to make of Prance the greatest manu
facturing state on the continent.'*'

To accomplish this

end, Napoleon placed restrictions on every facet of
Italian trade and commerce.
The Emperor, in his effort to ensure French
mercantile supremacy on the continent, established
ports of entry to control the flow of non-Prench goods
into Prance.

The same ports of entry controlled the
2
exportation of French products to foreign markets.

Thus in 1805 Napoleon made Lyons an entry point for
French goods entering Italy, and the next year he

Tarle, Le blocus continental, 20, 119.
Tarle
contends that Napoleon intended to make Italy an eco
nomic colony of Prance, as well as to make Prance the
most important manufacturing country in Europe.
p
Eugene, Memoires, VI, 380-384-, Eugene to Na
poleon, 11 September 1810.
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established ports of entry to control the importation
of German merchandise.

3

The first step in Napoleon's control of Italian
trade was restricting the export of grain from Italy by
a decree promulgated 24- August 1805.

The decree pro

hibited the exportation of grain to Yenetia, the Tyrol,
the Papal States, and Tuscany.

He allowed exportation

at only three points— two along the Po and one on the
Sesia.

Only licensed persons could engage in the ex4
port trade.
Three days later he wrote Eugene that
Piedmont suffered from a shortage of grain, and that
the Yiceroy should encourage Italians to send their
grain there.'’
Due to the war with England, Napoleon inter
dicted trade, and Italy perforce had to import from
some other nation.

Then in early 1806 Napoleon asked

Eugene for a project of a decree which would open Italy

rz

___

Moniteur, 9 Thermidor, Year XIII (28 July
1805); 23 February 1806.
^Ibid., 28 Fructidor, Year XIII (15 September
1805). Ports of entry are not mentioned by name in
this report.
5
Napoleon, Correspondence, XI, 14-8, Napoleon
to Eugene, 27 August 1805.
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g
to French, manufactures.

An imperial decree pro

mulgated the next day prohibited the importation into
the French Empire of all cotton except cotton yarn and
raw cotton and established a duty of sixty francs per
decimal quintal on raw cotton and seven francs per
kilogram on yarn.

The only places where cotton could

enter the Empire were the cities of Antwerp, Cologne,
7
Mayence, Strasbourg, Freiburg, and Versoix.
Italy and
other nations under Napoleon’s control would buy the
finished cotton from French processors.
In order to strengthen the sale of the products
of French manufacturers in Italy, Napoleon prohibited
the sale of the goods of satellite nations in the
Q
Kingdom of Italy.
At least in the later stages Eugene must have
allowed goods to enter from Germany.

The author has

found no letter written by Napoleon in September 1810

g
Ibid., XII, 87, Napoleon to Collin de Sussy,
director-general of customs, 22 February 1806; John
Baum Harrison, "The Continental System in Italy as
Eevealed by American Commerce" (Doctoral dissertation,
University of Wisconsin, 1937), 166.
(Hereafter cited
as Harrison, "Continental System").
7

Moniteur. 23 February 1806.
A quintal equals
220.46 pounds.
A decimal quintal, therefore, equals
22.046 pounds.
Q
Tarle, Le blocus continental, 129-130.
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complaining about German goods in Italy, but such a
letter must have been written.

Probably the letter was

very hotly worded, for Eugene stiffly informed the King
that cotton goods from Switzerland and Germany were al
lowed to enter the Kingdom of Italy under the terms of
decrees of 10 June 1806, 12 January 1807, and 28 Deq
cember 1807.
In answer to this letter Napoleon merely
stated that the Ticeroy's assertions needed studying.
The Emperor told Eugene that foodstuffs and cloth goods
entering Italy through Prance and from the Duchy of
Berg should be held in a depot until customs officials
could determine whether the goods came from Prance, a
German state, or Switzerland.

Eugene had asked for a

modification in duties, and the King informed him in
the letter that none could be allowed except at Vercelli and Pavia, though he did not indicate to what ex
tent duties might be lowered.10
Eugene apparently requested permission in No
vember 1810 to purchase cotton goods from Germany, for
in a very blunt letter Napoleon refused to grant this

^Eugene, Memoires, YI, 380-384, Eugene to Na
poleon, 11 September 1810.
10Napoleon, Correspondance. XXI, 146-147, Na
poleon to Eugene, 27 September 1810; Tarle, le blocus
continental. 24-26.
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request.

He told the Viceroy that Italy would have to

obtain her cotton, from France.
A year later the Viceroy allowed Italians to
import German cottons.

At this time Napoleon wrote

Eugene an abusive letter telling him it was maddening
that he had allowed German goods to enter Italy on the
strength of a letter from Antonio Aldini.

The Emperor

informed Eugene that German goods could enter Italy
only as the result of a decree.

He softened the tone

of his letter somewhat by writing that Eugene’s great
error was not in allowing German goods to enter, but
that he had done so without authorization. 12
Napoleon wrote Eugene in August 1810 that he
had learned the Italian grain harvest was light that
year, and told the Viceroy he should not allow a heavy
exportation of wheat.

1^5

A month later he instructed

Eugene to stop all exportation of grain to points out
side the Empire and to send it instead into Piedmont
and France' proper.

To encourage exportation of grain

"^Napoleon, Correspondance, XXI, 276-277* Na
poleon to Eugene, 15 November 1810.
~^Ibid., XXIII, 302, Napoleon to Eugene, 10
March 1812.;
~^Ibid.* XXI, 81-82, Napoleon to Eugene, 31
August 181(5! Tarle, Le blocus continental. 18.
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from Italy to Prance the French government removed the■
duty on grains entering Prance.

Napoleon anticipated

Italian opposition to mandatory export to Prance.

He

observed to the Viceroy that the needs of the people
were often at variance with the desires of producers,
and that Eugene's first duty was to his people.

There

fore, he should deafen himself to the proprietors'
sophisms which Napoleon expected to follow this di
rective."*"^
Rather than encourage the exportation of wheat
to Prance and Piedmont, Eugene issued an order which
prohibited such exportation..

This action brought a

letter from Napoleon in which he told the Viceroy not
to prohibit the export of wheat to Prance— the only
thing Eugene could do would be to encourage the grain
merchants.to send their grain into the interior of the
realm for sale.

15

Eugene did not take the directive fully to
heart.

In November he wrote Marescalchi, the Italian

foreign minister, to tell the Minister of the Helvetian
Republic that he had given orders to sell necessary

14
Napoleon, Correspondance, XXI, 142, Napoleon
to Eugene, 24 September 1810.
15
1810.

Ibid., 289, Napoleon to Eugene. 24 November
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grain to the canton of Tessin to relieve a shortage
there.^

It is evident from the letter written by the

Viceroy that he wanted nothing more to be put into
writing on the subject.

Marescalchi received orders in

the same letter to tell the Swiss minister that Italian
troops then in the canton would receive enough grain
for their own needs. 17
Though this controversy over wheat indicates
that in time of need Eugene fought imperial restrictions
which harmed Italy, the Viceroy did not hesitate to de
fend the restrictive policy when imperial regulations
did not harm Italian producers.

In 1808, for instance,

rice growers in Italy complained to the Minister of
Interior of the Empire, who wrote Marescalchi, and
Marescalchi reported the complaint to the Viceroy.

In

this instance Eugene replied that the complaints of the
rice growers had no solid foundation.

Tariffs on rice

were not excessive, and though the situation of rice
producers had been bad in 1804 and 1805, by 1808 they
had captured the French rice market normally dominated
by Americans; the price of rice was good, and the

16 Beauharnais Archive, Eugene to the Minister
of Foreign Affairs, 3 November 1810.
17

Italian troops had been sent into Switzerland
to control smuggling.
See below p. 286.
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harvest was plentiful.

In 1806 the government gave aid

to this group by purchasing most of the crop, and in
1808 the Viceroy intended to purchase more than a third
of the rice produced in Italy.

Eugene emphasized that

he could support his position with facts and figures.
*

Rice complaints do not figure further in his correspondance
Tariffs, as well as prohibitions against foreign
imports and Italian exports to countries other than
France, played a part in the commercial policy Napoleon
applied to Italy.

Whether French tariff rates were ap

plied in Italy before 1810 is uncertain.

However, it

is clear that after 1810 tariffs in Italy were to be
the same as those of France, for on 31 August 1810 Na
poleon informed the Viceroy he should collect the same
iq
tariff on colonial goods that France collected.
Then
in October 1810 the Emperor instructed Eugene to apply
the tariff of 5 August 1810 to all colonial merchandise

18Beauharnais Archive, Eugene to the Minister
of Foreign Affairs, 9 July 1810. tPhereis no available
letter from the Imperial Minister of Interior to Mares
calchi or from Marescalchi to Eugene. Eugene*s letter
states that he had Marescalchi*s letter explaining the
situation. The contents of Eugene*s letter indicate
that Italian rice producers complained of their market.
19
Napoleon, Correspondance, XXI, 81-82; Harri
son, "Continental System, '* 166. According to Harrison
the tariff of 5 August 1810 caused prices to skyrocket.
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found in warehouses and to deposit the receipts of this
tariff in a special fund to "be called tlie extraordi
naire des douanes which should be used exclusively for
naval construction.

20

Eugene immediately established

this fund.21
The tariff of 5 August 1810 placed a rather high
duty on Italian silk entering Prance.

Eugene, on 14

August 1810, wrote the Emperor that the new tariff
would do irreparable damage to the Italian silk trade
and other export items and would reduce Italy*s ability
to pay her share of the cost of the Empire.

He asked

Napoleon to lower the tariff on silk entering Prance.
He noted that the tariff would be very favorable to
Prance, but very unfavorable to Italy. 22

To this letter

20

Napoleon, Correspondancet XXI, 165-166, Na
poleon to Eugene, 2 October 1810; Eugene, Memoires, VI,
409-411, Napoleon to Eugene, 2 October 1810.
The
extraordinaire des douanes was simply a special or
extraordinary fund r a i s e d f r o m the extraordinary appli
cation of the tariff.
In essence Napoleon’s directive
constituted an order to apply the tariff twice or make
in retroactive.
Pi

Eugene, Memoires, VI, 423, Eugene to Napoleon,
8 October 1810.
22

Ibid., 361-363, Eugene to Napoleon, 14 August
1810; Harrison, "Continental System , a 166-167-
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the King replied that Italy would just have to suffer,
and Eugene must take as his motto, ’’France before
all.”23
The Upper Adige previously had been subject to
the payment of import taxes, but Eugene removed this
requirement by a decree which ordered the establishment
of customs houses along the Bavarian and Austrian
borders.2^
The application of the tariff of 5 August 1810
apparently led to much activity on the part of smug
glers, particularly along the Italo-Swiss border.

The

Viceroy, in October 1810, sent troops into Switzerland
to stop smuggling. 25 The mountainous northwest region
of Venetia provided good shelter for smugglers, and
when it became apparent that civil authorities could
not prevent smuggling along the Venetian border, Eugene
n r

used the army to suppress illicit trade.

The Viceroy

23
Napoleon, Correspondance. XXI, 60-61, Na
poleon to Eugene, 23 August 1810; Eugene, Memoires. VI,
367-369, Napoleon to Eugene, 23 August 1810.
24
Moniteur, 19 July 1810. The Upper Adige was
the Italian Tyrol annexed by Italy in 1810.
25
^Napoleon, Correspondance, XXI, 191-192, Na
poleon to Eugene, 6 October 1810.

nc

Ibid., XXIII, 393, Napoleon to Eugene, 30
April 1812.
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acted directly on N a p o l e o n ’s orders in sending troops
into Switzerland,

but Napo l e o n told him he should tell

the Swiss that he acted on his own authority,

and only

in case of n e c e s s i t y should he appeal to the Empero r
f o r support in the action.
his reason,
the troops.

27

The King, without

stating

in November 1810 ordered Eugene to recall

PR

Napoleon,
export business,

in addi t i o n to restricting the Italian
extended to the K i n g d o m of Italy the

p o l i c y of excluding B r i t i s h goods.
m e a n s new in 1805,

29

This policy, by no

Eugene applied by decree soon after

becoming V i c e r o y . ^ 0
W h e n Ven e t i a became a part of the kingdom,

the

V i c e r o y decreed that the Fr e n c h commercial regulations
w o u l d apply to that state.

However Venice, whose ex

istence depended primarily u p o n trade,

became a free

2^ I b i d . , XXI, 191-192, N a p o l e o n to Eugene,
t o b e r 1810.
28

Ibid.,

280, N a p o l e o n to Eugene,

6 Oc

19 Novemb e r

1810.

29

Eli F. Heckscher, The Continental System, A n
Economic I n t e r p r e t a t i o n , ed. “b y Harald Westergaard
(O x f o r d : At -bhe Clarendon Press, 1922), 78-83.
(Here
a f t e r cited as Heckscher, Continental S y s t e m ).
30

B e a u h a m a i s Archive, Eugene to the Minister
of Finance, 31 July 1805.
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port except for English goods.

In addition to pro

hibiting the entry of English goods at Venice, the
decree provided that any merchant caught with such
goods in his possession would suffer confiscation of
the merchandise and a fine equal to one-third of its
31
value.’
Though Eugene, in July 1805, promulgated a de
cree which prohibited English goods in Italy, the
Journal italien reported on 20 June 1806 that he had
issued another decree prohibiting the entry of English
goods into the kingdom.

The announcement went on to

report that Italy was determined to make its way with52
out the products of English manufacturers.
Six months later the Viceroy decreed that no
saltmeat or fish from England would be allowed in the
53
kingdom.
Then in mid-autumn 1807 Eugene announced
that he intended to carry out a program of inspection
of goods in customs sheds and private warehouses in
search of English merchandise„

If the investigators

should find goods of prohibited origin, such items
would be sequestered.3^

31
Moniteur. 27 February 1806.
32Ibid., 5 July 1806.
33Ibid., 29 January 1807.
34

Ibid., 24 October 1807.
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Napoleon1s visit to Italy in November and De
cember of 1807 and the promulgation of the Milan Decree
35
left Eugene in a most delicate position.
Hence
forward the Continental System was to he more strin
gently enforced.

Eugene had to make an effort to

please Napoleon without alienating merchants who saw
their investments in foreign merchandise confiscated.

36

Eugene also supervised the enforcement of the
Continental System in the Illyrian Provinces, and he
encouraged the Austrians to enforce the.system at Tri
este, which remained in Austrian hands until 1809-

One

letter written in 1808 by Eugene to Napoleon indicates
that the Austrians faithfully enforced the system there,
even to the extent of sequestering goods in Trieste that

Ibid., 18 November 1807.
The British, in
November 1807, issued the famed orders in council which
required all ships bound for Europe to stop and allow
British officers to search the cargoes they carried;ifor
contraband goods.
If contraband goods were found, the
cargo and ship were confiscated.
If no such goods were
found, the ship was to be given a license and allowed
to continue its voyage.
The Milan Decree answered this
policy by declaring that any neutral ship searched by
the British and bearing the British license would be
treated as a British ship when it reached a French port
and would be subject to confiscation.

^Eugene, Memoires, IV, 13.
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formed, the cargoes of prizes taken by the British on
the high seas. 37
Though in most instances Eugene conscientiously
attempted to put into operation in Italy the directives
sent by Napoleon, there is evidence which indicates
that he did not enter wholeheartedly into the appli
cation of the Continental System.

Napoleon, just be

fore his visit to Italy in November 1807, told Eugene
he was pained to learn that the Viceroy allowed English
products to be sold in Italy.

The Emperor ordered the

Viceroy to stop that practice, to confiscate all English
goods, to store them in specified warehouses, and to
7g'

dispose of them as instructed.
Though there is no direct evidence that the
Viceroy did not faithfully follow the exclusion policy
in 1807, in 1808 he deliberately broke the system.
Salt was scarce in Italy by the end of the year, and to
meet the emergency Eugene ordered that any and all ships
carrying salt exclusively, whether licensed by the
British or not, should be allowed to enter Italian ports

37

Ibid., 187, Eugene to Napoleon, 20 June 1808.

7Q
Napoleon, Correspondance, XVI, 160-161, Na
poleon to Eugene, 13 November 1807; Tarle, Le blocus
continental. 21-25.
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and sell the salt.

The Viceroy did this, he said, be

cause transport from Naples posed difficulties, and he
gave permission for salt ships to enter Italian ports
during the months of January, February, and March
39
1809.
EugeneTs violation of the system indicates a
stubborn unwillingness to adhere to orders which harmed
It aly.
The importation of goods into the Empire was
controlled by a system of licensing, but Eugene did not
follow the same system as that of France.

In 1809 Jean

Champagny, the imperial foreign minister, complained to
Marescalchi, the Italian foreign minister, about Italy1s
40
system.
Eugene wrote Marescalchi that his system had
been approved by the Emperor.

The Viceroy admitted

that the system might not prevent smugglers from ob
taining licenses, but he pointed out that unless the
foreign goods a merchant held matched in quantity and
quality the description of goods registered on the cer
tificate of entry, government officials confiscated the
merchandise.^1

39 Beauharnais Archive, Eugene to the Minister
of Foreign Affairs, 20 February 1809•
40
Ibid. Champagny1s letter to Marescalchi is
not available, but from Eugenefs letter to Marescalchi
it appears to have been written on 26 January 1809.
41

Ibid., Eugene to the Minister of Foreign Af
fairs, 20 February 1809*
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On the same day Eugene told Marescalchi to in
form Champagny that the government did not allow trans
portation of colonial goods into Italy unless the
merchant satisfied the customs inspectors that the mer
chandise came from an allowed origin.

When the customs

officials were satisfied as to the origin of goods,
they issued a certificate of entry and permit of transit.
Such certificates might he sold, the Viceroy admitted,
but Italy followed a policy of constant inspection which
could expose such activity.42
Further evidence of less than wholehearted en
forcement of the Continental System in Italy is con
tained in a letter from Napoleon to Eugene written in
1810.

In the letter, Napoleon ordered Eugene to stop

the sale in Italy of colonial merchandise without a li
cense of origin.

At the same time he instructed the

Viceroy to sequester American ships in Italian ports and
to confiscate their cargoes.

At this point Napoleon

bluntly told Eugene that Holland had lost her inde
pendence for violation of the Continental System and
that Italy was not immune to the same treatment.4^

42Ibid.
43

Napoleon, Correspondance, XX, 241-242, Na
poleon to Eugene, 24 February 1816; Eugene, Memoires«
VI, 317, Napoleon to Eugene, 24 February 1810.
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Apparently suspecting that his stepson -winked
at violations of the system, Napoleon, in August 1810,
instructed Eugene to send a list of ships which had
cleared Italian ports in 1810.

He further requested a

report on the cargoes carried and the price of coffee,
sugar, wheat, cotton, and i n d i g o . ^

Napoleon received

no reports of importation into Italy after this letter,
and in December wrote the Yiceroy that he could not
conceive that Italy had imported nothing since 5 August,
but that this was the only conclusion he could draw
since he had received no reports on tariffs collected.
In the same letter Napoleon told Eugene that certifi
cates of entry from Hamburg sent to Napoleon by Eugene
were worthless because they lacked authorization and
would allow German goods to enter without the importer’s
45
paying the French tariff.
It is impossible to determine whether the lack
of reports indicates Eugene’s method of avoiding contro
versy over his failure to enforce the Continental System

^ N a p o l e o n , Correspondence, XXI, 24-25» Na
poleon to Eugene, 6 August 1810.

^^Ibid., 325» Napoleon to Eugene, 18 December
1810; Harrison, "Continental System," 167-
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or an actual decline in trade due to a tariff decreed
on 5 August 1810.
Apparently Napoleon's letter of February 1810
had little effect, for in September 1810 he wrote the
Viceroy that he could allow no colonial merchandise in
Italian ports except that taken as prize at sea or that
which had been confiscated.

The Emperor told Eugene

that items such as coffee and cocoa not produced in
Italy should be purchased from Turkey, and that certain
Turkish ships should be licensed to deliver them.

All

other Turkish ships as well as ships of other registry
trading in colonial food items should be sequestered.
Napoleon extended the sequestration order to French
46
ships that had been stopped by the British.
In Italy as in Switzerland and Venetia, French
commercial policy and the Continental System were en
forced by the army.

All merchandise of prohibited ori

gin found by searchers was to- be confiscated.

At first

the army sold the confiscated merchandise at auction
and used the proceeds for the benefit of the unit
making the confiscation, one-half going into the unit's

46

Napoleon, Correspondance. XXI, 132-134, Na
poleon to Eugene, 19 September 18l"0.
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treasury and the other half being put in a special account at Milan. 47
Beginning early in 1808 receipts from confis48
cated goods were remitted to the French government.
After 1810 British goods confiscated anywhere were to
49
be burnt.
Except for cotton, which was sent to
50
Prance, merchandise taken from prize ships was sold.
Acting on his own authority, Eugene authorized the sale
at Ancona of cotton taken on prizes if the purchaser
intended to ship the cotton to either Prance or Italy,
but ordered that authorities making the sale attach a
certificate stating the prize from which the cotton was
51
taken.
This precaution protected the purchaser from
having his cotton confiscated because he lacked a cer
tificate of entry.

Eugene, Memoires. Ill, 415, Napoleon to
Eugene, 26 September 1807; 421-422, Eugene tc Napoleon,
,2 October 1807.
48
Beauharnais Archive, Eugene to Dauchy, Ad
ministrator-General of Tuscany, 7 March 1808; Eugene to
the Minister-Director of the Oaisse d*amortissement,
7 March 1808.
49

Sloane, Napoleon, II, 466; Moniteur, 14 March
1811; 1 January 1813; 25 August 1813; Harrison, "Conti
nental System," 166.
50 Beauharnais Archive, Eugene to General
Lemarois, 22 February 1808.
51 Ibid., Eugene to General Lemarois, 2 March

1808.
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Whether the Continental System was effective as
a means of destroying British commerce is far "beyond
the scope of this work.

Even the question of the ef

fect of the Continental System upon Italian commerce is
only a part of the larger problem of the effect of the
entire French commercial policy upon Italy.

The lack

of treasury reports makes the whole problem difficult
to analyze, and only a few tentative conclusions can be
drawn from available sources.
Available evidence indicates that Italy’s com52
mereial life suffered a decline.
Eugene, in 1807»
reported that both imports and" exports were far below
the figures for 1805.

This, he said, caused bonds to

sell very slowly, and in Venice there had been no bonds
sold in 1807*^

In 1810 2,000 silk workers were

•^Tarle, he blocus continental, 25> 34-35.
■^Eugene, Memoires, III, 389-390, Eugene to
Napoleon, 17 August 1807; Harrison, "Continental
System,” 167-168. According to Harrison, Venetian
trade was ruined. See also Tarle, he blocus conti
nental , 28-29. According to Tarle, in both 1807 and
1810 the Italian budget was balanced. However, his
figures show that receipts in 1807 were some 26,000,000
lire lower than in 1806, According to his figures, re
ceipts in 1810 were some 6,000,000 in excess of 1809»
and were 3,000,000 less than in 1811. Such a steady
increase indicates strong economic advance. Tarle ad
mits, however, that his figures are only "approximate,”
and in the absence of treasury reports they should be
used with caution.
»

297
unemployed at Vicenza alone. 94

The French policy of

forcing Italy to sell her silk to manufacturers at
Lyons undoubtedly was a factor creating unemployment in
the silk iJldustry.
Conclusions are much more easily drawn about
Eugene*s actions with regard to the Continental System
and other controls placed on Italian trade.

The evi

dence of letters from both principals indicates that
Eugene often stood between Napoleon and his Italian
subjects.

His actions with regard to salt when Italy

was in need of that commodity, his prohibition of the
export of grain in 1810, and his obdurate persistence
in allowing German goods to enter the kingdom when they
were prohibited indicate that conditions in Italy were
his first concern.

■^Napoleon, Correspondence, XXI, 276-277, Na
poleon to Eugene, 15 November 181(5; Harrison, “Conti
nental System," 166-168.

CHAPTER XIII
END OP THE EXPERIMENT
In 1813, while Eugene fought a delaying action
with the remnants of the Grand Army, Napoleon built
another army in Prance and issued orders for the de
fense of Italy.

He ordered the Minister of War of the
*
kingdom, General Achille Pontanelli, to form at Yerona
a corps of observation to consist of two French di
visions and one Italian division.

The French divisions

were to be thirty battalions strong and the Italian di
vision nine battalions.

This corps should have the

support of 500 Italian light cavalry and sixteen pieces
of Italian artillery.'3'
A fortnight later Napoleon wrote Pontanelli to
begin provisioning Italian forts.

He told the Minister

of War to place at Palmanova half the artillery for
which the fort had been designed.

He further ordered

Pontanelli to provision the fort with flour and biscuit.
Meat, wine, fodder, wood and other necessary items

^"Napoleon, Correspondance, XXIY, 384, Napoleon
to Fontanelli, 11 January 1813.
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should he provided w h e n conditions demanded them.

The

same letter instructed Pontanelli to take the same
action at Osoppo, Malghera,

and Ancona.

2

Basing estimates upon units he had ordered
formed in Italy and the manpower levy for 1813, Na
poleon told Pontanelli that he should he able to raise
an army of 60,000 to defend the kingdom.

In addition

to this number, the Emperor ordered the Minister of War
of the Prench Empire, General Henri Clarke, to form
four half-brigades in Italy and six additional garrison
battalions.

Since men for these last units would be

raw recruits, Napoleon cautioned Clarke to assign them
to veteran battalions.
But the officials in Italy could not perform
the task Napoleon gave them, and in May 1813* following
the battle of Lutzen, the Emperor sent Eugene back to
Italy to right the machinery of the state and to build
the army Napoleon felt Italy would need in the event
4
Austria joined the enemies of Prance.
Eugene arrived at Milan 18 May 1813 and received

2

Ibid.. 432, Napoleon to Pontanelli, 23 January

1813.
^Ibid.. 469-470, Napoleon to Pontanelli, 31
January 1813; 478-482, Napoleon to Clarke, 5 February
1813 .
^Weil, Eugene et Murat. I, 14.
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an enthusiastic greeting.
A

The populace engaged in

fetes and gala occasions of all sorts, but Eugene,
burdened with the necessity of rapidly bringing order
5

to Italy, took no part in the parties planned for him.
Eugene’s first report to Napoleon reveals tbe

condition of the Italian state.

The Viceroy reported

that there had been a number of bankruptcies in Venice,
and these had affected adversely the Italian treasury.

Though he had arrived only at noon the day before, he
wrote the Emperor he was beginning work with General

Martin Vignolle, the Italian chief of staff, to build
the Italian army.
The picture he painted was not an encouraging
one, for he told the Emperor that though the conscripts
of the class of 1813 were beginning to arrive, the
Italian regiments under his command still lacked 13,000
men of being at full strength.

He further reported

that he had only 10,000 rifles with which to arm 18,000
men.^
Eugene’s report must have been disturbing to
Napoleon, for in April 1813 General Clarke had reported

5Ibid., 2; Moniteur, 25 May 1813
6Weil, Eugene et Murat. I, 77.
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that Italy would provide an army of 72,000 men.

7

When

Clarke presented his plan for an Italian army to the
Viceroy, Eugene wrote that such an organization could

not be achieved, for Clarke had included two divisions
of C r o a t i o n s a n d D a l m a t i a n s w h o w o u l d he n e e d e d in

their own areas*

In addition, Clarke included ten bat

talions Eugene should have received from the Kingdom of
Naples.

But Joachim Murat refused to send troops to
g

the Viceroy.
M u r a t ’s attitude caused Eu gene co nsiderable
concern,

as w e l l it might.

E ugene u n d e r s t o o d that w i t h 

out support f r o m the south hi s p o s i t i o n v i s - a - v i s
Au str ia w o u l d he se riously compromised.
hostile,

If Murat be came

the V i c e r o y ’s p o s i t i o n w o u l d be fatal.

Eugene planned an army of four active divisions
plus two divisions to serve as replacement units.
six divisions were to total 58,000 men.

The

Though he made

great efforts to achieve his goal, in mid-June 1813 the
army in Italy numbered only 37,031.

In addition to the

units in Italy Eugene could call on 4,436 troops in

7 Ibid., 6-9.

6Ibid., 78; PIanat de la Faye, Le Prince BugSne
en 1814 (4ih ed.; Parisi Thunot et cie, l&pSj*si,
Sugene to Murat, 14 January 1814f 37-40, Murat to
Eugene, 21 January 1814. (Hereafter cited as De la
Pay®* X>e Prince Eugene).
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that Italy w o u l d provide an army of 72,000 men.
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hostile,

the V i c e r o y ^

If Murat became

p o s i t i o n w o u l d he fatal.

Eugene p la n n e d an army of fo ur active divisions
plus two div isions to serve as replacement units.
six divisions w ere to total 58,000 men.
great efforts to iachieve his goal,
army in I taly n u m b e r e d only 37*031.

The

Though he m a d e

in m i d - J u n e 1813 the
In a d d i t i o n to the

u n i t s in Italy Eugene could call on 4,436 tro ops in

7 I h i d . , 6-9.
^I b i d ., 78; Planat de la Paye, De Prince Eugene
en 1814 (4th e d . ; Paris:
Thunot et cie, 1858), 32,
E u g e n e to Murat, 14 January 1814; 37-40, Murat to
Eugene, 21 January 1814.
(Hereaf ter cited as De la
Paye, De Prince E u g e n e ).
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Illyria, 1,220 in the Ionian Isles, and 2,282 who occu
pied Corsica and Elba.

French battalions in Italy had

an organizational strength of 14,230, hut these units
9

were 6,100 short of their organizational
strength.
\
Clarke informed Eugene, however, that the troops in
Illyria could not he included in the Italian army, for
they were destined for policing the interior or for
coastal defense.

Contrary to this statement to Eugene,

Clarke reported the Illyrian units to the Emperor as
composing part of the Italian army.^
Napoleon promised the Viceroy troops from
Brittany, Naples, and Provence.

Though it is doubtful

that Napoleon actually sent the promised troops, it
appears that he did send the 1st Hussar and 31st Chasseur
regiments to Italy upon Eugene’s request. 11
Due to the deterioration of Franco-Austrian re
lations in the spring and summer of 1813, the French
Emperor felt that it was of pressing importance that
the Italian army should take defensive positions along

q

s

Weil, Eugene et Murat, I, 78.

10Ihid., 95 ff.
11

Ibid., 109-110; Napoleon, Correspondance, XXV,
471, Napoleon to Eugene, 18 June 1813; 596, Napoleon
to Eugene, 28 July 1813.
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the Austro-Illyrian border.

He therefore ordered the

Viceroy to he on the border with his army by 1 July
1813-

12

Though Eugene told the Emperor he hoped to be

in position by 10 July, he found it impossible and ob
tained permission to delay taking positions until 1
August.1 ^
During the summer Eugene pressed Italian manu
facturers for military supplies, and he gained July
delivery for 10,000 shakos previously scheduled to be
delivered in October.

He met with less success in more

viatl areas such as m u s k e t s . ^

Though lacking vital

equipment Eugene, as a result of a buildup of Austrian
forces in the border areas, began in July to direct his
army into Priuli.13

Eugene reported to Napoleon that

though his army reports indicated he had an army of
72,000, this number existed only on paper.

He had in

fact something less than 50,000 active combat troops.

-i o

Weil, Eugene et Murat, I, 111; Napoleon, Correspondance, XXV, 404, Napoleon to Eugene, 2 June 1813.
Weil, Eugene et Murat, I, 111-114, Napoleon,
Correspondance, X X V » 523-524, Napoleon to Eugene, 1
July 1813.
^Weil,

Eugene et Murat, I, 112.

1 5 I b i d . , 112-118.
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This number could not be increased without 15 *000
16
troops assigned to him from units in France.
Such
was the army the Viceroy led into the campaign of 1813.
Eugene's information on the Austrians in June,
July, and early August 1813 was faulty, and he was al
most entirely ignorant about enemy numbers and po
sitions.

Due to his mis-information, he had troops

scattered from Tarvis to Palmanova, a dangerously long
line for the forces at his disposal. 17 At the be
ginning of hostilities between France and the Allies,
which now included Austria, Napoleon wrote Eugene the
following letter:
My Son:... I am too far from you to give
positive orders. Cover the Illyrian
Provinces.and Italy; take good positions
and attack the enemy, if he is inferior
to you in strength, as everything leads
me to believe, and push him seriously to
ward Graz.18
This letter left tactics largely to Eugene, and
he took defensive positions, for his information led

l6Ibid., 125.
~*~^Ibid., 201 et passim.
18

Ibid., 204; Napoleon, Correspondance, XXVI,
69-70, Napoleon to Eugene, 14 August 1813.
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him to believe that the Austrians were before him in
greatly superior numbers.

IQ

For a time the troops of the Viceroy managed to
hold their own along the line and fought well at Spital,
Villach, Laibach, and Klagenfurt.

But an invasion of

the Tyrol threatened Eugene’s left flank, and he fell
back from the line along the Illyrian border to the
Isonzo. 20

His retreat was not a rout, but a well exe

cuted movement.

After the fighting in September along

the Illyrian border, Eugene did not engage the Austrians
in a major battle, but maneuvered his small army with
skill and forced the Austrian commanders to move with
caution.
Eugene, in October, following the defection of
Bavaria took the line of the Piave River for his line
of defense.

He held that position in the face of su

perior Austrian forces, commanded first by Heinrich
Bellegarde and then Johann Hiller, until another Aus
trian column, which had earlier forced its way into the

"*'^Weil, Eugene et Murat, I, 204»
20 This very brief summary of the Italian cam
paign depends for its validity upon M. H. W e i l ’s Prince
Eugene et M u rat. Approximately three and one-half of
the five volumes of W e i l ’s great work are devoted to a
day by day, and sometimes hour by hour description, of
the campaign and Eugene's military talents.
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valley of the Adige in the Tyrol, threatened to invade
Italy.

After this occurrence the Viceroy fell back to

the Adige and established his headquarters at Verona,
where he remained until the defection of Joachim Murat.
He then accomplished a withdrawal from Verona to the
Mincio in good order.

His line on the Mincio was from

Peschiera to Mantua, rather in the shape of a semi
circle c21

In February of 1814, though by this time

France had been invaded through Switzerland, Eugene
fought and defeated the Austrians at Villafranca, not
far from Marengo.

He was still on that line defending

the southeastern border of France when Napoleon abdi
cated in April 1814.

Though the Viceroy knew of the

abdication, he refused to abandon his position to the
Austrian forces until he received word from his Emperor
that more fighting to preserve the French Empire and
the Kingdom of Italy was In vain.

Even then the

Viceroy negotiated only an armistice which was to last
until the return of a deputation sent from the Italian
government to the allied sovereigns to determine the
fate of Italy.22

21Ibid., III, 502-507.
22Ibid., IV, 501.
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Upon the collapse of the French Empire, the
supporters of the Napoleonic regime in Italy attempted
to make the Viceroy king of Italy.

Among this number

were Finance Minister Giuseppe Prina and the former
head of the police, Diego Guicciardi.

Even Chancellor

of State Francesco Melzi favored the Viceroy.

Melzi so

strongly supported Eugene that he had advised the
Viceroy to call an extraordinary session of the elec
toral colleges and ask them for their support in naming
him king.
gestion.

Eugene bluntly refused to act on this sug
He wanted first to know the attitude of the

conquering allies to such a move, and he wanted also to
have an expression of the will of the Italian people.
On 20 April 1814 the Italians made known their
will.

On that day Prina attempted to persuade the

Senate

to n am e the V i c e r o y king.

Prina and

Guicciardi,

who supported the nomination, were killed by an angry
mob for having made the suggestion.
the w i l l

of t h e m a j o r i t y ,

or w h a t

majority, and left the state.

23

he

Eugene accepted
thought

to be t h e

When he left, he took

with him thirty million francs and a fabulous collection

23I b i d . , 542-561.
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of paintings.

To his honor, the paintings had heen
24
purchased, not "liberated."
*

*

*

*

*

*

Eugene, during the time of his vice-royalty,
developed into a first-class administrator, both mili
tary and civil.

He gave to Italy orderly government.

He improved the state through the program of public
works, and brought a fuller measure of justice to the
Italian people through his administration of the Na
poleonic codes.

He developed for Italy an admirable

system of fortifications, and further provided for her
security by developing a well-organized, well-trained
armed force.
While it is true that Eugene accomplished the
above items under the aegis of Napoleon, he had sole
responsibility for the application of the program.

He

performed his duty well.
In one area Eugene failed utterly.
not make Erench rule over Italy popular.

He could

The unpopu

larity of foreign dominance in Italy accounts for the

o A

Andre Berthelot et al. (eds.), La Grande
Encyclopedie (32 vols.; Paris; E. Arrault et cie,
n.d.), V, 1021-1022.

unwillingness of the masses to accept Beauharnais as
king in 1814.

By that time he had become a symbol of

the Napoleonic system, a system which denied to subject
peoples the right of self rule.
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